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Abstract 
In response to competing group claims and the challenge to achieve pre-set triple 
national goals - recognising and accommodating ethnic diversity, achieving national 
unity and political stability, successive Nigerian governments from the colonial era to 
the present, have at various periods negotiated, constitutionalised and/or decreed state 
building strategies. This thesis offers detailed discussion and evaluation of some of 
these competing group claims and strategies using principles derived from the 
theoretical arguments of Michal Walzer, Charles Taylor and Will Kymlicka, and 
prescriptions based on the empirical arguments of Crawford Young, Eric Nordlinger, 
Donald Horowitz and Donald Rothchild. The thesis argues that some of the strategies 
adopted in response to the competing group claims were defensible in the very 
circumstances in which they were introduced, but were either not deep enough to offer 
an adequate political inclusion, or lacked the appropriate instruments that would have 
minimised recurrence of ethno-political conflicts and institutional instabilities. There 
were some strategies that either generated tension among groups, or were purely driven 
by strategic considerations for national unity, but were defensible. There were other 
strategies that were pragmatic at the very period they were adopted, but not defensible. 
The core theoretical finding of the thesis is that, the normative and empirical 
prescriptions validate the country’s various strategies for coping with diversity. 
However, application of some elements of the prescriptions in the Nigerian 
multicultural society has the potential to generate tensions leading to ethno-political 
conflicts and institutional instabilities. The important empirical finding of the thesis is 
regarding the role the inherent tensions between the triple national goals and the state 
building strategies play in the generation and recurrence of ethno-political conflict and 
institutional instabilities. The thesis argues that the underlying factors responsible for 
the prevalence of ethno-political conflict and institutional instabilities in the country 
include among others, the ascension of the military to power and its costly dominance 
of the political scene for about thirty five years, the immediate post-civil war period 
which coincided with the era of petroleum boom that created a deepening crisis of 
corruption, the perpetuation of large scale electoral and financial corruption, and 
manipulation of ethnic loyalties. Given the above underlying factors, this work observes 
that state building and Constitutional politics in Nigeria’s multi-ethnic society is a 
difficult task, especially taking into account the ethno-political conflicts and 
institutional instabilities associated with the Armed Forces over the years. On the basis 
of a detailed and interdisciplinary analysis, the thesis recommends constitutional and 
institutional safeguards for mitigating ethno-political conflicts and institutional 
instabilities in the course of future political development of Nigeria. 
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        CHAPTER ONE 
       INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Statement of the Research Problem 
With a population of about one hundred and forty million people, and with well over 
250 ethnic groups, Nigeria is undoubtedly the most populated and heterogeneous 
country in sub-Saharan Africa.
1
 Right from the British colonial era to the present, the 
desire to reflect plural composition or ethnic equality within the framework of one 
united country called for a series of state building strategies and constitutional debates. 
Faced with the challenges of multiculturalism, and the desire of the Nigerian 
government to address it, the core questions the thesis addresses therefore are: What 
governmental strategies have been attempted to establish state building institutions that 
recognise and accommodate ethnic diversity? And what roles do the state building 
strategies play in the generation and recurrence of ethno-political conflicts and 
institutional instabilities in the country? These questions arise from the recurring ethno-
political conflicts in Nigeria, a country whose history has been characterised by a cycle 
of tensions and state building debates in the attempt of devising strategies to achieve 
what is popularly referred to as Nigeria’s triple national goal- recognising and 
accommodating ethnic diversity, achieving national unity and political stability.
2
  
In an attempt to establish state building institutions that recognise and 
accommodate diversity, successive Nigerian governments at different periods have 
constitutionalised and/or decreed several state building mechanisms. It is important to 
bear in mind from the onset that, competing claims for recognition and accommodation 
expressed by the various groups in the country, and the state building responses to the 
claims are too numerous to be contained within this thesis. Thus, the thesis dwells only 
on selected competing claims and state building strategies. Furthermore, for the sake of 
flow and clarity, the competing group claims and the state building responses adopted 
are grouped into two phases- the pre and post-independence eras.  
                                                 
1
 Even though every census in Nigeria since 1952 has been highly disputed because it is a criterion of 
revenue allocation and political representation, the 2006 population census estimates it at 140 million. See 
Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala and Philip Osafo-Kwaako, Nigeria’s Economic Reforms: Progress and Challenges, 
Working Paper No. 6 (Washington DC: The Brookings Global Economy and Development, The 
Brookings Institution, March, 2007), 1. See also Siri Aas Rustad, Power-sharing and Conflict in Nigeria 
(Power-sharing Agreements, Negotiations and Peace Processes) (Oslo: Centre for the Study of Civil 
War, International Peace Research Institute (PRIO), 2008), 1-39. 
2
 See Figure 1 for some of the major state building/constitutional events and ethno-political/religious 
violence in Nigeria. 
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The state building and constitutional strategies in the pre-independence Nigeria, 
spanning the 1940s through the 1957/58 Willink Commission, were the result of a series 
of debates held in Nigeria and Britain. State building in this era, involved recognition of 
the three most numerous ethnic groups- the Hausa/Fulani (North), the Yoruba (West) 
and the Igbo (East) through the division of the country into three political regions, and 
the adoption of a federal system of government.
3
 Yet, the state building approaches of 
the pre-independence Nigeria set the stage for future ethno-political tensions not only 
among the main three ethnic groups, but also among minor ones that were marginalised 
within the new political framework despite their demands for recognition.  
The post-independence era on the other hand, witnessed a series of debates and 
constitutionalising and/or decreeing of state building arrangements that during the years 
have been constantly revised. During the early phase of the post-independence, 
especially from 1960 to 1969, in an attempt to include into the nation building the 
highest number of ethnic minority, a Quota System was introduced to guarantee their 
participation in the public administration of the country. For this reason, against the 
earlier state building strategies that recognised only the three most dominant ethnic 
groups, the country was re-divided into twelve administrative units termed states.
4
 Some 
scholars, nonetheless, have argued that the Nigerian government strategy behind state 
creation in 1967 was deliberately aimed to destabilise the emerging powers of the Igbos 
and the contingencies of Biafra’s secession bid.5 Starting from the early 1970s to the 
present, especially after the Nigeria-Biafra civil war, state building in Nigeria involved 
the adoption of approaches that include, federal character and its subsequent revision to 
avoid dominance of the national institutions by a few ethnic groups, revisions to 
revenue allocation system and nationalisation of oil ownership and control to achieve 
                                                 
3
 The Hausa/Fulani compose of the largest group with 29% and are concentrated in the Northwest; the 
Yoruba are the second largest with 21% and are situated in the Southwest. Third are the Igbo with 18%, 
who are situated in the Southeast. All the other ethnic groups fit into the marginal and minority category, 
with varying degrees of political status, depending on their numerical size and political influence. See 
Peter M. Lewis, Growing Apart: Oil, Politics and Economic Changes in Indonesia and Nigeria (The 
University of Michigan Press, 2007), 54. See also Appendix D for the political map of Nigeria showing 
the ethno-linguistic group of the country, and also, Figure 2 showing the structure of the Nigerian 
federation. 
4
 See Appendix B for the map of Nigeria showing the administrative borders. 
5
 There are other scholars who have also argued that, the Nigeria- Biafra civil war between 1967 and 1970 
was strongly motivated by the discovery of oil in the then Eastern region, the struggle for political power 
and ethnic dominance. See Ukoha Ukiwo, ‘Violence, Identity Mobilisation and Re-imaging of Biafra’, 
Africa Development, XXXIV (1), (2009), 9-30; Rotimi T. Suberu, ‘The Travails of Federalism in 
Nigeria’, Journal of Democracy, 4 (4), (1993), 39-53, and Rotimi T. Suberu, ‘The Struggle for New 
States in Nigeria, 1976-1990’, African Affairs, 90 (1991), 499-522.  
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fairness and equitable distribution of revenue, division and further division of the 
country into geo-political zones, states and local government units to take account of, 
and adequately reflect ethnic ties and other elements of diversity such as religion.
6
  
Despite all the effort to achieve the objectives of its national goals as previously 
stated, these strategies have generated deep ethno-political tensions not yet resolved. 
One of the core aims of the thesis is the analysis of how the recurring and escalating 
cycles of ethno-political tensions and institutional instabilities cannot be disconnected 
from the inherent tensions between the Nigerian national goals and the state building 
strategies that were mostly introduced and executed during the long Military rule in the 
country. For instance, progress made in the recognition and accommodation of ethnic 
diversity by the means of state creation approach, reduces progress in the achievement 
of political and institutional stability due to endless demands on the Nigerian 
government for state creation by groups. 
In order to thoroughly discuss the research problems, the thesis critically 
evaluate competing group claims and Nigeria’s key state building strategies from the 
immediate post-World War II  period to the present over the issue of whether inclusion 
or denial of ethnic difference- diversity ought or ought not to be reflected in state 
building arrangements. To achieve the above objective, the competing claims of groups 
are first presented and evaluated for their normative- theoretical importance. 
Immediately following the above, selected state building strategies adopted in response 
to group competing claims whose details are considered in separate, but linked chapters 
in this thesis, are then critically analysed and evaluated in order to determine their 
desirability and fairness. If the state building strategies are found not to be fair and 
desirable, the thesis aims to suggest alternative strategies that are feasible under the 
same circumstances. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
6
 A major feature of ethnicity in Nigeria is that each group is concentrated in an identifiable geographical 
region/zone. The geographical concentration in turn permits overlap of ethnic cleavages and other forms 
of group identification such as religion. See Arnim Langer and Ukoha Ukiwo, Ethnicity, Religion and the 
State in Ghana and Nigeria, Centre for Research on Inequality, Human Security and Ethnicity (CRISE) 
Working Paper No. 34, October, 2007, 1-23.  See also, Appendices B, C and D for the political maps of 
Nigeria showing the administrative borders, the six geo-political zones, and the ethno-linguistic groupings 
of the country. 
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1.2 Theoretical and Empirical Framework of Analysis
7
 
In order to discuss the selected attempts successive Nigerian governments have made at 
constitutionalising and/or decreeing state building arrangements that recognise and 
accommodate ethnic diversity, as well as roles the state building strategies play in the 
generation and recurrence of ethno-political conflicts and institutional instabilities, this 
thesis explores two types of literatures that considers the relationship between ethnic 
identities and the state. The first type is normative philosophy debates, and the thesis 
explores those arguments that discuss how political community ought to be constructed 
if multiculturalism is to be taken seriously.
8
 Therefore, at the centre of the theoretical 
argument of this thesis is the debate in liberal philosophy over what state building 
strategies would be required to recognise and accommodate deep diversities. In order to 
explore the normative philosophy arguments in detail, they are in turn grouped into 
three strands as follows: the first strand of the debate associated with Michael Walzer 
regards human beings as culture-producing creatures and whatever they create as having 
social meaning. The argument of Walzer is that, to achieve justice- recognise and 
respect difference in a multicultural political community, the state building process is 
expected to respect social good for its meaning. The argument of Walzer above 
translates into internal autonomy for various cultural groups since each of the cultural 
community would have different understanding of social goods. 
The second strand of the debate associated with Charles Taylor, regards identity 
as shaped by the recognition of others, and the demand for equal recognition requires a 
model of liberal society in which culturally diverse groups are treated as equal partners. 
Taylor’s argument is basically that, in a liberal society, irrespective of size, groups 
                                                 
7
 The theoretical framework of analysis of this thesis is based on the normative philosophy works of 
Michael Walzer; Charles Taylor and Will Kymlicka. The empirical framework of analysis on the other 
hand, is based on the works of Crawford Young; Eric Nordlinger; Donald Horowitz; and Donald 
Rothchild. It is important to mention here that, statement of the theoretical and empirical framework of 
analysis in this chapter is merely to serve as prelude and foundation to chapter two of this thesis where the 
debates of these scholars is carried out in detail. 
8
 For the normative philosophy arguments, the thesis explores the works of Michael Walzer, Spheres of 
Justice: A Defense of Pluralism and Equality (New York: Basic Books, 1983); Michael Walzer, 
Interpretation and Social Criticism (Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1987), and Michael 
Walzer, Thick and Thin (Notre Dame (Indiana): University of Notre Dame Press, 1994). Will Kymlicka, 
Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995); Will 
Kymlicka, Liberalism, Community, and Culture (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989). Charles Taylor, 
‘Shared and Divergent Values’, in Roland Watts and Douglas M. Brown, (eds.); Options for a New 
Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1991), Charles Taylor, Multiculturalism: Examining the 
Politics of Recognition, Amy Gutmann, (ed.); (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994). Charles 
Taylor, Reconciling the Solitudes (Essays on Canadian Federalism and Nationalism), (Montreal: McGill-
Queens University Press, 1993). 
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should recognise one another as equal political partners. For Taylor, therefore, in order 
to achieve the above, there should be some form of federal arrangement. The last, but 
not the least strand of the debate was developed by Will Kymlicka. The main theme of 
Kymlicka’s argument is that, it views political institutions of the liberal states as 
reflecting the culture of the majority ethnic groups, while the cultures of the minority 
ethnic groups are threatened. Therefore, in the course of state building process, if every 
group has to make life choices, then the liberal state has to ensure that ethnic minorities 
also have access to their culture. Institutionally therefore, Kymlicka’s argument 
translates into federal sub-units, special representation, and veto rights for ethnic 
minorities.  
 The arguments of the above three strands of the normative philosophy 
arguments appear to reach the same conclusions with regard to their openness to 
multiculturalism.
9
 That is to say, all the normative philosophy arguments accept federal 
system of government as the most desirable framework for recognising and 
accommodating diverse groups, and also all the arguments prescribe differentiated 
citizenship rights as a means of guaranteeing fairness and justice in a political 
community.
10
 
 After a critical evaluation of the normative prescriptions proposed by Michael 
Walzer, Charles Taylor and Will Kymlicka against the experiences in Nigeria, the thesis 
accepts some of the arguments in the normative philosophy literatures, but also 
highlights the tensions inherent in their prescriptions. For example, the prescription that 
federalism offers the best arrangements for recognising and accommodating groups 
                                                 
9
 It is important to bear in mind that, John Rawls proposed an opposite end of the argument. For example, 
in his original position, Rawls argues that, equality and justice requires political institutions to put in 
place a difference-blind system of rights and liberties- the state provide a neutral ground for groups to 
stand as equals in the distribution of rights, privileges and power without regard to social difference.  See 
John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), see also Ibid., A Theory 
of Justice (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971). 
10
 Most federal political systems are identifiable by common structural features which include among 
others: (a) at least two orders of government acting directly on their citizens. (b) a formal constitutional 
distribution of legislative and executive authority and allocation of revenue resources between the orders 
of government to ensure some areas of genuine autonomy for each other, (c) provision for the designated 
representation of distinct regional view within the federal policy-making institutions, usually including 
representation of regional representatives in a federal second legislative chamber, (d) a supreme 
constitution not unilaterally amendable and requiring for amendment the consent of a significant 
proportion of the constituent units either through the assent by their legislature or by regional majorities 
in a referendum, (e) an umpire, usually in the form of courts or by provision for referendums (as in 
Switzerland regarding federal powers) to rule on disputes over constitutional powers of governments, and 
(f) processes and institutions to facilitate intergovernmental collaboration in those areas where 
governmental powers are shared or inevitably overlap. See Ronald Watts, ‘Models of Federal Power 
Sharing’, International Social Science Journal, 53 (167), (2001), 23-32.   
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have the potential to create institutional instabilities such as, endless demands for 
recognition, and fragmentation of internal political units into states and or local 
governments. Also the prescription for some form of differentiated citizenship rights 
has the potential to elevate ethnic membership over legal state membership as a 
criterion for citizenship identification. This could lead to official state sanctioned 
discrimination against individual citizens and constraints on their freedom. It is this type 
of empirical reality that the thesis uses to reveal the potential tensions the prescriptions 
could generate when applied in Nigeria’s multi-ethnic society.11 It is important to 
mention at this juncture that, the idea behind evaluation is to show the applicability of 
the normative philosophy prescriptions proposed by Michael Walzer, Charles Taylor 
and Will Kymlicka. 
The second types of literatures the thesis explore are the empirical arguments, 
and the debates focusing on the design of democratic institutional frameworks that 
would minimise ethnic conflict.
12
 With regard to the empirical literatures, the thesis 
reviews the arguments of Crawford Young, Eric Nordlinger, Donald Horowitz, and 
Donald Rothchild for the design of inclusive political arrangements. The reason for 
focusing on these scholars who are considered doyen and external observers of the 
government and politics of Nigeria is because their arguments contain important 
prescriptions for the type of democratic arrangements that are required in multi-ethnic 
states. For example, each of the last three scholars used empirical facts to demonstrate 
that proportional distribution of political offices and resources among groups make for 
moderate and co-operative behaviour. This marks a shift from the Anglo-American 
democratic practice of allocating offices strictly on the basis of political competition. 
Similarly, all the scholars mentioned above show that a federal system is 
necessary to accommodate diversities, to disperse powers to those that would not have 
had the chance of exercising it, and to make for equitable distribution of societal goods. 
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 For the boomerang effects of state building attempts that recognise and accommodate groups, see 
chapter three and four for state creation and recognition of minorities in separate region/states, and 
chapter five and six for federal character.  
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 For empirical discussions on the design of democratic institutions to minimise ethnic conflicts, the 
thesis explores the works of Crawford Young, Politics of Cultural Pluralism (Madison: University of 
Wisconsin Press, 1976), Eric A. Nordlinger, Conflict Regulation in Divided Societies (Cambridge, 
(Massachusetts): Centre for International Affairs, Harvard University, 1972), Donald Horowitz, Ethnic 
Groups in Conflict  (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994), Donald Horowitz, A Democratic 
South Africa? Constitutional Engineering in a Divided Society (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1991), Donald Rothchild and Victor Olorunsola, ‘African Public Policies on Ethnic Autonomy and State 
Control’, in Donald Rothchild and Victor Olorunsola, (eds.); State versus Ethnic Claims: African Policy 
Dilemmas (Boulder: Westview Press, 1983), 234-235, Donald Rothchild, Managing Ethnic Conflict in 
Africa (Washington DC: The Brookings Institution Press, 1997).   
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The views expressed by the empirical scholars could also be considered as a shift from 
the dominant liberal view that separates the state from ascriptive characteristics such as 
ethnicity. Finally, some of these scholars in their various writings have asserted that the 
rules of liberal democracy in Africa’s multicultural societies should be conscious of the 
reality that ethnic cleavages exist in African societies, and the best form of government 
that guarantees unity and political stability is a consociational/coalition government.
13
 
By implication therefore, the empirical scholars in a way are reminding Nigerian 
leaders, for instance, the popular slogan that constructs Nigerians as belonging to one 
nation, with one destiny is unachievable.
14
 
As for the normative philosophical prescriptions, the normative arguments in the 
empirical literatures have also been evaluated against the Nigerian experiences. Even 
though the thesis accepts some of the empirical prescriptions, it for example, highlights 
the possibility that the politically ambitious Nigerian elites use ethnicity as a vehicle to 
achieve personal ends, or that inter-personal elite conflict  transformed into group 
conflict.
15
 The thesis acknowledges the importance of the discourses- normative 
philosophy and empirical arguments in helping to understand the complexity of 
Nigerian political environment but, at the same time, it also contextualised the potential 
tensions of the prescriptive arrangements. For example, there exist fundamental and 
underlying factors in the Nigerian political environment such as, the multiple groups 
that create tensions between the need to express difference and stability.  
In general term, when the normative philosophy prescriptions proposed by 
Michael Walzer, Charles Taylor and Will Kymlicka on the one hand, and the empirical 
prescriptions proposed by Crawford Young, Eric Nordlinger, Donald Horowitz, and 
                                                 
13
 The groundwork for the development of consociational model was laid by Arthur Lewis in 1965. In his 
work, he argued that majoritarian rule is not suited for plural societies; and that, the type of government 
that is needed in plural societies is that which unites them in a coalition government, i.e. African leaders 
should recognise ethnic cleavages in state building processes. For instance, in the contemporary time, the 
International Community facilitated a coalition government deal between President Mwai Kibaki and 
Raila Odinga after the December 2007 elections triggered bloody communal conflict.  Other countries 
with coalition government experience are South Africa, Ethiopia, Angola, Burundi, and Rwanda. See 
Arthur Lewis, Politics in West Africa (London: Allen and Unwin, 1965), 64-65. See also, British 
Broadcasting Corporation (BBC News), Bush urges Kenyan Power-sharing, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/7248271.stm  
14
 For more of this argument, see David Brown, ‘Ethnic Revival: Perspective on State and Society’, Third 
World Quarterly, 11 (4), (1989), 1-4. 
15
 The political influence of the elites from the various groups in Nigeria is a function of many factors 
among which demographical, historical, administrative, and economic factors are the most prominent. In 
the current political dispensation, the Northern elites are undoubtedly the leading group, followed by the 
Yoruba, Igbo, Niger Delta, and the Middle-Belt elites respectively. It is important to mention here that 
this hierarchy is not static, as there are possibilities of shifts depending on how much influence a group 
wield at a particular time. 
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Donald Rothchild on the other hand are applied in Nigeria’s diverse and multicultural 
society, the thesis observes that, rather than reduce conflict, their prescriptions have the 
potential to generate tensions - ethno-political conflicts and institutional instabilities. In 
specific terms, in fairness to these scholars, the above observation is not a suggestion 
that the normative and empirical prescriptions are not relevant to Nigeria. Indeed, 
Nigeria’s attempts at coping with ethnic diversity that are discussed between chapter 
three and eight validate the normative and empirical prescriptions. It is rather that, 
fundamental and underlying tensions in Nigeria’s body politics such as the ascension of 
the military to power and its dominance of the political scene for about thirty five years, 
the immediate post-civil war period which coincided with the era of petroleum boom 
that created a deepening crisis of corruption, perpetuation of large scale electoral and 
financial corruption, and manipulation of ethnic loyalties. These underlying factors it is 
observed are the challenges Nigeria face in its attempts at state building and 
constitutional politics. It is therefore the view of this thesis that, in order to mitigate 
recurrence of ethno-political conflicts and institutional instabilities, the above 
mentioned tensions and prejudices would have to be minimised or completely 
eliminated through concerted political agenda such as, introducing and enforcing 
Constitutional and institutional safeguards. 
 
1.3 Significance of Study 
This thesis differs on two grounds from most writings about Nigeria’s diversity, 
ethnicity, state building strategies and constitutional politics.
16
 The significance of this 
study lies first in its normative and empirical evaluation of competing group claims and 
the alternative state building strategies. There are many works on Nigeria’s state 
building strategies, diversity and ethnicity that are conducted strictly from an empirical 
point of view. However, most of these important contributions either dwell on the 
importance of identity in politics, or argues for political recognition of groups, or 
evaluates state building strategies that have been used by some African States to 
accommodate groups, and at times mention the successful states as examples for other 
countries to emulate.
17
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 In the five decades of its attaining political independence from Britain in 1960, Nigeria has written six 
federal constitutions- in 1960, 1963, 1979, 1989, 1995 and 1999 as amended in 2011. 
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 The works of Crawford Young, (Politics of Cultural Pluralism) belongs to the first and second 
categories, and those of Donald Horowitz, (Ethnic Groups in Conflict; and A Democratic South Africa? 
Constitutional Engineering in a Divided Society). Donald Rothchild, (African Public Policies on Ethnic 
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Similarly, there are many literatures that criticise state building strategies 
adopted by Nigeria, especially in the post-independence era, but do not spell out 
possible alternatives. Such literatures, very often does not consider strategic 
requirements - Nigeria’s national goals that include recognising and accommodating 
ethnic diversity, achieving national unity and political stability that have to be balanced 
and other socio-political circumstances that the country’s government officials consider 
before arriving at a particular state building strategy. Criticisms tend to be 
unconstructive in the sense that they condemn and reject, rather than suggesting by 
presenting alternatives that reflect conditions and realities in the country.
18
  
This thesis goes beyond a mere examining and criticism, but critically evaluates 
competing group claims against the selected state building strategies that the country 
has adopted in order to determine their normative importance. This work also goes 
further with the analysis of feasible strategies from a range of alternatives that best 
reflect the interest of the opposing parties. This procedure thus enables the thesis to 
offer an original perspective that complements the empirical approaches proposed by 
Crawford Young, Eric Nordlinger, Donald Horowitz and Donald Rothchild who have 
done extensive research on the design of institutional arrangements for minimising 
ethnic conflicts in several African States. 
In addition, this thesis is significant because it aims to generate awareness about 
the applicability of theory by using the Nigerian experience regarding recognition and 
accommodation of diversity to reveal some tensions in the philosophical literatures. 
Without any doubt, the principles for reorganising societies to accommodate cultural 
diversities proposed by Michael Walzer, Charles Taylor, and Will Kymlicka are helpful 
for understanding the complexity of Nigerian political environment. However, in 
                                                                                                                                               
Autonomy and State Control; and Managing Ethnic Conflict in Africa). Arend Lijphart, (Democracy in 
Plural Societies: A Comparative Explanation) and Eric Nordlinger (Conflict Regulation in Divided 
Societies) belongs to the third category. 
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 This assertion is true of articles by some Nigerian academics on state building approaches such as 
Revenue Allocation System, the Federal Character Principle, Oil Resource Ownership and Control etc. 
With regards to the Revenue Allocation System, see Olu Okotoni, ‘Governance, Taxation and Fiscal 
Policy in Nigeria’, European Journal of Economics, Finance and Administrative Sciences, Issue 6 (2006), 
387-51. For Federal Character Principle, see Peter P. Ekeh and Eghosa E. Osaghae, (eds.); Federal 
Character and Federalism in Nigeria (Ibadan: Heinemann Educational Books, 1989). See also, Ladipo 
Adamolekun, John Erero and Basil Oshienebo, ‘Federal Character and Management of the Federal Civil 
Service and the Military’, Publius, 24 (4), (1991), 75-88. For the Oil Ownership and Control, see Ekanade 
Olumide, ‘The Minorities and Resource Allocation in a Transitional States. The Nigerian Experience 
1960-1999’, Africana, 5 (1), (2011), 74-107. See also John Boye Ejobowah, ‘Who Owns the Oil? The 
Politics of Ethnicity in the Niger Delta of Nigeria’, Africa Today, 47 (1), (2000), 29-47.  
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general terms, the ensuing analysis observes that the prescriptions, the way they are 
have the potential to generate tension when applied to the realities on the ground in 
Nigeria’s multi-ethnic society. For example, the prescription that segmented autonomy 
offers the best arrangements for accommodating the interest of diverse groups have the 
potential to create recurring and perhaps, escalating cycles of ethno-political tensions 
and institutional instabilities with some groups asking for self-determination or for their 
independence from Nigeria. It is this type of empirical experiences that the thesis uses 
to reveal the tensions generated by principles that are meant to cut across differing 
societies. After a critical assessment of the country’s political, social and economic 
environment, the thesis concludes that the normative and empirical prescriptions 
proposed by the mentioned researchers are relevant to Nigeria, but that there are 
fundamental and underlying tensions in Nigeria’s body politics that poses great 
challenge to its attempts at state building and constitutional politics.  
 
1.4 Definition and Conceptual Clarification 
The terms state, government and recently state building are core concepts in political 
analysis. Even though they are closely linked to the extent that, often people use them 
interchangeably, distinctions should be drawn between them since these terms will be 
extensively used in this thesis. 
State is an abstract term with a variety of definitions. For the purpose of this 
thesis, I will refer to state as a territorial and political sub-unit that operates inside and 
within a larger territory or country. For instance, Kogi state is a contiguous territory, 
with its own political administration, established by a higher level of government- 
Federal Government of Nigeria on the 27
th
 August, 1991 to initiate and execute state 
functions inside and within the larger Federal Republic of Nigeria.
19
  
A state in the above definition does not have a guaranteed territory or existence, 
as the Federal Government, operating on behalf of the entire Federal Republic of 
Nigeria, has in the past re-created and/or adjusted the structure and internal boundaries 
of states. For instance, the internal boundaries and structures of Northern, Southern and 
Western regions in the Federal Republic of Nigeria were adjusted in 1964. Similarly, 
the internal boundaries and structures of these regions were in 1967 re-adjusted to 12 
states. From 1967 to the present, states in Nigeria have experienced internal boundary 
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 See Kogi state inset Appendix B- map of Nigeria showing the administrative borders. For the highlights 
of the legislative jurisdictional powers of the three tiers of government, see Figure 3. 
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adjustment four times, in 1976, 1987, 1991 and 1996. This brought the total number of 
states in the Nigerian federation to 36 states.
20
 Essentially therefore, a state in the above 
definition is a territorial and political sub-system within a sovereign country, which in 
turn exists as a sub-system in the international system.  
In the specific of this thesis, the use of term state is based on the traditional 
definition provided in article 1 of the 1933 Montevideo Convention on Rights and 
Duties of States. The convention stipulates that, the state, as an “international person”, 
should possess the following qualifications: ‘(a) a permanent population; (b) a defined 
territory; (c) government; and (d) capacity to enter into relations with other states’.21 
When the main attributes of a state in the above definition are put together, the second 
usage of a state in this thesis is created. The state in this sense is the cumulative 
territorial and political association of sub-units that exists as one country, and which 
exercises internal and external sovereignty. An example of state in this definition is a 
country such as the United States of America, which exercises sovereign powers within 
geographically defined borders on behalf of the constituting territorial and political sub-
units. 
The common distinctions between the two definitions of a state discussed above 
are that, in the latter, state- Federal Republic of Nigeria or the United States of America 
(USA) are treated in international politics at least in theory, as an autonomous and 
sovereign entity. In addition, a state in the latter definition is also regarded as an 
important sub-system of the international system. In the case of the first definition, as a 
territorial and political sub-unit within a country- Federal Republic of Nigeria or the 
USA, the constituting states have no right, and are not recognised as a separate, 
autonomous and sovereign entity by the international community. Practically, from both 
definitions of a state above, the common theme is government- the means/mechanism 
with which the task and responsibility of achieving national goals and objectives of the 
concerned state is brought into operation. Even though, government is ‘the “brains” of 
the state … the state is a continuing, even permanent, entity, while government is 
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 See Figure 1 for the chronology of major state building events, and Appendix B for the map showing 
Nigeria’s administrative borders.  
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 Citation comes from Article 1 of the Montevideo Convention on the Rights and duties of States which 
was a treaty signed at the 7
th
 International Conference of the American States in Montevideo, Uruguay, 
on 26 December, 1933. See also, Malcolm Nathan Shaw, International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2003), 178. 
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temporary’.22 Government being the means/mechanism that is entrusted the task to 
achieve national goals and objectives, the formal and institutional functions of 
government is therefore primarily achieved through state building processes.  
The term state building which is frequently used in this thesis is a broad term. 
For instance, it could indicate  
Those governmental policies aimed at the accumulation, consolidation and centralisation of 
power, as well as the promotion of state identity. In principle, state building encompasses 
the objectives of achieving societal cohesion and political stability within the territory of a 
given state.
23
  
 
The above definition of state building is relevant to the subjects covered in this thesis 
when adopted in two related parts. The first part of the definition is vividly relevant to 
some key state building strategies in Nigeria that aims to achieve national unity and 
state identity, but at the expensive of political stability. For example, in January, 1966, 
in an attempt to purportedly consolidate its hold on the entire country that was fast 
drifting, late General Johnson T.U Aguiyi-Ironsi, the then Head of the Military 
Government quickly promulgated Decree Number 34; which abolished the federal 
structure of government and the regions and thereby converted Nigeria into a unitary 
state. Another good example was when Major General Yakubu Gowon (Rtd) enacted 
the Petroleum Act of 1969 which vested in the Federal Government absolute control 
and ownership of all mineral and oil resources within the territories of the Federal 
Republic of Nigeria. The essence of the two Nigerian state building policies above, 
were to enhance the powers of the central government for the purpose of national unity. 
The second part of the definition on the other hand is vividly relevant to some 
key state building policies in Nigeria that aims to achieve a mixture of societal cohesion 
- diversity, national unity and political stability. Examples of state building policies in 
the Federal Republic of Nigerian in this regard are the Quota System, recognition of 
minority groups - state creation, Federal Character, Revenue Allocation System etc. It is 
important to mention at this juncture that, state building policies that fall within the 
confines of both parts of the above definition are analysed in this thesis. 
In this work, state building means those affirmative actions adopted by  
successive Nigerian governments introduced and implemented through  negotiations, 
decrees, constitutional processes and/or executive fiat, with the purpose of constructing 
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23
 See Klejda Mulaj, Politics of Ethnic Cleansing (Nation-State Building and Provision of In/Security in 
Twentieth-Century Balkans) (Lanham, Maryland (MD): Lexington Books, 2008), 7. 
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and reconstructing policies and institutions of governance capable of providing the 
various Nigerian multicultural groups with physical, social, economic and political 
security. Examples of state building in this instance are the affirmative policies and 
institutions discussed between chapters three and eight below. 
 
1.5 Methodology 
Viewed from a broad perspective this thesis intends to contribute to the theoretical and 
empirical analysis of state building and constitutional politics in Nigeria’s multi-ethnic 
society within a multidisciplinary framework. However, viewed against the backdrop of 
a multicultural society, and the Nigerian government’s aim to achieve triple national 
goals, the thesis specifically intends to contribute to theoretical and empirical 
understanding of selected group claims and the Nigerian government attempts to 
establish state building institutions that recognise and accommodate diversity on the one 
hand, and on the other, the roles the state building strategies play in the generation and 
recurrence of ethno-political conflicts and institutional instabilities in the country. 
As the task of the study involves large volumes of documents spanning over six 
decades, the most effective way of understanding state building attempts and its effects 
is to examine existing normative and empirical literatures related to the subject matter 
on the one hand, and documents produced by the government on the other. In order to 
achieve this aim, content analysis or textual analysis method of enquiry comes handy as 
a vital tool for generating and tracking significant and high points in both the existing 
normative and empirical literatures and Nigeria’s state building and constitutional 
attempts. Content analysis is thus, a useful tool in the context of this thesis that helps 
dwell extensively on ‘the study of recorded human communications such as, books … 
(journals, constitutional debates, decrees, memorandums) and laws’.24 Content analysis 
is especially a useful tool for examining and understanding the kind of formulated 
questions the thesis addresses as it enables it to describe in a convenient way ‘who says 
what, to who, why, to what extent and with what effect’.25 Bearing in mind time 
limitation, and the need to remain focused on the research questions, the thesis discusses 
only selected pertinent normative and empirical literatures, and state building and 
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 See Harold D. Lasswell, ‘The Structure and Functions of Communication’, in Bryson, Lyman (ed.); 
The Communication of Ideas (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1948). 
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constitutional strategies within the periods of the late 1940s- pre-independence to 2012- 
post-independence. 
Even though the thesis is not intended to reject earlier researches on Nigeria’s 
state building strategies, group claims, diversity and ethnicity that were conducted 
strictly from empirical viewpoint, this work is an explicit attempt to generate awareness 
about the applicability of theory by using the Nigerian experience regarding attempts by 
government to recognise and accommodate diversity through constitutionalising and/or 
decreeing state building institutions. The thesis thus provides an alternative and analytic 
approach when describing and explaining issues surrounding state building strategies, 
group claims, ethnicity, and diversity dynamics in Nigeria’s multicultural society.  
Using the content analysis or textual analysis method of enquiry, this thesis 
contextualises and evaluates normative and empirical literatures on what it takes to 
recognise and accommodate diversity. In order to achieve this objective, the thesis  
examines in detail the normative arguments proposed by Michael Walzer, Charles 
Taylor and Will Kymlicka on  one hand and the empirical arguments of Crawford 
Young, Eric Nordlinger, Donald Horowitz and Donald Rothchild on the other vis-à-vis 
the realities on the ground in Nigeria.  
In order to arrive at valid generalisations and conclusions on the formulated 
research questions the thesis addresses in detail selected group claims and state building 
and constitutional strategies in the following chapters. The group claims and strategies 
discussed include the type of political system negotiated for the country in series of 
constitutional conferences, the recognition and separation of minorities through creation 
of states, the Quota System and recognition of minorities, federal character principle, 
the revenue allocation, and the politics of oil ownership and control. The group claims 
and the state building and constitutional strategies are thereafter subjected to evaluation 
on the basis of the arguments contained in the normative and empirical literatures that 
form the theoretical framework of analysis in this thesis.  
By adopting a multidisciplinary approach to content/textual analysis within the 
subject matter of ethno-political studies, the thesis draws on a wide range of reference 
resources which were mostly selected from large secondary sources. Thus, through 
content/textual analysis technique, the thesis identifies, summarises and analyses 
relevant data in logical order.  The methodological approach adopted  is, therefore, not 
only suitable for a detailed discussion and analysis of group claims and state building 
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strategies in Nigeria’s multi-ethnic society, but will be of great significance for future 
research on related subject matter.  
 
1.6 Synopsis of Chapters 
The thesis is organised into nine chapters.  The following chapter analyses the 
contributions of the normative liberal theorists about the potential relevance of 
accommodating cultural and ethnic difference - diversity in state building processes. It 
also discusses the empirical literature on ethnic diversity in politics and democratic 
institutional arrangements for conflict reduction. Chapter two suggests that even though 
some elements of the normative and empirical prescriptions have the potential to 
generate recurrence of ethno-political and institutional instabilities, they indeed validate 
the country’s strategies for recognising and accommodating diversity. The chapter then 
sets a contextual framework for the discussion that will follow in all the subsequent 
chapters by identifying and presenting the relevant prescriptions/issues raised in the 
normative and empirical literatures against the realities on the ground in Nigeria.  
Chapter three discusses the type of political system for coping with diversity in 
the period from the post-World War II era through 1958 when the country was 
preparing for independence. The chapter spells out claims that were made in the various 
state building and Constitutional Conferences between 1940 and 1958 and the type of 
political system that were negotiated for the country. It also evaluates the claims and 
considers what feasible alternative political system could have been best for the country.  
Chapter four presents a detailed account and normative evaluation of competing 
group claims and state building strategies adopted during the period from 1960 to 1967. 
The chapter specifically presents a detailed analyses and normative evaluation of the 
Quota System and the re-division of the country from 3 to 4 regions in 1964 and into 12 
states in 1967 to take account of minority groups that were previously denied political 
recognition.  
Chapter five discusses competing group demands and the state building 
strategies to reflect the federal character of the country that were negotiated in the 
1970s. It was during this decade and within the federal character principle that the 
country was divided into 19 states and 301 local government units to reflect ethnicity, 
and adoption of arrangements that required representation of groups in institutions at the 
three tiers of government to avoid dominance of national institutions by a few ethnic 
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groups. The chapter presents the 1975 government Panel’s assessment of the demands 
for states. It also gives a detailed account of the opposing views of the constitutional 
negotiating team regarding the best way to accommodate ethnic diversity. It then 
conducts a critical assessment of the Panel’s recommendation for the creation of 
additional states and considers what alternative there was. The chapter finally evaluates 
the constitutional agreement to determine if it was a desirable strategy for ensuring 
equity in government, and what should have been done if it was not the desirable 
approach. 
Chapter six discusses the revised federal character principle (approach). This is 
regarding competing group claims and constitutional strategies adopted between the 
mid-1980s up to 2010. This was the time during which the federal character strategy of 
the 1970s was revised and new claims emerged which was discussed in the 1986 
Political Bureau and the 1994/95 Constitutional Conference. The chapter presents the 
revisions to the federal character principles, the new claims that emerged from the 
demand for alternative political structure and power sharing/shift, and the constitutional 
agreement for a more equitable political arrangement. The chapter also makes a critical 
evaluation of the revisions suggesting viable alternatives.  
Chapter seven discusses one of the most contested and controversial issues in 
Nigeria’s multi-ethnic society - the Revenue Allocation - a state building strategy that 
was put in place to achieve fairness and equitable distribution of resources. The chapter 
discuss the background to the trend and development of Nigeria’s Revenue Allocation 
System (RAS), and how it has generated controversies, dissatisfaction and suspicion 
among Nigeria’s ethnic groups. The chapter also examines the relevant and potential 
issues in the revenue allocation system. Finally, the chapter evaluates the revenue 
systems and thereafter suggests normative frameworks for revenue allocation in the 
country. 
Chapter eight examines oil ownership and control solely by the federal 
government (nationalisation) as a state building strategy. This chapter discusses how the 
revisions and the high stakes in oil ownership and control features prominently in state 
building politics between the various groups in the oil producing areas of the Niger 
Delta and the Federal Government of Nigeria. It gives detailed analyses of the claims 
and counter claims, and the circumstances that led to the monopoly of oil resource by 
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the central government. The chapter finally conducts a critical evaluation of oil 
ownership claims. 
Chapter nine provides a summary and findings for the thesis. It employed the 
empirical experiences in Nigeria in order to evaluate the prescriptions of the normative 
theorists. The chapter demonstrates that the design of state building around ethnic 
groups as proposed by the normative and empirical theorists though has the potential to 
trigger ethno-political conflict and institutional instabilities; the design of state building 
around ethnic validates Nigeria’s approaches to group recognition. The chapter further 
narrowed the ethno-political Conflict/tensions to the role of the Military and escalation 
in corrupt practices. The chapter concludes the thesis with policy recommendations. 
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       CHAPTER TWO 
 NORMATIVE AND EMPIRICAL APPROACHES TO ETHNIC  
     RECOGNITION AND ACCOMMODATION 
 
2.1 Introduction 
One of the greatest challenges currently facing Nigeria is how to meet its pre-set 
national goals - recognising and accommodating ethnic diversity, achieving national 
unity and political stability, and at the same time meeting claims to equal treatment in 
the public sphere. For this reason, the country’s national goals, state building strategies 
as well as the political institutions have come under severe criticisms for failing to 
adequately take into consideration the interests of all citizens. The nature of the 
challenge is both a lack of commitment of the political institutions involved in state 
building to securing equality and justice on the one hand, and a disagreement on what it 
really entails to respect equality for all the diverse groups in the country.  
In liberal theory, especially in John Rawls’s Original Position, Bruce 
Ackerman’s Spacecraft Journey, and Ronald Dworkin’s Dessert Island, the assignment 
of uniform or equal rights for all without consideration for ascriptive criteria has been 
the standard mode of ensuring equality.
26
 Recently, however, their point of views have 
been criticised by scholars such as Michael Walzer, Charles Taylor, and Will Kymlicka 
as partial, exclusionary and oppressive. Instead, there is the insistence on the part of the 
above mentioned scholars that the issue of equality entails recognising what is specific 
to each group in the society. In the opinion of these scholars, therefore, the challenge is 
how to ensure that political institutions recognise diversity when assigning civil rights.  
Until recently, liberal theorists such as John Rawls, Bruce Ackerman and Ronald 
Dworkin had no difficulty devising a model of society in which groups in a country 
such as Nigeria with diverse social and cultural backgrounds receive fair treatment. In 
their view, private and public are two different spheres.  For instance, they opted from a 
total separation between state and religion as well as between the state and any other 
cultural sphere of any particular group. This means that the state provided a neutral 
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ground for groups to stand as equals in the distribution of rights, privileges and power 
without regard to social or cultural differences. Thus, the project of ensuing equality and 
justice requires the political institutions to proceed from a neutral turf to put in place a 
difference-blind system of rights and liberties for all citizens.
27
 An example of such 
equality and justice project is John Rawl’s original position whose veil of ignorance 
denies people knowledge of their social background.
28
 A similar example is Bruce 
Ackerman’s spacecraft journey, or Ronald Dworkin’s desert island with its insurance 
scheme. In all these equality and justice projects, a system of rights and liberties is 
defined without the influence of particularistic interest and is considered to be impartial 
and fair.
29
 
However, the definition of the rights of groups in a manner that abstracts from 
their social background has in recent years attracted heavy criticisms for failing to meet 
the requirements of equality and justice. A number of theorists within and outside the 
liberal philosophy, for example, Michael Walzer, Charles Taylor, Will Kymlicka and 
Melissa Williams have argued that the supposedly neutral turf of the political institution 
is pervaded by the cultural values of a dominant set of groups. For instance, in Nigeria, 
the Hausa/Fulani, Yoruba and Igbo were the only group to negotiate political changes in 
the country and these, according to these scholars can only reflect their cultural and 
social values.  By implication therefore, the difference blind conception of equality and 
justice is not difference blind after all. It is regarded to be hegemonic and oppressive.
30
 
Consequently, an alternative conception of equality and justice that recognises social 
differences among groups has been proposed by Michael Walzer, Charles Taylor and 
Will Kymlicka. 
Just as an alternative theoretical conception of equality and justice is being 
worked out, so are empirical political scientists conducting inquiries of ethnic relations 
and governance in African and Asian States with a view to designing state building and 
constitutional mechanisms that would nurture democracy. Their empirical studies have 
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yielded the new view that ethnically plural states such as Nigeria would have to revise 
the Anglo-American model of democracy to make for political inclusion of all the 
diverse groups in the country. The surest way of fostering inequality and injustice, and 
perhaps conflict, the empirical scholars argued, is to replicate the liberal democratic 
model that emphasises majority rule that is difference blind. Studies that have generated 
this new insight include Crawford Young’s, Politics of Cultural Pluralism, Eric A. 
Nordlinger’s Conflict Regulation in Divided Societies, Donald Horowitz’s Ethnic 
Groups in Conflict, A Democratic South Africa? Constitutional Engineering in a 
Divided Society, Donald Rothchild and Victor Olorunsola’s African Public Policies on 
Ethnic Autonomy and State Control, Donald Rothchild’s Managing Ethnic Conflict in 
Africa, and Arend Lijphart’s Democracy in Plural Society. This chapter will attempt to 
review the arguments contained in both the theoretical and empirical literatures. 
 
2.2 Theoretical Arguments about Ethnic Recognition and Accommodation 
There are different strands of the theoretical arguments within the liberal philosophy for 
the recognition and accommodation of cultural diversity in a political community. Some 
are identity based, while others are based on sexual orientation. This thesis identifies 
and concentrates on three strands of identity arguments of Michael Walzer, Charles 
Taylor and Will Kymlicka. The arguments of these theorists are considered in turn as 
follows. 
The first strand of the liberal philosophy arguments for the recognition and 
accommodation of cultural diversity in a political community to achieve equality and 
justice, unity and stability is associated with Michael Walzer, a relativist, and therefore 
a strong opponent of the Universalist conception of rights championed by Rawls, 
Ackerman and Dworkin. Walzer put forward a conception of equality and justice that 
recognises and accommodates difference among groups in multicultural societies.
31
 In 
his book the Spheres of Justice, Walzer lays out his theory by taking on the argument of 
Rawls that groups in an original position prevented from making claims that is 
particular to them would adopt universal principles for the distribution of primary 
goods. Rawls original position, according to Walzer, is abstract and removed from 
realities. In real life, goods have different meanings in different societies and it is the 
meanings that would determine how they are distributed. In postulating the theory, 
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Walzer put forward three arguments: first, goods do not fall from space; they are made 
by people and have social meaning among those people who make them. Secondly, the 
social meaning of goods determines their movement, and how they are distributed. And 
last but not the least, justice is done if the values that govern distribution in one sphere 
of life or a particular social good are not used to govern distribution in another sphere of 
life or another social good.
32
 
On the basis of the above mentioned postulations, one can easily infer that 
Walzer is a relativist, and his theory of justice, to use his words, ‘is alert to differences’ 
and ‘sensitive to boundary crossing’.33 Culture is implicated in this form of value 
pluralism because different cultural communities would come up with different values 
that should govern distribution in different spheres of life. The relevance of this 
postulation is that, in a culturally plural society such as Nigeria, Walzer’s relativism 
would defend state building and constitutional strategies that aims to recognise and 
accommodate diversity in the society. He referred to this in Spheres when he makes the 
point about adjusting the principles of justice operative in the political community to 
meet the requirements of historic communities.
34
 In his other book, Thick and Thin, 
Walzer’s argument gravitates towards autonomy for groups. Moral understandings of a 
culture, according to him, are thick and should not be overridden by external 
understandings of dominant groups in the society. Criticisms have to come from within, 
and the standard which the critic appeals to, has to be internal to the culture as well as to 
other cultures. He calls it ‘Minimal Universal Moral Standard’ which the thesis 
considers to mean basic human rights.
35
 It is thin, according to him, not thick enough to 
provide details of how life should be lived. Moral minimalism, therefore, cannot be the 
basis of political unity for diverse cultures. It rather evokes the conscience to make 
people solidarise in its defence whenever it is violated, thereafter people separate to 
their rich, thickly constituted moral life.
36
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For Walzer therefore, pluralism of values is the most meaningful life. The view 
of Walzer consciously applied for instance would mean that, to supplant pluralism of 
values in favour of national unity and stability as evident in most of Nigeria’s state 
building goals is to throw groups into a moral wilderness.
37
 For him, the most justifiable 
arrangement is that derived from, and grounded on, thickly developed moral values. For 
this reason he settles for the right of cultural groups to self-determination. However, the 
chaos and anarchy that would result from the assertion of independence by one group 
after the other makes him think that self-determination does not provide a single best 
answer to all situations. The best alternative, he thinks, is a confederal or federal 
arrangement whose institutional checks could prevent the domination of one group by 
the other.
38
 
Delving into a sensitive societal issue as Walzer has done, no doubt attracts 
attentions. For this reason therefore, Walzer’s arguments have received wide ranging 
criticisms from scholars such as Will Kymlicka, David Miller and Wayne Norman and 
others.
39
 As far as application of Walzer’s theory to the Nigerian society is concerned, 
some notable criticism needs to be pointed out. One of the elements of Walzer’s 
theoretical prescription is the questionable assumption that differentiated rights or 
internal autonomy for groups such as those of the Niger Delta communities could 
ensure equality, justice and national unity. The argument takes cultural groups as cast 
and fixed, not subject to self-multiplication in the event of goods being distributed on 
their terms. Goods, like rights, power and opportunity are not just end in themselves. 
They are means to further goods. Consider power, for example, it could be a means to 
wealth, security, and even more rights and opportunities.  
Bearing in mind Walzer’s argument, if values such as cultural identity are used 
as criteria in the distribution of goods, many cultural groups in Nigeria tends to claim 
different values in order to have a greater share of the national wealth.  To be more 
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practical, if cultural identity becomes the basic criterion for the distribution of goods, a 
group of families could seek political recognition by claiming to be culturally different, 
or some elites in search of power could mobilise members of a group of villages to 
claim difference. Without a universally known standard of judgement, the grounds for 
assessing such claims would be highly arbitrary and controversial. In any event, they 
have to be recognised, as cultural identity has become the criterion for the distribution 
of goods. Based on Walzer’s account therefore, it becomes easy to understand why 
Nigeria’s cultural groups proliferated from 4 regions in 1964 to 36 states in 2012, and 
the experiences so far have been institutional chaos rather than political stability and 
or/unity. 
The problem of political stability and unity in the polity in the above discourse 
attracted the attention of Charles Taylor whose contribution is analysed here under the 
second strand of the liberal philosophy arguments for the recognition and 
accommodation of cultural diversity in a political community. In Shared and Divergent 
Values, an article written in acknowledgement of the Canadian political scene, Taylor 
explained why Quebeckers are pressing for autonomy  despite they having a special 
immigration regime, income tax, pension plan etc. they have the right to speak their 
own language and, addition, they hold influential  positions in the federal government of 
Canada.
40
 
The paradox, according to Taylor, has to do with Quebec’s understanding of 
Canada as a pact between two nations - English Canada and French Canada - and the 
country as existing to contribute to the survival of both nations. However, for a long 
time, the nation of French Canada had been demeaned by being refused recognition. In 
recent years, Taylor argues that, the transformation of the country into a multicultural 
society has buoyed English Canada to build political unity around the Meech Lake 
Accord, a Charter of Rights adopted in 1982. The Charter, according to him, accords 
some powers to collectives by making provision for linguistic and aboriginal rights, but 
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imposes a procedural model of liberalism that provides a set of groups’ rights, but 
prohibits discrimination on grounds such as race.
41
 
Taylor, however, argues that procedural norms governing the way political 
decisions are made for the entire Canadian federation enunciated in the Charter clashed 
with and thwarted Quebeckers’ aspiration of seeking their good, for example, the 
survival and flourishing la nation canadienne francaise distinct culture. A request for 
constitutional amendment of the Meech Lake Accord to provide a distinct society clause 
was defeated despite a de facto special status enjoyed by the region. Taylor regards the 
imposition of a procedural model of liberalism in which the state is uncommitted to a 
conception of the good as diametrically opposed to what Quebeckers opted for: a liberal 
society organised around a definition of the good life without having to demean those 
who do not share in it. Taylor speaks of multiculturalism as the sort of group rights 
provided in the Charter, as a first level diversity that does not come close to what 
Quebeckers want. It is hegemonic because, in substance, people are required to conform 
to procedural norms.
42
 For Quebeckers and Aboriginals, Taylor says, their sense of 
being Canadian rest on the survival of their national communities. There has to be ‘a 
second level or deep diversity in which a plurality of ways of belonging would also be 
acknowledged and accepted’.43 What can be inferred from the above is that, recognition 
of cultural difference is not for profitable ends. Rather, it has to do with the survival of a 
national community that is gradually being deprecated or wiped out. But, the possibility 
of groups proliferating to undermine stability of the arrangement that would emerge still 
remains, and was not addressed by Taylor. 
 Taylor’s argument above was given a higher theoretical cast in 
Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition.  In this piece, Taylor argues 
that there is no real tension between fundamental liberal commitments to the principle 
of autonomy and recognition for cultural minorities whose survival is threatened.
44
 In 
this contribution, Taylor also observes that group identity comes from within but is 
affirmed by the recognition they receive from others. Non-recognition or mis-
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recognition can inflict harm or can be a form of oppression, as in the case of women in 
patriarchal societies or the case of colonial subjects who are induced to internalise their 
own depreciatory image. In pre-modern times, Taylor argues, recognition was not a 
problem because honour was intrinsically linked to social hierarchies. In the modern 
world it is a problem, because social hierarchies have collapsed and in place of honour, 
we have equal dignity of persons. The identity of each comes from his/her inner self, 
but has to be affirmed by others because ‘we become full human agents, capable of 
understanding ourselves through our interaction with those who matter to us’.45 The 
understanding that identity is formed in relation with others has engendered, in the 
social plane, a demand for equal recognition. 
Equal recognition according to Taylor, has come to mean two different things. 
For some, it means ‘an identical basket of rights and immunities’, the basis for this 
being a universal human potential, namely the capacity to direct lives. For others, it 
means ‘recognition of the unique identity of this individual or that group’. The basis for 
this is also a universal potential, but it is the potential to form an identity either as an 
individual or a group.
46
 The latter views difference blindness as a reflection of a 
hegemonic culture; as particularism masquerading as the universal and as an attempt to 
assimilate or disparage others. One that results in a proceduralist model of liberal 
society as defended by Rawls, Ackerman and Dworkin, and the other produces a model 
of liberal society organised around collective goals.
47
 
Taylor regards both models as mutually opposed, exemplifying with the case of 
Quebec where the commitment to the collective goal of survival constrained individual 
rights to school of their choice, to carry out transaction in English, and to put up 
commercial signage in English. However, Taylor endorses the second view, arguing 
that a society with collective goals can be liberal, ‘provided it is capable of respecting 
difference, especially when dealing with those who do not share its common goals, and 
provided it defends fundamental rights recognised in the liberal tradition’.48 Taylor did 
not show how this could be achieved. He did not make arguments for a synthesis of the 
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two models; neither did he show that those who do not belong to the favoured culture or 
do not share the collective good will not suffer violation of right. 
Taylor reproaches procedural liberalism for discriminating against those who do 
not belong to the dominant culture, but the alternative prescription he presents, just as 
Walzer suffers from similar criticisms. For instance, his arguments for a society 
organised around community goals do not yield a rule that tells us when to and when 
not to extend recognition to those that claim it. Nevertheless, they boil down to internal 
autonomy for territorially concentrated groups and differentiated citizenship rights.  
Within this arrangement, the hopes and aspirations of those individuals who do not 
share in the collective goal could be diminished by what Steven Rockefeller referred to 
as the ‘elevation of ethnic identity over universal human potential’.49 Take the example 
of Quebec that Taylor uses to exemplify his argument. There, law prohibits immigrant 
and Francophone Canadians living within the same jurisdiction from sending their 
children to English language schools. So, those of them who have no preference for 
French language schools cannot help but follow what has been officially decreed. 
Taylor acknowledges the constraint in fundamental rights and liberties of individuals 
but did nothing to deal with it.
50
 
Will Kymlicka’s argument which is considered for the recognition and 
accommodation of cultural diversity in a political community to achieve unity and 
stability has given some attention to the reconciliation of collective goals and individual 
liberty. He argues in two very important books about the recognition of difference, in 
particular dealing with Canadian Aboriginals.
51
 Following J.S. Mill and Immanuel 
Kant, Kymlicka shows the distinctive feature of liberalism to be its ascription to groups 
of freedom to choose and revise their conception of the good life. Two preconditions are 
required: first, that groups lead their lives from the inside, in accordance with their 
belief of what gives value to life; second, that they have the freedom to question and 
revise their conception of the good in light of whatever information is available. There 
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is therefore the liberal concern for education, freedom of association and expression.
52
  
Citing the argument of Ronald Dworkin as an example, Kymlicka argues that a societal 
cultural membership provides the basis for freedom, the ability to understand and to 
make and remake meaningful life choices. Besides, it provides a secure sense of 
belonging and identity without limiting freedom of choice. In the above context, 
therefore, cultural membership is necessary for groups in a political community to live a 
good life. 
 However, in multicultural liberal states, the political process and institutions in 
most cases reflect the culture of the majority national group. Worse still, the system of 
liberties and rights serve to assimilate minorities as they lose control of their land and 
resources. For Kymlicka, in order for the minority groups to enjoy the primary good of 
cultural membership which the majority groups take for granted, the minority groups 
should have a variety of special rights including a right to self-government within the 
polity, guaranteed representation on inter-governmental bodies, and veto rights on 
issues affecting them.
53
 Kymlicka says special rights are not to be considered 
advantages, rather they secure for minorities the cultural context which members of the 
majority national group take for granted. And powers of self-government are not to be 
considered as temporary but inherent and therefore permanent.
54
 
If the above theoretical prescription is applied to Nigeria’s multicultural society, 
the potential constraint could be that, group-specific rights may contradict common 
citizenship and trigger political disunity or separation. But Kymlicka addresses this 
problem by differentiating between representation rights and self-government rights. 
The former, according to him, facilitates the inclusion of minorities within the 
mainstream society and this strengthens rather than erodes shared civic virtue. He sees 
self-government rights as posing the danger of secession, but does think the latter is an 
option because of the problem of viability of minority groups. Multi-nation states, 
according to him, should promote unity not by denying particularistic differences 
among groups, but by respecting and nurturing it.
55
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 The model of society that emerges from Kymlicka’s arguments is one in which 
minorities are accommodated in sub-units organised around their collective good with 
the inevitable danger of compromising the autonomy of those who do not share the 
collective good. In chapter nine of Liberalism, Kymlicka tries but fails to reconcile the 
autonomy of members with the community’s good. Like Taylor, he did not show how 
the rights of those members who have different conception of the good could be 
defended. 
Just as Walzer and Taylor, when the theoretical prescription of Kymlicka is 
applied to a multicultural society such as Nigeria, there are many potential difficulties 
with Kymlicka’s arguments for instance, his assumption about justice and stability in 
the political community.
56
 Like Walzer and Taylor whose arguments presuppose the 
immutability of groups, Kymlicka assumes minority groups to be discrete and 
immutable. Consequently, he thinks that if groups are accorded special resources or 
rights to pursue their conception of the good life, a just and stable normative order will 
be achieved. It is understandable why Kymlicka assumes that groups would not 
proliferate to take advantage of special rights. His argument present special rights as 
creating conditions for equality and discounts the possibility of regarding them as 
benefits. But the reality is that they are not just formal rights. They are also tangible for 
they entail internal self-government that goes with the setting up legislative and 
executive positions, political representation at the centre and job opportunities in 
government that have to be filled. Being tangible, and the fact of granting them on the 
criterion of ethnicity, would instigate new claims to minority status even from within 
the majority group. It automatically opens a leeway for others to claim minority status 
in order to receive similar treatment. The general attitude would be akin to, ‘you have 
had yours; we need ours because we are also a minority suffering domination’.57 
 Kymlicka might respond by pointing to the use of political judgment in 
determining and rejecting spurious claims to recognition. This could be effective if 
groups are homogenous, but this is not the case if some consist of subgroups with 
different dialects and are attached to definite territorial homelands as it is found all over 
Nigeria. The feasibility of Kymlicka’s prescriptions becomes a real issue if a country is 
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made up of one or two major groups and several minority groups. In this scenario, the 
prescription will require disentangling multiple minority groups for special recognition 
in separate sub-political units. This would trigger a slippery slope that may elevate the 
concern for stability over equality and justice. 
In conclusion, the theoretical approaches of Walzer, Taylor and Kymlicka 
discussed above make normative arguments in defence of state building and 
constitutional arrangement that gives recognition to group identities. The problem with 
the arguments especially with reference to Nigeria is that the kind of constitutional 
structures  they support can potentially be the source of social and cultural unrest 
because of an unrestrained use of ethnic identity as means to power by the elites and, 
consequently, institutional instability and ethno-political conflict. 
 The problem of stability has been raised by some critics of multiculturalism in 
the United States of America who worry that group recognition might lead to the 
disintegration of the country. For example, in a polemical work, Arthur Schlesinger Jr. 
argues that, from the start, America like most countries has been multi-ethnic. But, 
unlike most multi-ethnic countries, it has cohered, endured, and achieved greatness 
because ‘individuals from all nations are melted into a new race of men’.58 Although he 
regards the American practise of citizenship as falling behind its theory, he sees the 
latter as modifying the former without any contradiction by the assimilation ideal. He 
therefore assails multiculturalism for encouraging ‘separate racial and ethnic 
communities and advancing the fragmentation of American life’.59 In The Menace of 
Multiculturalism: Trojan Horse in America, Alvin Schmidt likens multiculturalists to 
soldiers seeking to conquer and destroy the American melting pot. He regards the 
introduction of bilingual education and the revision of the curriculum of American 
colleges to reflect the concerns of diverse racial groups as a Tower of Babel that brings 
ethnic separateness, disunity and conflict.
60
 Using Canada as an example, he shows that 
the ingredients of the secession tendency in the country were prepared in the 18th and 
19th centuries when the British colonial government rejected a melting pot philosophy 
for bilingualism.
61
 
                                                 
58
 See Arthur Schlesinger Jr., The Disuniting of America: Reflections on a Multicultural Society (New 
York: W.W Norton and Company, 1998), 16. 
59
 Ibid., The Disuniting of America: Reflections on a Multicultural Society, (1998), 136 and 151. 
60
 See Alvin Schmidt, The Menace of Multiculturalism: Trojan Horse in America (Westport 
(Connecticut): Praeger, 1997), chap. 8. 
61
 Ibid., Schmidt, The Menace of Multiculturalism: Trojan Horse in America, 116-118. 
 41 
 
The criticisms that emphasise the danger of balkanisation are similar to the ones 
made above, but they are also different in the sense that the empirical basis for the 
concern is less valid in the American context than in the Nigerian context. In fact, both 
Kymlicka and Taylor are conscious of the dangers of group proliferation in North 
America for which reason they limit recognition to minority historical communities- not 
immigrants whose survival is threatened.
62
 Thus, groups covered by this limitation 
would constitute a small number of cultural groups and, perhaps, a small percentage of 
the population. This narrowing of cultural groups that would be entitled to special 
protection rescues the arguments of the liberal theorists and renders the instability 
argument less compelling than claims to group recognition.  
The liberal arguments are attractive to my study of state building and 
constitutional politics in Nigeria’s multi-ethnic society because the concerns that 
motivate the theorists to argue for special rights for minorities in North America could 
also support the demands of many minority groups in Nigeria for political and 
particularistic recognition, especially in the design of state building strategies such as 
the type of political system, federal character principles,  revenue allocation system, and 
oil ownership and control, etc. However, unlike North America where the demands for 
recognition and problems of governability and stability may not be at stake, in Nigeria’s 
multi-ethnic society, the tension exists.  For example, the prescription that a segmented 
autonomy offers the best arrangements for accommodating the interest of diverse 
groups has resulted in recurring and perhaps, escalating cycles of ethno-political 
tensions and institutional instabilities with some groups asking for self-determination or 
political independence.
63
 In conclusion, the prescriptions analysed until now cannot 
work in Nigerian reality because of the underlying tensions and the ethnic conflicts 
inherent to its society.  
 
2.3 Empirical Arguments about Ethnic Recognition and Accommodation 
The empirical literature on ethnic recognition and accommodation attempts to 
understand actual relations among groups and the formal and informal state building 
strategies which the political institutions use to respond to demands/claims of groups for 
political inclusion. On the basis of such empirical observation, general rules that make 
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for political accommodation and take account of group sense of worth are prescribed. 
Horowitz has emerged as one of the most outstanding scholars in this field, but some of 
the earliest empirical arguments for conflict reduction were actually proposed by Eric 
Nordlinger and Crawford Young. It would be worthwhile to discuss the contributions of 
these scholars. 
In his book, the Politics of Cultural Pluralism, Crawford Young presented 
ethnicity as a variable that is dependent on the political. He saw it as coming into being 
and altering in accordance with changes in the political arena. With specific reference to 
Nigeria, Young showed that the transition to independence triggered the emergence of 
previously non-existing identities, for instance, the Hausa/Fulani, the Yoruba, the Igbo 
to mention but a few, for social goods and the creation of more states in 1967 
fragmented their identities and engendered the emergence of new ones.
64
 He argued that 
ethnic labels would always feature in the competition for scarce resources and group 
conflict would be inevitable. Young prescribed ways by which African States could 
cope with conflict. The prescriptions include first, the provision of group security 
through the adoption of policies that are sensitive to difference and diversity. Secondly, 
the principle of equality has to be envisaged for groups as well as for individuals. 
Thirdly, institutionalised group should have access to power through political 
representation, and or/by the grant of cultural autonomy, and finally, the establishment 
of the autonomy of groups through federal arrangements.
65
 
In his Evolving Modes of Consciousness and Ideology: Nationalism and 
Ethnicity, Young modified his earlier position by presenting the nationhood of the 
African State as an invention by nationalists who thought that nation building would 
open the door to modernity, and by scholars who were bent on rediscovering the 
African past. He argued that in the contemporary world in general, the imagined nation-
state is being challenged by ethnic movements and, in Africa, the illusion that nation 
building would lead to modernity has been dispelled by the upsurge and intensification 
of ethnic pressures. Unlike his earlier work, he did not prescribe strategies for conflict 
reduction.
66
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Prior to the 1976 work - Politics of Cultural Pluralism written by Crawford 
Young, Eric Nordlinger had in Conflict Regulation in Divided Societies published a 
monograph in 1976 surveying six countries - Austria, Holland, Switzerland, Malaysia 
and Lebanon - whose open regimes were able to bring intense conflict under control at 
various periods in their history.
67
 By open regimes, Nordlinger meant the free 
functioning of independent interest groups and political bargaining rather than 
repression as the principal means of conflict reduction. Drawing from the six countries, 
Nordlinger proposed six conflict-regulating measures. They are  
“Stable governing coalition” between … the major conflict organisations; the “principle of 
proportionality” whereby offices are distributed according to relative size of segments; “the 
mutual veto” which requires government decisions to be agreed upon by all conflict 
organisations; and “depoliticisation” whereby conflicting groups agree not to involve 
government in policy areas that might touch on segments values. Others are “compromise” 
which entails mutual adjustment of interests, and “concession” by a stronger to a weaker 
group.
68
 
 
According to Nordlinger, only conflict group leaders can use the above practices to 
reduce conflict. He did not regard federalism as a conflict regulating process rather it 
could be an outcome of the above mentioned six practices. He also regarded the then 
conventional strategies like creation of an integrative national identity and spatial 
isolation of conflict groups as ineffectual and counterproductive. 
While Nordlinger’s six practices are a great contribution to strategies for conflict 
regulation, they have nonetheless been criticised on the ground that they seem to apply 
to a broad range of conflict. Nordlinger’s use of concepts such as conflict organisations, 
conflict groups, segments etc., suggest that his study covers all forms of conflict. Also, 
as Milton Esman has rightly argued, the restriction of his study to countries with open 
regimes, and in which there are two parties to a conflict, severely limits the relevance of 
his prescriptions to deeply divided societies such as Nigeria.
69
 
Nordlinger’s main thesis that Anglo American majoritarian democracy is 
unsuitable for plural societies also powered Arend Lijphart’s argument for 
consociational democracy as an instrument for conflict regulation.  Lijphart presented 
four defining characteristics of consociationalism that over lapped with, but also 
differed from, the six conflict regulating techniques of Nordlinger. They are: segmental 
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autonomy expressed through federal arrangement, coalition of ethnic parties, mutual 
veto in decision making, and the proportionality principle in the allocation of offices.
70
 
Like Nordlinger, Lijphart studied techniques used by some European countries - 
which include Belgium, Holland, Switzerland, and Austria - to regulate conflict and 
presented them as models for Africa and Asia. Both Nordlinger and Lijphart assumed 
that ethnic group dynamics in Europe and the developing world are similar. They also 
assumed that each ethnic group is a unitary actor and has united leaders who would 
come up with a single party that would rationally enter into coalition with others. As 
Horowitz has argued, ‘intra-group competition or rivalry does not make for a single set 
of leaders with authority to speak on behalf of the entire groups’.71 A political party 
supposedly representing an entire group may have limited leadership latitude because of 
intra-group fissures and factional leadership. Both Lijphart’s and Nordlinger’s conflict 
reduction techniques grant too much autonomy to elites and do not consider the 
structural constraints imposed by the dynamics within their groups. No one would 
object to the argument that inter-ethnic cooperation is required to reduce conflict and 
some techniques are needed to achieve it. However, competition and conflict within 
groups tend to undermine coalition formation, and if formed it gets too fragile to last. 
Donald Horowitz in his book Ethnic Groups in Conflict tries to go beyond the 
above limitations by arguing for a conflict reduction strategy that contains incentives for 
altering intra-group structural constraints that prevent inter-ethnic cooperation. His 
strategies are the creation of lower level political units with a view to proliferating 
points of power and taking heat off the centre, and an electoral system that places high 
premium on multi-ethnic support in the election of state officials and induces coalition 
building. Others are the adoption of policies that encourage alignments based on interest 
other than ethnicity, and affirmative action programmes to reduce disparities between 
groups.
72
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Horowitz regards his prescriptions as having the potential of producing both 
politics of bargaining and minority representation in national institution.
73
 Unlike 
Walzer, Taylor and Kymlicka, Horowitz warns against granting special rights because 
they do not last. Citing the case of Zimbabwe as an example, Horowitz shows that 
group rights that offer too many benefits are likely to be abolished by the majority 
group. For instance, Whites in Zimbabwe were guaranteed temporary over-
representation by the independence Constitution of 1980, but this was abolished by the 
majority government of Robert Mugabe as soon as it was possible.
74
  
Horowitz also cautions against the drawing of internal boundaries around 
homogeneous groups because it is not the only way of making minorities share power.
75
 
Excluded groups, according to him, could be made to share power through an electoral 
arrangement that requires party executives to be drawn from wide ethno-regional 
sections, and that victory at the polls should be based on plurality of votes. He regards 
this electoral arrangement as having internal incentives to harness selfish calculations 
for inter-ethnic cooperation. Political actors and groups cooperate not because they want 
to, but because the cost of not cooperating is to be out of power. Nigeria and Sri-Lanka 
whose constitutional measures provided the strategies he prescribes heavily influence 
Horowitz. He particularly extols the usefulness of the Nigerian measure in producing 
incentives for ethnic realignment, balancing and toleration, and therefore offers it as a 
model for racially and ethnically inclusive post-apartheid South Africa. In his words: 
If one is looking for African democracy in a divided society, the place to look is … 
Nigeria … That is where many of the African lessons are, but they seem far away, little 
known, and less understood in South Africa.
76
 
 
Just as Nordlinger, the empirical prescriptions Horowitz proposed are not without 
criticisms. For example, one major difficulty with Horowitz’s argument is its treatment 
of group claims as unmediated by elites. As a consequence, he did not foresee his 
prescriptions clearing a leeway for a deluge of demands by elites interested in 
advancing their own agenda. This difficulty arises from Horowitz’s strong view that 
group worth most powerfully explains ethnic conflict and that economic motives of 
elites have little to do with its intensity or the claims that are made. Horowitz finds 
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materialist theory deficient because, it does not link elite and mass concerns to explain 
why the followers always follow, the role of symbolic issues, and the sheer passion with 
which participants engage in conflict. In his words: ‘it is necessary to account, not 
merely for ambition, but for antipathy’.77 
Similarly, the argument that concern for identity and group esteem is what unites 
elites and the masses into political action does not completely refute the class argument 
because the problem of representational legitimacy remains unexplained. Elites claim to 
act on behalf of groups even when they are not elected to do so, and very often they are 
not. It is therefore very easy for those in quest of power and privilege to use ethnicity as 
a vehicle once it is given constitutional recognition. As is the case with Nigeria, 
Horowitz does not recognise that his prescriptions, when adopted could induce a spate 
of elite demands that may wreck political arrangements. 
Donald Rothchild recognises the limitations in the work of Horowitz and has 
tried to make room for it in his very pragmatic, but dense prescriptive arguments. He 
presents ethnic groups as people that have consciousness of common identity that may 
be socially constructed. They have corporate interest that leaders maximise by pressing 
demands on the state.
78
 Ethnic demands and state responses, according to him, are not a 
fixed process of one side making demands and the other side responding. The policy 
choices of regimes could determine how group leaders frame their demands and the 
nature and intensity of demands could determine the readiness of regimes to co-operate. 
It is a two way process that is mutually reinforcing. But because regimes wield power 
and formulate policies for society in general, they have significant impact on conflict 
management. Regime types are therefore critical in the determination of responses, and 
Rothchild offers three types which are: hegemonic, elite power sharing, and polyarchic 
regimes. 
Hegemonic regimes are authoritarian. They not only regard claims by group 
leaders as threatening to the political system but respond by imposing their own 
preferences that range from subjection to ethnic cleansing.
79
 Elite power sharing 
regimes are combinations of authoritarianism and consociational democracy. They 
come into being when elites in hegemonic regimes co-opt and strike bargains with 
powerful ethno- regional entrepreneurs in order to contain pressures from civil society. 
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They treat demands in pragmatic terms, and their informal rules for coalitions and 
balanced representation in national institutions are responses to ethno-regional 
pressures. Polyarchic regimes are democratic and are characterised by ‘extensive 
societal participation in governance and low state control over the political processes’.80 
By fact of their institutional electoral competition and accountability, they tend to have 
regularised public access to decision-makers.
81
 
 Both elite power sharing and polyarchical regimes are more inclined to promote 
unity and stability by accepting the legitimacy of autonomous groups in civil society 
and by accommodating them politically.
82
 However, Rothchild qualifies this by noting 
the tendency for some authoritarian regimes to incorporate various ethnic elites into 
high governmental positions. This is when dominance becomes terribly expensive either 
in monetary terms or in terms of intense conflict (e.g. Nigeria under military regimes in 
the early 1970s, mid 1980s-late 1990s, Guinea under Sekou Toure, Kenya before the 
1992 election and Zaire under Mobutu Seseko).
83
 The readiness to respond, according 
to him, has the positive effects of encouraging ethnic elites to frame demands in 
moderate terms and of facilitating negotiation by creating opportunities for them to 
withdraw from inflexible positions without loss of face. So, polyarchic regimes, and to a 
lesser extent elite power sharing, and to a still lesser extent hegemonic regimes, have the 
effect of providing incentives for co-operative relations. 
Rothchild identifies four main incentives that encourage ethnic groups to 
moderate and co-operative behaviour. They are: inter-group equality as a major rule in 
the allocation of offices and resources, an electoral system that ensures the inclusion of 
various ethnic elites in decision making, the representation of various ethnic and other 
interests in the ruling coalition- e.g. the Transitional Constitution of South Africa, 
Federal Character principle in Nigeria, and a form of federalism designed to separate 
geographically concentrated groups into distinct sub-units, thereby dispersing power 
among a great array of actors. From the above, it is clear these prescriptions proposed 
by Rothchild are not very different from Horowitz’s recommendations. 
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Although Rothchild was optimistic about his prescription, he cautions that they 
might not necessarily produce regime stability, because of elites’ political ambition and 
corruption, demand overload, and resource scarcity. Nonetheless, he hopes that if 
political routines for inclusion are established and repeated over time, elites would get 
used to norms of reciprocity and accommodative behaviour. In his words, ‘the initial act 
of forging a constitution is not an end in itself but of a larger process of confidence 
building that leads to repeated interactions’.84 
What is worth mentioning here, however, is that unlike Horowitz who assumes 
that his prescription would definitely minimise conflict and produce stability, Rothchild 
is more circumspect. He recognises that elite competition and corruption could cause a 
reversal, and deals with it by insisting on perseverance. It is in this respect that he goes 
one step ahead of Horowitz and the liberal theorists. 
 
2.4 Relevant Issues Raised by the Normative and Empirical Arguments 
The normative and empirical arguments shed some light on what it means to recognise 
and accommodate ethnic difference- diversity in politics. For Walzer, it means 
recognising group claims to regulate their social space according to their own values, in 
which case to ensure equality and justice, unity and stability will require granting them 
autonomy. For Taylor, it means a formally recognised internal autonomy for groups 
whose culture or continued existence is under threat. For Young, Horowitz and 
Rothchild, taking ethnic diversity seriously means decentralising power to enable 
groups to have some share of it, and putting in place an electoral system that induces 
inter-ethnic accommodation at the centre. At the extreme, the Walzerian position means 
political separation, and at the minimum an arrangement that provides minority groups 
with federal sub-units and whose constitutional checks could be enforced by 
international bodies when violated. 
On the other hand, the positions of Young, Horowitz and Rothchild mean a 
federal system of government by which minorities, in the case of Young, it is simply, 
groups have their own states. For Horowitz, the states need not be homogeneous 
because an electoral system makes it impossible for a few groups to exercise monopoly 
of national institutions. In between, but close to Walzer, lie Kymlicka for whom taking 
recognition seriously means securing minority groups by giving them sub-units of 
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government and guaranteed representation on inter-governmental bodies. The sub-units 
are rightful entitlements and should be permanent, while guaranteed representation is 
derivative of the right to units. When all of these arguments are critically unpacked, the 
thesis has the following emerging as the most relevant issues in the normative and 
empirical prescriptions.  
The first is the desirability of federal system as a common theme among both the 
normative and empirical writers, but they seem to differ on why it is desirable. 
Horowitz’s federal prescriptions is inspired by its utilitarian value, while that of 
Kymlicka and the prescription of Walzer, which ranges from political separation to 
federalism, are inspired by a sense of equality and justice. Walzer prescribes federalism 
because, even when separation occurs, there would be new minorities in the new state. 
He sees the institutional checks of federalism as an arrangement which enables 
minorities to control their local political space and, if the checks are violated, then an 
international intervention would be necessary to enforce justice. Kymlicka also finds it 
justifiable because the internal autonomy which it gives minorities would ‘compensate 
for the unequal circumstances which put the members of minority cultures at a systemic 
disadvantage in the cultural market place’85 Therefore, for Walzer and Kymlicka, 
federalism is desirable because it is what equality and justice requires.  
Young, Rothchild and Horowitz, on the other hand, prescribe federalism because 
it devolves power to groups who would otherwise not have had a share of it, and 
reduces the power of majority groups over minority groups. These are desirable because 
they express institutional pluralism more adequately and, above all, provide the basis 
for the establishment of conciliatory institutions, more especially an electoral formula 
for mitigating zero sum politics.
86
 It is all the above arguments among others that make 
federalism appealing to the empirical writers.  
The importance of the federal system is particularly exemplified by Horowitz 
when he argues that inter-ethnic conflicts may be reduced by devolution of power that 
activates intra-ethnic conflict because ‘if intra-ethnic conflict becomes more salient it 
may reduce the energy available for conflict with other groups’.87 Unlike the projects of 
Walzer and Kymlicka that aim at fair treatment of groups, Horowitz’s federal project 
                                                 
85
 Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights, 113. 
86
 Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict, chap.15, and Ibid., A Democratic South Africa? 217. See also, 
Rothchild, Managing Ethnic Conflict, 54-57. 
87
 Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict, 598. 
 50 
 
requires the shift of part of the burden of conflict resolution to groups and he justifies it 
with the over-all utility of the project. He cites some countries where this has occurred: 
The complexity of Indian society has facilitated the flow of conflict in linguistically 
homogenous states into subethnic channels, just as it has in Nigeria’s homogenous states. 
Under such circumstances devolution of a generous share of federal power upon largely 
homogenous federal units promises a dramatic reduction in conflict at the centre. Many 
issues will be contested within ethnic groups, rather than between them, simply because 
many contested issues become state level issues. It is difficult to infer causality from 
Switzerland, because it has not had intense conflict. But it has been argued that Swiss 
federalism with its powerful and mainly homogenous cantons is effective in dampening 
ethnic conflict because of the sparseness of contentious issues at the federa1 level of 
politics and the tranquillising effect of compartmentalising them.
88
 
 
The critical issue at stake is whether federalism is desirable because it makes for peace 
or because it makes for a balanced representative arrangement. This question could be 
answered by looking at what unites the universalistic theorists and those who argue for 
the recognition of difference among groups. They disagree on what justice requires in 
the political community, but they are united on the quest for justice. Once this is 
recognised, then any prescribed arrangement should aim at being just. But a critical 
view should not be held of Horowitz’s federal prescription because its utilitarian cast 
aims at reducing domination of one group by any other, very much like the projects of 
Walzer, Taylor and Kymlicka, and could therefore be said to have a democratic 
framework. 
Prescriptions of the normative theorists are on the same level as Horowitz’s, for 
they require the redrawing of internal political boundaries around groups, at least 
minority groups in the case of Kymlicka and Taylor, and a massive decentralisation of 
power. As Horowitz argues in the case of Nigeria and India, the contest for power 
within the sub-political units has the effect of triggering intra-ethnic divisions and 
conflict thus shifting the burden of conflict from the centre. In this context the 
arguments of the two sets of writers are not different. In fact, Horowitz is positive about 
his democratic framework when he declares that his project is ‘peaceful and compatible 
with democracy’.89 He justifies this claim by exploring ways of achieving an inclusive 
democracy in a divided South Africa where any group would not be able to establish its 
hegemony over others.
90
 
The second relevant issue in the normative and empirical prescriptions is 
difference over the constituent federal units. While Walzer’s and Taylor’s arguments 
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require groups to have their own federal units, Horowitz holds that internal political 
boundaries need not be drawn around homogenous groups. Young and Rothchild are 
silent on this, but their views would lean towards the drawing of boundaries around 
homogenous groups. For Kymlicka, the boundaries of federal units could be blind to 
groups, but where there are national minorities they should have their own units in order 
to exercise self-government rights and limits their vulnerability to the decisions of the 
majority.
91
 Implicit in Kymlicka’s argument is that each national minority should have 
its own political unit.
92
  
Among both the normative and empirical writers, Horowitz is most explicit in 
proposing the non-homogeneity of federal units. What is most important to Horowitz is 
the putting in place of conciliatory institutions that would do away with census type 
politics. That is, a political process whose outcome is determined by pre-formed 
majorities and minorities. In this type of politics, minorities know their fate in advance 
of an election. For Horowitz, devolution of power to homogenous groups is ‘neither the 
only nor the best way out’. This is because conciliatory institutions could thaw frozen 
majorities and minorities.
93
 His prescription is derived from his empirical study of the 
Nigerian Second Republic where half the total number of 19 states enclosed multiple 
ethnic minority groups.
94
 
Walzer would assent, on grounds of principle, to the view that units should not 
be homogeneous. But the problem of separating small groups living on small 
contiguous lands and the issue of their non-viability would make him qualify the view 
that units be homogeneous. He particularly makes room for the adjustment of moral 
principles to circumstances on the ground while rejecting arrangements that are 
determined a priori.
95
 
The third salient issue the prescriptions raise is minority group-rights. For 
Kymlicka, federal units in which minorities have self-government and by which they 
have representation on inter-governmental bodies are special rights, rights without 
which members would not be as equal as the majority group members. This is what his 
project is all about. Walzer does not say much about minority rights, but does argue that 
groups separated in federal units would need to be protected by constitutional checks 
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and by the possible use of international sanctions if the checks are violated by the 
majority. Both Rothchild and Taylor say nothing about special rights, except that the 
latter argues for equal recognition. 
Horowitz is strongly opposed to any form of special rights- reserved seats, veto 
rights, federal units, etc. for minorities because they are agreements based on constraints 
which the majority will overtime violate if their interests so demand. The quick, though 
lawful abolition of special representation rights for Whites in Zimbabwe makes 
Horowitz regard group rights as providing illusory security, easily pierced. On this 
score, he makes a scathing remark about international lawyers who, ‘with little 
knowledge of ethnic relations, have … been creating a whole new set of understandings 
about group rights’96 
 The fourth relevant issue raised by the prescriptions is the problem of disunity. 
Federalism, from the viewpoint of all the writers, is the best possible arrangement for 
accommodating diversities. However, there is some wavering by Walzer and Kymlicka 
on how unity can be achieved. Walzer’s cultural relativism, which locates common 
authoritative moral values within groups, makes political union conditional upon 
convergence of cultural values. In the absence of the latter the federal sphere of unity 
would be without a moral foundation, in which case it would be a modus vivendi. On 
this, Kymlicka is not different either. He explicitly says that both minorities and 
majorities have different cultural values, and that both groups would have to 
accommodate each other on the basis of a modus vivendi if they cannot adopt each 
other’s moral principle.97 
Horowitz rejects constitutional arrangements grounded on modus vivendi 
because they are transient. Citing constitutional arrangements like the Lebanese 
National Pact of 1943, the Malaysian constitutional bargain of 1956, the Indian Punjabi 
Regional Formula of 1956, and the B-C Pact in Sri Lanka, Horowitz says that: 
They are all “bargains”, “pacts”, “and contracts”. They are treaties between semi-sovereign 
peoples based on reciprocity, and they have all the characteristic problems all contracts 
have: the preferences of the parties change over time; conditions also change; the returns to 
the parties from the deal are uneven . . . if incommensurables are traded - X in return for Y- 
and if X proves more valuable over the long term, the party that received Y may nurse a 
grievance. Unless provision is made for amendment contract alone is not a lasting basis for 
accommodation. Inter-group contracts tend to be their own undoing.
98
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In order to achieve unity, Horowitz presents a design for living together premised on 
incentives for accommodative behaviour without sacrificing immediate group interest. 
The design, drawn from Nigeria’s second republic, is the agreement on an electoral 
system that induces political parties to ethnic inclusion and requires wide ethno-regional 
support in the election of the President.
99
 
Horowitz regards an agreement on an electoral system that places high premium 
on accommodative behaviour as similar to the original position contract of Rawls.
100
 
The original position is a device that model parties who want to enter into social 
cooperation. It is characterised by a veil of ignorance, that is, parties are ignorant of 
their class positions and social circumstances and, as a consequence, do not know who 
will be at the top or lower scale of the social ladder in the society they are trying to form 
or agree upon. So situated, they would agree on principles that are fair and just.
101
 
Horowitz takes after Rawls by saying that in an electoral arrangement where there is 
high premium on multi-ethnic support in the election of officials, each contesting party 
have to reach out and accommodate other groups. Since no group knows who would 
gain office, each would have to strive to reach out. The cost of not reaching out is 
electoral defeat or violence. And, what is more, a combination of two or a few large 
groups behind a single party is not enough to reach the required geographically spread 
of votes even if they make up two thirds of the country’s total population. Horowitz 
regards this arrangement as ‘not merely reflect(ing) transient interests but a design for 
living together premised on incentives for accommodative behaviour transcending 
group interests at the moment of enactment’.102 
Horowitz acknowledges that in Nigeria, where he draws his model from, the 
electoral arrangement was not enough to produce an enduring unity among the diverse 
groups. The arrangement failed because of politicians’ ambitions and intense 
competition. In spite of the failure of the Nigerian innovation to arrest conflicts, 
Horowitz thinks that it could produce the much desired stability if it is continuously 
refined. He receives some support from Rothchild who argues that the incentives for co-
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operative behaviour if built upon and nurtured, would dispose politicians to learn and 
get acculturated to the politics of reciprocity.
103
 
The four most relevant issues in the normative and empirical prescriptions that 
are discussed above provide a helpful framework for discussing Nigeria’s attempts at 
coping with ethnic difference and diversity. The approaches set the agenda not only in 
the sense of providing models for dealing with ethno-political problems in Nigeria, but in 
a sense,  a starting point for a discussion about ethno-political issues in the country and 
the interaction between the central government and the different ethnic groups claiming 
recognition.  
 
2.5 Summary 
This chapter reviewed the arguments among normative liberal theorists about the 
potential relevance of accommodating cultural and ethnic difference and diversity in 
state building processes. The chapter also discussed the empirical literature on ethnic 
diversity in politics and democratic institutional arrangements for conflict reduction. The 
relevant prescriptions/issues raised in the normative and empirical literatures were 
identified and discussed against the realities on the ground in Nigeria. The issues raised 
in both the normative and empirical literatures are intended therefore to be used as the 
contextual framework for evaluating the applicability of the normative and empirical 
prescriptions against the specifics of Nigeria’s multicultural society. The essence of the 
evaluation is basically to determine the applicability of both prescriptions against the 
experiences in Nigeria, and whether the implementation of state building strategies for 
coping with diversity are connected to the inherent ethno-political conflicts and 
institutional instabilities in the country. In addition, this chapter analysed the inherent 
ethno-political conflicts and institutional instabilities in the country are aggravated by 
fundamental and underlying factors that are inherent in the Nigerian political 
environment. 
On the whole, this chapter has also been able to create awareness that given the 
prevailing underlying issues, the Nigerian government would face enormous challenges 
in the designing of state building strategies that would not prejudice its national goals 
and objectives, unless these obstacles are minimised or completely eliminated. In the 
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above context therefore, the important questions to ask are two: What governmental 
strategies have been attempted to establish state building institutions that recognise and 
accommodate ethnic diversity? What roles do the state building strategies either in 
isolation or in combination play in the generation and recurrence of ethno-political 
conflicts in the country? Answers to these questions which are the research problems of 
the study are examined in the remaining seven ensuing chapters of this thesis. 
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   CHAPTER THREE 
      COPING WITH DIVERSITY: THE POLITICAL SYSTEM APPROACH 
 
Do we wish to see a fully centralised system with all legislative and executive power 
centralised at the centre or do we wish to develop a federal system under which each 
different region of the country would exercise a measure of internal autonomy? If we 
favour a federal system should we retain the existing regions with some modifications of 
regional boundaries or should we form regions on some new basis such as the many 
linguistic groups which exist in Nigeria?
104
 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Faced with the challenges of multiculturalism, and the desire to reflect the plural 
composition within the framework of a united country, Nigeria has adopted several state 
building approaches for coping with its problem of ethnic difference and conflict. The 
first, beginning from the immediate post-World War II period through 1958, involved 
recognition of the three most numerous groups in the political arrangements of the 
country, but denied equal recognition to several minority groups who asked for similar 
treatment.
105
 A product of hard Constitutional negotiations, this state building approach 
was adopted in response to competing claims made by group elites in several 
Constitutional Conferences held in l949/1950, 1953/54, 1957 and in 1958. This chapter 
aims to discuss and evaluate claims and counter-claims that were made in the several 
Constitutional Conferences/Committees and the important agreements that were 
negotiated on the type of political system for the country and minorities’ claim for 
recognition in separate states.  It will begin by spelling out the claims of groups and 
proceed with a normative evaluation. 
 
3.2 Group Claims During the Pre-Independence Constitutional Conferences 
Pre-independence claims by groups’ elites were not made at random. Rather, they were 
channelled through Constitutional Conferences that required representation of the three 
regions and political parties operating in them. While representation was not on the 
basis of ethnicity per se, the process was dominated by elites of the majority group in 
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each region.
106
 Thus, claims made during the Constitutional Conferences were mostly 
those that reflected the views of the majority ethnic groups, and they were presented in a 
manner akin to what Donald Rothchild regards as non-negotiable.
107
 The representatives 
took positions they were not ready to compromise, and did not wish to make 
concessions that would be interpreted by their opponents as signs of weakness. Claims 
and counter-claims, mostly on issues of political arrangement, minorities’ claims for 
recognition and revenue allocation were therefore, repeated in one Conference after 
another and with greater intensity in every succeeding one.
108
 It is in the light of the 
above, that Eric Nordlinger’s argument that conflict group leaders alone are capable of 
negotiating agreements on behalf of those they represent could be regarded as valid. 
This is because representatives to the Conferences were not prepared for conciliatory 
behaviour on the issues mentioned above.
109
 It was the British mediators who used their 
position as sovereign rulers to influence leaders of the three large ethnic groups to adopt 
a modus vivendi that entailed their retention of the three-regional structure and the 
sharing of national assets.
110
 
 It was when elites of some ethnic minority groups realised that constitutional 
agreements being negotiated among elites of the major groups would subject them to 
domination that they formed opposition parties or allied with the ruling party in another 
region.
111
 This gave them access to the Resumed Lagos Conference of 1954 and the 
1957 Conference for the review of the Lyttelton Constitution where they voiced 
demands for political separation. The outcome was the institution of the Willink 
Commission to examine their fears and look for ways of allaying them.  The thesis 
presents competing claims relating to the issues mentioned above, and it begins with 
those pertaining to the type of political system for the country. 
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3.2.1 The Type of Political System 
The type of political system to be adopted during the de-colonisation period was 
particularly important because it would structure power relations and determine which 
ethno-regional group would be politically dominant. The issue of power was important 
not only because it was a means to an end but also because, as the British colonial 
administration was close to end, the political elites started to prepare themselves to take 
over the political offices that would be left behind and the most suitable political system 
that would place them at comparative advantage. For example, we are going to see the 
leaders of the Western and Northern regions arguing for different forms of political 
arrangement that would make for the respect of difference.
112
 
In the General Conference of 1950, the Western region’s representatives put 
forward claims for retention of the three-regional structure within a federal framework 
but with adjustment of boundaries to take account of ethnicity. They used ethnic 
principle to ask for a redrawing of the northern boundary of the West to enclose the 
Yoruba speaking people of Ilorin and Kabba provinces of the North, and of the southern 
boundary to enclose Lagos and its Colony.
113
 They coupled it with demand for an 
indirect system of election so that Igbos could be locked out of the region’s political 
positions. The concern of the representatives of the Western region with the Igbos was 
that their educational achievements and rapid rise in national politics would give them 
some competitive advantage in mass election.  
The quest for territorial expansion by Western region’s representatives to the 
1950 Conference, which was also a quest for national political power was justified on 
ground that people in the affected areas had been clamouring for reunion with their kin 
groups from whom they have been separated by colonial administrative boundaries. On 
the other hand, the demand for indirect election was defended on the ground that over 
90% of people in the region were illiterate. The idea behind the illiteracy justification 
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was that, the people had no knowledge of national political issues, could not make 
leadership choice, and did not even know how to cast the ballot. 
In the 1953 London Conference, the Action Group (AG), the dominant party of 
Yoruba elites and also the governing party in the Western Nigeria from 1951 onwards, 
made arguments for recognition of the federal quality of the country. The quality was 
identified to be the existence of ethnic groups territorially contiguous, having different 
political and social institutions, different educational and general development, yet 
desiring to unite. The AG identified ten main ethnic groups in the country - five in the 
North, two in the West and three in the East- and called for the grouping of each into a 
state.
114
 Strategically, agreeing to this demand would have made the Western region, 
minus its minorities, one of the largest units in terms of size and population. 
The Eastern region, like the West, argued for a political federation of three 
regions during the 1950 General Conference, but objected to arguments for the 
redrawing of internal boundaries to reflect ethnicity and for the indirect electoral 
system. At the beginning of the 1953 Conference, the National Council of Nigeria and 
the Cameroons (NCNC) which later became known as National Council of Nigerian 
Citizens, the most dominant party of Igbo elites, had backed-off the federalist position 
to argue for a unitary system. The NCNC leadership argued that a political federation 
would undermine unity of the country, while a unitary constitution with a strong centre 
would make for political cohesion. They referred to the regional structure as the 
Pakistanisaton of Nigeria- an analogy for the splitting of India into India and Pakistan. 
Their position was informed by the dominant influence of the Igbo State Union in the 
party after 1950, which required that the latter responds to the need of migrant Igbos for 
equal political rights. It is important to emphasise here that the Igbos at this time had 
migrated to all parts of the country to take advantage of whatever the modern market 
economy could offer, and also to make a living because their land was not fertile 
enough and smaller than the other regions to support their numbers.
115
 
Like the Easterners, Northern leaders stood for a federal system during the 
General Conference of 1950. Suspicions about the relative educational advancement of 
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the two Southern regions translating into political dominance influenced them to opt for 
retention of the three regions so that each can advance at its own pace towards self-
government. They opposed any boundary adjustments that would transfer their territory 
to the West, arguing that the area conquered by the Sokoto jihadists in the 19th century 
extended far into the East and West, but had already been reduced when the British 
imposed the regional boundaries. Besides, at the Northern fringes of their region there 
were groups that were split by the international boundary drawn by the French and 
British.
116
 A revision of boundaries to unite groups would be the beginning of a slippery 
slope. If the Yoruba of Ilorin and Kabba provinces had genuine grievances, which they 
believed was not really the case, there could be better ways of resolving them. However, 
if the West insisted on its position, then the affected people should migrate while the 
territory remained.
117
 
 The Northern position, however, changed in 1953 when the AG sponsored a 
motion in the central legislature calling for self-government for the country in 1956. 
The Northern People’s Congress (NPC), the dominant party of Northern elites 
especially those of the Hausa/Fulani ethnic group, went to the London Conference with 
an 8 point plan demanding a political confederation in which the three regions would 
enjoy complete autonomy. The idea was that if the Southern regions were bent on 
political dominance by virtue of their relative educational advancement, then each 
should go its own way. 
The above competing claims were hardly reconcilable, and unless each of the 
three parties was prepared to make some concessions, a compromise would be elusive. 
The British colonial office whose officials presided over the Constitutional Conferences 
had decided after the 1953 self-government motion crisis that a loose federal association 
of the three regions was the best way of keeping Nigeria together. It was this objective 
that the colonial office had in mind when the London Conference was convened and, in 
fact, the Colonial Secretary had declared it a loose federal association in the House of 
Commons in May of 1953. Oliver Lyttelton, later known as Lord Viscount Chandos, the 
Colonial Governor during the period, further made the point when he wrote that:  
The only cement which kept the rickety structure of Nigeria together was the British … 
What was the present Conference for? It had been convened by us to keep the diverse 
elements in Nigeria together: left to themselves they would clearly fall apart in a few 
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months … it was clear that Nigeria, if it was to be a nation, must be a federation, with as 
few subjects reserved for the central government as would preserve national unity.
118
 
 
Perhaps the commitment of the British to forge an agreement that would keep the 
country together urged the AG, the NCNC and the NPC to reach a compromise. For 
example, the AG dropped its demand for a reconstruction of internal boundaries on 
ethnic lines, while the NCNC shifted from its unitary position to accept a federation of 
three regions.
119
 In turn the NPC backed-off its confederation demand to settle for a 
loose federation in which the centre had limited list of subjects while the three regions 
had an unspecified list of subjects- Residual List. This compromise agreement which 
technically accorded semi-sovereign status to the regions, together with a promise from 
the British government that any region desiring self-government could have it in 1956, 
subsequently fuelled political demands by minority elites for recognition in separate 
states. 
 
3.2.2 Minorities Claims to Separation 
Minorities’ claims for recognition in new states were driven by what Richard Sklar has 
referred to as the ‘big tribe chauvinism within the major political parties’ and by fear 
arising from the 1953/54 Constitutional agreements which guaranteed regional power 
and security to each of the three big groups.
120
 It is worth noting that some minority 
groups were not relatively backward, both in terms of education and social provision. 
For example, non-Muslim minorities in the North were more exposed to Western 
education provided by Missionary schools, had more trained personnel in the region’s 
civil service, and were supreme in the army compared to the Hausa/Fulani. The NPC’s 
adoption of an 8 point plan in 1953 which amounted to Northern secession drove some 
of them, especially the Tiv, to express their separate identity by demanding a separate 
state.
121
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Similarly, in the Eastern region, the NCNC was assembled and led by elites of 
the minority Ibibio and Efik ethnic groups.
122
 The first NCNC government in the region 
was led by Professor Eyo Ita, an urbane, polished, articulate and principled United 
States trained educationist of the minority Efik group. It was after he was expelled from 
the party leadership position to make way for an Igbo leader that minorities in the 
region followed him en-mass to form an opposition party - the National Independence 
Party (NIP) to spearhead the demand for separation. These historical realities call for a 
modification of Tedd Gurr’s thesis regarding autonomy claims. The thesis states that 
psychological stress and cultural difference, not political or economic discrimination 
drive group demands for autonomy.
123
 But evidence from the pre and post-
independence Nigerian experience rather shows that fear of permanent political 
domination and its economic consequences give rise to separation demands.
124
 
 Minorities’ fear of permanent political exclusion intensified with the 1953/54 
Constitutional agreements that shared the country among the three big ethnic groups. 
This fear was first driven into them during the 1949/50 nation-wide three-stage 
Conference when the demands of some minority provinces of the Northern and Western 
regions for political recognition in separate states were suppressed at their respective 
regional conferences. Some minorities’ provinces of the North and the West had 
responded to the question regarding the form of political arrangement by recommending 
separation in ‘Central Region’ and ‘Warri-Benin State’ respectively. These 
recommendations were rejected at the regional conference level dominated by 
representatives of majority groups who then proceeded to retain the three regional 
structures at the highest level of the three stages Conference. 
125
 One of the questions 
asked at the Provincial Conference in the North was: ‘Should there be a centralised or 
federal system of government’? To this question, the people of Benue province 
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answered: ‘There should be a fourth region, comprising Adamawa, Benue, Ilorin, Niger, 
and Plateau provinces. It should be known as ‘Central Region’.126 
 The forceful removal of elites of the ethnic minorities from the leadership 
position of the government of the Eastern region heightened the fears of the minorities 
of the other regions in the country. By the 1953 London Conference minorities of the 
country could no longer contain their fears. Having lost leadership positions because of 
ethnic identity, they had to attend the 1951/52 Conference as delegates of the official 
minority opposition party in the region. They demanded a strong centre as safeguard 
against majority dominance in the regions. They were, however, rebuffed and therefore 
forced to withdraw early from the Conference. At the resumed Lagos Conference of 
1954- for the discussion of Louis Chick’s revenue allocation report, the fears of the 
minorities could no longer be contained. Elites of some minority groups in the East and 
West submitted memoranda asking for recognition of Benin-Delta State (BDS) and 
Calabar-Ogoja-Rivers (COR) State respectively.
127
 They were soon followed by 
demands from elites of some non-Muslim minority groups of the North for a Middle 
Belt State. The demands were based partly on fear of leaving ‘minority groups … 
entirely at the mercy of the majority groups’.128 
 The response of the dominant parties to the demands of the minorities for 
separation was dictated by their strategic interests. In the Eastern region, the strategic 
interest of the NCNC was to break the political dominance of the Northern region and 
reduce the size of the West by having several states. It therefore advocated the division 
of the country into seventeen smaller and weaker states linked through a strong centre- 
quasi federalism.
129
 This required that, in principle, the regional government agrees to 
separation demands. It actively backed demands in other regions but tried to open a 
schism among its own dissenting minorities by secretly sponsoring or encouraging rival 
state movements in the Ogoja and Rivers provinces. Demands for Rivers and Cross 
Rivers States emerged to compete with the COR demand. 
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 In the West, the AG arguments for ethnic states required that it support 
separation demands. The AG, however, initially opposed the Benin-Delta State- 
Midwest State because the area was controlled by the NCNC, and also because it did 
not wish to narrow its territory to the advantage of its rivals. The AG queried: ‘Why 
should we gratuitously widen the area of our opponents’ influence by offering them 
another state practically on a platter?’130 It was when the AG became a patron to the 
COR State Movement in the East and thus gained a foothold in that region that it argued 
that the creation of COR State be a condition for the creation of Midwest State, or that 
the two be created simultaneously. 
 In the North, the demand for the Middle Belt State was supported by the AG 
who felt that the ‘time had come when the North should be broken into at least two 
separate states.
131
 The NPC was deadly opposed to it, threatening trouble if the 
territorial boundaries of the region were tampered with. 
 By the start of the 1957 London Conference which convened to evaluate 
difficulties that may have arisen from the practical workings of the 1953/54 
Constitutional agreements and for the granting of self-government to regions, separation 
claims and the positions of each ruling party were already set. What emerged from the 
Conference was the institution of a commission to examine the fears of minorities and 
recommend ways of allying them. In each region the Minorities Commission, as it was 
popularly known, received separation demands and they were all based on political 
exclusion, cultural domination, and discrimination in the provision of social services 
and infrastructure.
132
 
 In its report, the Commission observed that minorities’ allegations of domination 
and discrimination were exaggerated, but that, when the latter was discounted, there still 
‘remained a body of genuine fears and … the future was regarded with 
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apprehension’.133 However, it did not regard state creation as a remedy for the fears and 
apprehensions. The reasons given by the Commission were: 
a)  In each of the regions, the area of the proposed state was made up of several 
groups some of who preferred to be excluded. It was therefore difficult to draw a 
clean boundary that would not create a fresh minority. For example, the Middle 
Belt State that was demanded from the North had no definite boundary. 
Proponents of the state had suggested that it should enclose predominantly 
Christian areas, but it was difficult to draw a neat line, and the Commission was 
not provided with a definite map despite its insistence. It was believed that the 
area would comprise four provinces and parts of other three provinces, but there 
was uncertainty about the latter and it was left for the Commission to draw an 
arbitrary line.
134
 The same applied in the Eastern region where the area of the 
proposed COR State covered that of the Rivers and Cross Rivers States. It was 
on account of these difficulties that the Commission ruled that the areas to be 
covered by the two states were not ethnically homogenous, and that a slippery 
slope would be triggered if the demands were granted.
135
 
b)  The second reason given by the Commission was that, until the last few years, 
modernisation, especially the development of education, had been blurring 
ethnic differences in the country. It was when the prospects of independence 
became real that the tendency was reversed. This was not likely to continue, 
especially in a few years’ time when Nigeria would face the outside world and 
would find within herself forces working for unity. For this reason, ‘we do not 
accept in its entirety the principle of ethnic grouping, that is, the principle that a 
recognisable ethnic group (should where ever possible) form a political unit’.136 
The Commission felt that it was more important to find means of allaying fears. 
Some Constitutional safeguards were therefore recommended. They were: the 
incorporation of fundamental human rights into the Constitution; a single 
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Nigerian Police Force serving both federal and regional purposes but controlled 
by the federal government; the creation of a special area in the Niger Delta to be 
developed by the federal government and the governments of the East and West, 
under the auspices of a Board; the Constitution of parts of the Western and 
Eastern regions into minority areas for purposes of fostering cultural 
advancement and social and economic development.
137
 
Leaders of the state creation movements were not satisfied. They attended the Resumed 
Conference of 1958 that gave the final touches on the transfer of power from the 
British- with the slogan of no states, no independence. The British decided that political 
independence for the country which was two years away would be postponed in order to 
conduct a referendum among the affected minority groups with the aim of testing the 
popularity of the demands. This would then be followed with other rounds of 
Constitutional negotiations. The idea that the country’s freedom from colonial rule 
would be compromised prompted the leaders of the three major parties to opt for the 
Commission’s report. Clauses for boundary adjustment and states creation procedure in 
the future were inserted in the report and also incorporated in the independence 
Constitution.
138
 The minority groups in the country who advocated for separation 
entered the newly independent Nigeria with their demands unrealised, and as a 
consequence they became more assertive and violent in the pursuit of their goals. For 
instance, the Tivs waged series of resistances against the NPC leadership in the 
Northern region.
139
 
 
3.3 Evaluating the Claims and Agreements 
If there is one problem that emerged from the lengthy discussion above, it is the issue of 
the political system that would best accommodate multiple groups in the country. Of all 
the opposing proposals/positions by the elites of the three majority groups, federalism 
triumphed over unitarianism, but the question remained as to whether it should be used 
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to accommodate minority groups. The following sub-sections of the thesis evaluate the 
claims regarding the type of political system and minorities’ claim for recognition in 
separate states. 
 
3.3.1 The Political System and Diversity 
There are three positions to be considered: One regards ethnic federalism as the best; the 
second refers to federalism based on the three regional structures as the most desirable; 
and the third position considered a unitary system as the ideal. Then there were some 
minorities who went for ethnic federalism that entailed their equal recognition in 
separate regions. Each of these positions could be interpreted as rationalisations by 
group elites who were out to maximise power for themselves and on behalf of those 
they were representing. However, it is not enough to look at these different positions in 
strict ideological terms. The positions were used as rationalisations because there was 
something good about them. For example, a unitary system that secured the social and 
economic needs of Igbos was defended in the name of qualities that would make it 
acceptable to the general public. Similarly, the Hausa/Fulani elites used fear of Southern 
dominance that was shared by Non- Hausa/Fulani in the North to justify their hold on a 
region they regarded as an inheritance from their forefathers. To make a fair judgement 
about what arrangement was desirable and what was not, one has to examine the 
inherent qualities of these proposals and not simply dismiss them as ideologies. 
 To begin with the position of the Western region, there was an assumption in the 
claim for ethnic federalism. The assumption was that, the creation of a common civic 
bond in the new Nigeria that was coming into being would need decentralised political 
structures which allowed identity groups to organise their lives according to their 
cultural requirements and needs. Political autonomy for groups was presented as a 
prerequisite for political coherence and stability. The common wisdom was that ethnic 
loyalty would not be transcended with time, and without the granting of autonomy to 
identity groups, nation building would be futile.
140
 
 The above assumption had validity on two grounds. One was the strong 
attachment by a vast majority of the population to their ethnic communities. For 
instance, studies conducted by Peter Ekeh showed that the people enclosed within the 
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Nigerian boundary have always felt stronger obligations to their communities than to 
the state.
141
 Commitments to the former overrode and displaced commitments to the 
latter. It was along this reasoning that the British colonial rule identified ethnic 
communities as the relevant unit of political identification, and conferred powers on 
their chiefs. It was they, the chiefs, who collected taxes, mobilised labour, supervised 
the construction of roads, and dispensed justice in the courts. For the governed, the 
ethnic community was the state. This was dramatised during the de-colonisation period 
when the local educated elites organised inter-ethnic football tournaments the way 
nations meet in international sporting events. The side that emerged victorious in the 
tournaments proclaimed their group as having a manifest destiny to lead the rest of the 
country. Whereas modernisation theorists were pontificating that the middle class, with 
their education, would be the historic agents in the project of eliminating particularism 
and effecting change from tradition to modernity, the opposite proved to be true as the 
middle class became the real harbingers of ethnic loyalty in politics.
142
 
 The other ground for the validity of the assumption was the existence of ethnic 
communities as units of concrete rights and privileges. Ethnic communities guaranteed 
rights to factors of production- such as land, and met the social welfare and material 
needs of members. They formed dense network of aid that provided for the emotional 
and security needs of members. They more or less pre-empted the state of its role, for 
which reason some have referred to them as the primordial public as opposed to the 
modern public of market society.
143
 It is here that people directed their energies, 
resources and loyalty for collective self-realisation. 
The above views about loyalty and citizenship in the primordial public would 
tally with theoretical explanation for the desirability of federalism. The explanation 
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centres on identity and attachment and it presents community, defined by cultural 
characteristics like language and ethnicity, as a ‘sense of collective identity’.144 
The community in which we live and play out our lives defines what and who 
we are. As a consequence, we have powerful sense of attachment and loyalty to it. At 
the political level, federalism becomes desirable not because it is administratively 
convenient, but because its structures of participation and authority are organised to 
reflect underlying forms of belonging.
145
 Hence, it is commonly seen as ‘a device 
designed to cope with the problem of how distinct communities can live a common life 
together without ceasing to be distinct communities.’146 This explanation echoes the 
view on federalism mostly associated with William Livingstone. The view presents 
federalism as a device for coping with diversity and understands a country as having 
federal qualities if it consists of heterogeneous groups. This would suggest that claims 
for ethnic federalism had merit and should have been taken seriously. 
 What would a commitment to ethnic federalism have required? Implementing 
the Yoruba proposal was one way of meeting the commitment. But it was an 
unpersuasive proposal because it did not take the principle of respecting ethnicity very 
seriously by proposing only ten states in a country with over 250 ethnic groups and by 
proposing boundaries that clearly served Yoruba interests. The proposal by some 
minority communities for more states was another and perhaps a more persuasive and 
genuine way of meeting the commitment. This is what the Willink Commission ought 
to have considered. But this proposal, as the Commission rightly observed, was not free 
of difficulties because there were too many groups, their sizes varied too much, some 
were mixed up together in some territories, membership was unclear, and some 
preferred the existing three regional structure to ethnic federalism.
147
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Given the difficulties, taking claims about ethnic federalism seriously would 
probably have entailed ignoring minorities’ claims. In this case the salience of group 
membership would have been ignored and the problem of political unity and stability 
would remain unaddressed. This is what actually happened. The 1953/54 Constitutional 
agreement compromised unity when it retained the three regions and shared power and 
assets among them. 
Let us turn now to the claim for a unitary system put forward by leaders of the 
Eastern region. The claim was put forward in the interest of Igbos who had migrated to 
all parts of the country on account of the thin soil and high population density of their 
homeland. However, one should stand back from this ideological position and assess the 
claim for what it was worth. The claim assumed a form of political community in which 
citizenship is a matter of treating individuals as having equal rights under standard 
universal laws. Unlike the claim for ethnic federalism of the Yorubas that presupposed a 
background conception of citizenship that is differentiated, that of the Igbos required 
treating people as equals in the assignment of rights and in the distribution of social 
goods. In principle, this would permit everyone to participate equally in the political 
community and its system of opportunities. 
From the perspective of the Yorubas therefore, ethnic federalism would be too 
divisive.
148
 The creation of ethnic regions would encourage citizens to look inward and 
focus on their ethnic difference, thereby compromising attempts at achieving political 
unity. Such state structure would foster sensitivity to, and preoccupation with, the ethnic 
origins of citizens in the competition for public offices and allocation of social goods. In 
this context, differentiated citizenship would cease to be integrative and would become 
a device for cultivating distrust and conflict.
149
 This therefore means that, instead of 
unifying people by a system of common rights and privileges, citizenship would 
become a force for disunity. Moreover, the creation of ethnic regions would encourage 
excessive differentiation. Leaders of new groups would emerge with perceptions of, and 
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claims to difference. As claims are met one after the other, chaos would replace order 
and the hope of attaining stability would be lost.
150
 
Part of the case for unitarianism was that, in principle, the system would 
maintain a common standard of rule for judging the actions of both rulers and ruled. 
Rules are authoritative precisely because of their universality, and they operate in the 
mind of citizens because they are settled objects of knowledge. They define roles and 
expectations that make for stable and secure interaction. Without standard rules, what is 
known as the rule of law would be severely threatened, as there would be no universally 
known principles for judging the decisions of office holders and the actions of the 
citizens.
151
 Rulers could act arbitrarily and get away with it. Citizens could suffer rights 
violations without having an impartial judge to appeal to. This is where a unitary system 
offers a lot of comfort. Within it, every individual is regarded as a rights bearer, even if 
abstractly, for which reason its system of rules is in principle dissociated from 
particularistic social interest and appears non-politicised. Therefore, freedom and 
equality, even if they are abstract, are secured. 
What principled objections could be posed to such a unitary system? One is that 
the formal equality of the system masks the ways in which the arrangements would 
advantage some groups and disadvantage others. Under the unitary system, the 
educational advantages of the Igbos would have enabled them obtain key positions in 
the East and in the North. But given the salience of ethnic identity, they would have 
occupied these positions not as individuals but as representatives of their kinship and 
ethnic groups. This underlying socio-cultural reality meant that a unitary system based 
on individual rights would have functioned quite differently in Nigeria of the 1950s 
from the way it functioned in Europe and America in the same period. For the above 
reason, therefore, the objections from the Yorubas and others to the Igbo proposal had 
some foundation in justice. 
It was T. H. Marshall, who analysed the tension in universal citizenship by 
showing the dis juncture between its claims to political equality and the actual inability 
of the industrial working class to exercise political rights. Before him, R. H. Tawney 
had in the early 1920s warned that British society would fall apart if the extension of 
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political equality was unaccompanied by the grant of social and economic rights to the 
economically disadvantaged.
152
 Marshall, writing after the 1920s, rested the integration 
of British society on the extension of citizenship to the social sphere, that is, the grant of 
social and welfare rights to the weak.
153
 
The British case would confirm the real fears of the Yoruba that common 
citizenship rights, by themselves, do not promise equal inclusion in the political 
community. Whereas, in the British case, it was the economically weak that were 
excluded despite their possession of common rights of citizenship, in the Nigeria case, it 
was ethnic groups that feared exclusion. Whereas, in Britain, the response to exclusion 
was the empowerment of the weak, in Nigeria, the response took the form of calls for 
states to accommodate ethnic difference. On the basis of the above therefore, despite its 
qualities, the unitary system was unjust. Moreover, it could not have fostered national 
unity. 
Consider now the Northern claims for a loose federation of three regions- which 
latter changed to a demand for political break up. Horowitz has argued that the 
juxtaposition of groups in a common political environment creates anxiety about 
possible domination by those regarded as more advanced- in terms of being 
proportionately more educated and more represented in the professions and in the 
modern sector of the economy.
154
 Horowitz’s argument falls within the domain of 
psychology because fear, apprehension or anxiety has to do with the response of the 
human mind to perceived external stimulus. Reactions may be exaggerated if they are 
disproportionately out of tune with the perceived danger, or irrational if the perception 
is false. Some would regard the fear and anxiety of Northern leaders as an exaggerated 
and irrational reaction to a false perception. However, this is not enough to brush aside 
their case because the apprehension not only existed, but also provided the context for 
their inflexibility and what one could regard to be the extremity of their demands. 
Understandably, the decision of the British to de-colonise raised the issue of 
who would exercise power and, among the Muslim leaders of the North; it caused 
anxiety about the future of their Islamic culture. The connection between power and the 
preservation of Muslim culture has to be grasped in order to make a fair judgement 
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about Northern leaders’ claims for a federation of three regions or a political break up. 
Recall that Muslim leaders of the North agreed to the political amalgamation of 1914 on 
condition that the region be shielded from Western influences and administered 
separately from the South. Cultural and religious survival were tied to the exercise of 
political power or, better still, to governance. This connection made Northern leaders 
perceive with trepidation a unified Nigeria in which Southerners who are not Muslims 
would occupy policy making positions in government. The need to secure cultural and 
religious identities, more than anything else, explains the tenacity of demands for 
recognition of the North as a region that had to be, at most, in loose political partnership 
with other regions. 
 On the basis of the above, therefore, the point about cultural identity providing 
the basis for normative claims was very relevant. For example, Will Kymlicka 
persuasively argued that cultural identity is a prerequisite for the moral worth of 
individuals and their ability to make moral claims which liberalism cherishes and 
attempts to secure for all citizens. Taylor took similar position when he argued that our 
identity is shaped by the recognition we receive from others. This engenders demands 
for equal recognition that requires respecting different cultural identities. One influential 
theorist whose ideas were not discussed in detail for lack of space is Iris Marion Young. 
According to her, liberal democracy is committed to equality in the political 
community, and attempts at achieving it will require affirming difference. She gives two 
reasons, but the important one for the purpose of the task at hand is that cultural groups 
excluded from the political process have distinctive needs which can only be met 
through differentiated policies.
155
 These arguments about normative value of cultural 
difference compel us to give weight to the sort of claims that were made by Northern 
leaders. Giving weight to their claims would entail recognising the region as being 
constituted primarily in large part by a single cultural group. 
Although the North was made up of several ethnic groups, a greater part of it 
was unified by Islamic culture. It is true that some Islamic groups in the region either 
maintained their independence from the Emirate rule.
156
 But it is also true that such 
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groups- especially the Kanuri in the North-Eastern end of the region and the Hausa of 
Kano-Kaduna axis regards Islam as defining their value system and identity. Despite 
internal opposition to the Emirate rule, the values and symbols of Islam provided a 
common bond, thus creating a corporate identity. In this respect, one could speak of a 
greater part of the region as having an Islamic Weltanschauung.
157
 It was no surprise 
that Northern leaders boasted of ‘Islamic brotherhood’ being ‘stronger than blood’.158  
Neither was it a surprise that there was coherence and united front among the leaders 
when they appeared in the several Constitutional Conferences to make their demands. 
At no time was there any dissension or disagreement within their ranks. Ted Gurr may 
have been justified when he argued that group cohesion is a key factor that makes 
people subordinates their personal preferences to those of their group.
159
 
Given the above arguments, a grant of autonomy to the region would have been 
one way of responding to claims of Northern leaders. The problem is that this option 
would have entailed treating Non-Muslim ethnic minorities of the region as sharing the 
same aspiration with the numerically dominant Muslim groups. The former were as 
opposed to Southern political dominance of the region as the latter, and both were 
united in calls for the exclusion of Southerners from political and administrative 
positions in the region. But this was where their common aspiration ended. It had no 
depth. The bonds were too thin and fragile to serve as a basis for common political life. 
This is not to suggest that different groups cannot unite in a political unit if a sense of 
shared future exists.
160
 The point is that, if the basis for unity is some kind of shared 
values, then what existed between the two sets of groups was not enough. Culturally 
they were very different. Most of the Non-Muslim minorities repelled political conquest 
and cultural assimilation during the 19th century and during the colonial era; they 
resisted the imposition of Islamic legal systems and cultural practices over their 
customary ways of life. Meeting claims for autonomy of the region would have 
threatened their political and cultural security. This would have opened the door to 
                                                 
157
 A point to note is that, the dissenting Muslim groups of Kano-Kaduna and the independent ones of 
Borno were more for the political reform of the Islamic Weltanschauung and not against its existence.  
See Simeon O. Ilesanmi, Religious Pluralism and the Nigerian State (Athens: Ohio University Centre for 
International Studies, 1997), 140-141. 
158
 John O. Panden, Ahmadu Bello Sardauna of Sokoto: Values and Leadership in Nigeria (Portsmouth, 
N.H: Heinemann Educational Books, 1986), 285.  
159
 See Ted Gurr and Barbara Harff, Ethnic Conflict in World Politics (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994), 
84. See also, Peter M. Lewis, ‘Nigeria: Elections in a Fragile Regime’, Journal of Democracy, 14 (3), 
(2003), 131–44. 
160
 See Rothchild, Managing Ethnic Conflict in Africa, (1997), 31-32. 
 75 
 
separatist claims, as it latter emerged after independence and especially from the 
1990s.
161
  
Another alternative would have been to do nothing. Leave intact the three 
regions within a quasi-federal system in which they have no autonomy. This alternative 
leaned more towards unitarianism which Northern leaders were opposed to, and 
adopting it would have deepened conflict. In this case, the 8 point declaration would 
have culminated in Northern secession. Non-Muslim minorities in the region would 
have been taken along, perhaps against their will, and domination and new secession 
claims would have emerged in the new state.  
What alternative was desirable? The preceding arguments show that each claim 
by the three regional elites had its own strengths and weaknesses. A desirable 
alternative should not be blind to them. The critical issue is what alternative 
arrangement was desirable and feasible, given the strengths and weaknesses of each 
claim? 
One alternative arrangement would have been an arrangement that derived from 
Rawlsian type of agreement.
162
 In this scheme, representatives of free and equal citizens 
negotiate fair terms of social cooperation in an original positioning which none has 
bargaining advantage over others. The original position is created by eliminating 
contingencies of the social world e.g. historical circumstances, natural endowments, 
social position, ethnicity and moral doctrines of those represented. Thus, symmetrically 
situated behind a veil of ignorance, representatives of free citizens cannot forestall who 
would occupy the top or lower positions of society being formed, but they are rational.  
To be more specific, in the Rawlsian model, the regional leaders had to leave 
behind them all particular social interests of their people, single out primary goods and 
negotiate impartial principles that would assign and guarantee them. The agreement 
would, therefore, be in the interest of everyone in general and not any person or group 
in particular. A blind agreement, if it were ever possible to make such, would have been 
contested by Northern leaders, and by leaders of the Western region. This is because the 
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veil of ignorance eliminates substantial differences among groups, thus establishing a 
universal standpoint that the Igbos desired. The list of primary goods derived from the 
universal condition guarantees the rights of abstract individuals which in effect, amount 
to universal citizenship rights that Northern leaders and leaders of the Western region 
were deadly opposed to. This in essence means that the blind contract delivers an 
arrangement in which members have universal rights, very much in consonance with 
Igbo demand for unitarianism, and very much against commitment of the Muslim North 
to regional autonomy or the commitment of the Yoruba to a federation of ethnic 
regions. As argued above, this was not fair in the Nigerian context and would have 
intensified ethno-political conflict. 
 A possible alternative would have been one that combined elements of all forms 
of arrangement demanded by the three regional leaders, something akin to Aristotle’s 
mixed constitution. Confronted with competing claims for monarchical, democratic and 
aristocratic systems of government, and the prospect of each being perverse and 
unstable, Aristotle came up with a Composite Constitution as the most desirable. The 
idea involved mixing institutions in whole or in part from competing constitutions. 
According to him, the more the mixture the more equitable; and the more equitable the 
more durable.
163
 
 Taking a middle course that balanced the interest of the three parties would have 
entailed extracting and blending parts of the institutional features of ethnic federalism, 
of a unitary system, and of a confederal system. Such a composite arrangement would 
have been inclusive of, and fair for the three parties, but un-practicable. Extracting and 
fusing institutional features of the three constitutional systems is not something that can 
easily be done. It could, perhaps be achieved, if the parties making claims were 
represented and assigned specific roles in government, rather like the composite 
Constitution of Cicero.
164
 But this would still have required a framework that is either a 
unitary, federation of ethnic groups, or confederation of the three regions. 
Apart from its practical difficulties, a mixed regime, assuming it was possible to 
have one, would have been in the exclusive interest of those whose claims it reflected. 
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Ethnic minorities that had no place in the constitutional negotiation processes and 
whose voices were not heard on that account, stood to be excluded from such a deal. In 
short, a composite regime would have been a regime of the dominant groups exclusive 
of ethnic minorities. 
A third alternative might have been the softening of claims in order to reach a 
mutually acceptable compromise. Rothchild has argued that the potential for conflict 
resolution is greater when group leaders make negotiable demands, or are willing to 
moderate their extreme claims.
165
 True, for the leaders to reach a reasonable agreement, 
it was necessary that they soften their claims in order to bridge the gaps that separated 
them. Such trade-offs were a pragmatic way of reaching agreement on a mutually 
accommodative normative arrangement. Instead of advancing inflexible demands that 
would result in confrontation and intense conflict, the leaders dropped aspects of their 
demands that were mutually unacceptable. For example, the Northern leaders dropped 
their claim for confederation and instead agreed for a federal union. Eastern leaders also 
made a concession by dropping their unitary demand for a federation of the existing 
three regions. In return, leaders of the Western region backed-off from their demand for 
a regrouping of the country on ethnic lines to agree on retention of the three regions.  
The behaviour of the regional leaders as discussed above is in following with 
Nordlinger’s principles of mutual concession, compromise and concession, the two of 
the six strategies for reducing conflict.
166
 The cost of not going by that principle is self-
consuming conflict, and the reward for following is peace. The principle made for an 
arrangement that was neither unitary, confederal, nor ethnic federalism. The 
arrangement, therefore, had an element of neutrality and at the same time gave each of 
the three negotiating parties a self-governing right to its territory. 
Pragmatic as it was, the federal arrangement was imperfect because it rested on 
the mutual advantages of the regional leaders and the majority ethnic groups they were 
representing. It did not accommodate the interests and claims of some minority ethnic 
groups as was made by their elites. Although the 1957/58 Commission argued this was 
not feasible, it would be necessary to examine the claims of minorities to determine if 
the agreement for a federation of three regions was the best possible. 
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3.3.2 Minorities’ Claims for Recognition in Separate States 
Some have argued, and very strongly too, that separatist demands were a strategy by 
elites to gain access to power and resources. For example, in his book on class 
formation and state creation in Nigeria, Eme Ekekwe argued that there was no 
correlation between minority membership and demands for new states. He argued that 
the demands were made by elites who belonged to parties in opposition and had no 
patronage from the ruling government.
167
 This set of politicians, according to him, 
withdrew their demands when allowed some access to power. To buttress his point, he 
cited the case of the Western region where a subgroup of the Yorubas most of whom 
were of the NCNC, and therefore in opposition to the ruling AG, demanded for the 
Central Yoruba and Ondo States. The purpose of the demand was purely to comprise 
the Yorubas’ Western region. He also referred to the Midwest, where 
The Oba of Benin in 1953 clearly demonstrated this case. Upon being offered the position 
of “Minister without Portfolio” in 1956 by the AG government, he accepted it ostensibly in 
the best interest of his people. Thereafter he “ceased” to be connected with the opposition 
and … campaign for the Midwest State Movement.168 
 
He also gave a similar illustration with the demand for Middle Belt State from the 
North.
169
 As relevant as the above illustrations are, in these arguments, Ekekwe has, 
however, overlooked the importance of mentioning that separatist demands dated back 
to the provincial and regional conferences of 1949 well before the advent of competitive 
party politics. He also failed to take note of the fact that intense pre-colonial hostilities 
between Yoruba subgroups were opened as the British set to de-colonise and some 
factions tried to counter the others by seeking external alliance. This thesis will not 
refute his argument in detail; however, the tenacity of the demands, despite defections 
by some of the leaders, is enough to warrant looking beyond the narrow self-interest of 
elites. Separatist demands may have been used by some elites to advance their self-
interest agenda, but what is important is the normative value of the demands. The 
demands would not have been used as a mask if they had no normative importance. 
 Ted Robert Gurr has shown that autonomy demands are associated with identity 
groups desiring security and protection, and that the reluctance of public officials to 
accommodate them intensifies conflict and sometimes leads to open warfare.
170
 
Demands by elites and their groups, both majority and minority, were driven by the fear 
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that they would suffer political subjection and would not feel at home when the British 
handed over power. Despite the conflicting nature of the demands, they were united by 
a common purpose, to achieve a fair and acceptable arrangement that would make for 
peaceful co-existence. Hobbes’s thesis about tacit consent, formulated in a different 
context, could be modified and applied here. His thesis states that a group of persons 
tacitly consent to peace if, of their own free will, they decide to join others who are 
assembling to renounce lawlessness.
171
 In the context of ethnic relations, one could 
modify it by saying that groups whose leaders are making claims for a normative 
political arrangement are implicitly asking for peace. The reasoning here is that conflict 
is bound to erupt if outlets for the expression of group demands are denied, repressed, or 
closed.
172
 
 Indeed, it was the exclusion of minorities from the Constitutional negotiation 
process that intensified their demands for autonomy. The several and periodic 
Constitutional Conferences were convened with the express purpose of negotiating a 
framework for political life. This required that diverse voices be heard and considered. 
This turned out not to be so, as majority group members dominated the Constitutional 
process and excluded minority views. The agreement for a political federation of three 
regions was, therefore, not reflective of the interest of minorities. It was more reflective 
of the interest of dominant groups. For example, for the Muslim Northerners, the 
agreement offered protection from the Christian and educationally advanced 
Southerners. For the Yoruba, it was a shield against the ambitious Igbo, and even for the 
latter, it guaranteed political right to their region, at the least.
173
 It was not for anything 
that Richard Sklar referred to the compromise agreement that produced the arrangement 
as the ‘principle of regional security’.174 This argument merely shows that the 
compromise political arrangement was for the chief benefit of majority groups. The 
issue of normative weight of minority demands still has to be established. 
 Political inclusion was the chief objective of minority demands and, to this 
extent; one could say they were demanding equal political treatment. Equality in the 
                                                 
171
 See Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan. C.B. Macpherson, (ed.); (Harmondsworth (Middlesex): Penguin 
Books, 1976), Part II chapter 18, 231. 
172
 For more of this argument, see John Boye Ejobowah, ‘Liberal Multiculturalism and the Problem of 
Institutional Instability’, in Bruce Berman, Dickson Eyo and Will Kymlicka (eds.); Ethnicity and 
Democracy in Africa (Oxford and Athens: James Curry and Ohio University Press, 2004), 301-316. 
173
 The agreement made it possible for each region to close its elective and civil service positions to 
citizens whose ethnic origin was not traceable to it, thus violating individual rights. 
174
 See Richard Sklar, ‘Nigerian Government in Perspective’ in Robert Melson and Howard Wolpe, 
(eds.); Nigeria: Modernisation and the Politics of Communalism, 46. 
 80 
 
political community is one of the chief attributes of liberal democracy and one would 
expect that the process of transiting from colonial subjection to parliamentary 
democracy would offer hopes that the attribute will become a reality. However, the 
transition process proved early enough that classical liberal democracy could not 
reconcile itself with equality and freedom. Why?   
The disappointment lay in the hidden assumption of liberal theory that people 
belonging to a homogenous culture constitute a political society. This was mentioned in 
the social contract theories of Locke and Rousseau in which atomised individuals 
sharing the same cultural life associate in a political society. It was more explicit in the 
utilitarian Mill.
175
 In contemporary times, it is seen in the liberalism of Rawls and 
Dworkin which constructs principles of justice by overlooking difference. Universal 
liberal theory grew out of a cultural milieu specific to some European societies and did 
not reflect heterogeneity that prevailed elsewhere.  
In Nigeria for instance, the underlying assumption of a free and responsive 
government emerging from open political competition were contradicted by ethnic 
voting and the emergence of governments responsive to the groups that brought them 
into office. Impartial rules that were supposed to ensure fairness in the distribution of 
societal goods and privileges turned out to work unintentionally to the advantage of 
some groups. In some cases it was openly partial and worked in self-contradictory 
manner. For example, the educated Igbo who moved to the North and other parts of the 
country as clerks argued for universal citizenship rights. Yet they retained very strong 
loyalty to their homeland and closed off positions in the public service by bringing in 
their kin groups to fill vacant spots. By the time groups in the North became conscious 
of what was going on, the Igbos had monopolised civil service positions in the 
region.
176
 The partiality and contradictory working of liberal principles meant that they 
were not quite appropriate for the country. The heterogeneous ethnic make-up of the 
country required that liberal rules be adjusted to take account of cultural specifics on the 
ground. 
 The need to redefine liberal rules of justice to make them more responsive to 
cultural difference was recognised by elites of both majority and minority ethnic groups. 
In fact, the solution to the problem of liberal equality and difference was initiated by 
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elites of the majority ethnic groups when they made arguments for a federation in which 
groups would be free from political and cultural domination. Their arguments proposed 
what Melissa Williams would refer to as the ‘political solution to the problem of 
difference’.177 That is, they sought for the explicit recognition of groups by asking for a 
redefinition of the rules of justice not in an abstract philosophic plane, but in the very 
process of politics. It was their political arguments and solutions that set off the several 
Constitutional negotiations, beginning in 1949. They initiated it all and the minorities 
then followed. In principle, both sets of groups ought to have been treated equally in 
terms of political recognition. If the compromise of federal arrangement was good for 
the numerically strong because it promised them freedom from oppression, then the 
numerically weak needed it most. This was voiced by a representative to the 1950 
General Conference when he observed that:  
If a region as large as the North can have … fears it is understandable that minor tribes in 
Nigeria must be anxious that adequate and unmistakable provisions are made to safeguard 
their survival, and assurance of place for them in the new Nigeria.
178 
 
So far, this sub-section of the chapter has been able to present the minorities’ demands 
for equal political recognition. The problem that immediately arises is balancing the 
‘ought to’ with realities on the ground. A desirable prescription might not be 
practicable, and on the other hand, what is realistic might not be desirable. But between 
these poles there could be a middle course. There were social circumstances on the 
ground that seemed to have made separation infeasible. Firstly, although the demands 
for separate states were identifiable with multiple minority groups contiguously located 
in each region, they did not originate from, and were not unanimously supported by all. 
There were some who felt safer with the status quo because they thought it was more 
tolerable to be dominated by some distant groups than to be subjected to an immediate 
neighbour who would occupy majority position in the new state.
179
 For example, in the 
Western region, some groups did not want to be part of a Midwest State in which they 
would be numerically inferior and dominated by their next door neighbour. This was 
true of the Itsekiri whose aristocrats exercised power over their numerically superior 
Urhobo and Ijaw- before the declaration of colonial rule, but feared that in a Midwest 
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State the use of majoritarian vote would reverse power. Their leaders reacted by 
claiming ethnic affiliation with the Yoruba and by opting to be in the Western region. 
 Similarly, in the Eastern region, the Rivers State demand ran into difficulties 
because the Ikwerre and the Ogba regarded the Ijaw as likely to be the majority group if 
the Western region Ijaw were included. Their leaders opposed the demand on this 
ground, but were ready to support it if they were granted majority status by an exclusion 
of the Western Ijaw from the state. Thus, in the proposed new states those who were to 
be in minority knew their fate in advance and were therefore not prepared to support or 
be included in a new state that would make them a minority group. In this context, the 
creation of each additional state, once established, contained potential new states, while 
new minorities would emerge with accusations of being dominated and oppressed.  
The above problem was not simply one of drawing new boundaries, but it 
threatened social and political stability and reminded the dilemma of both the ‘camel’s 
nose theory’ and the ‘domino theory’. The camel’s nose theory holds that if the nose is 
let inside, the whole beast will soon follow. Some Israelis use this to justify their 
rejection of autonomy demands by Gaza and West Bank Palestinians. The domino 
theory, on the other hand, has to do with threatening prospect that the grant of 
recognition poses for larger groups containing subgroups, and for the stability of the 
country.
180
 This could be illustrated with some inland Yoruba subgroups, the Ekiti and 
Ibadans, who demanded recognition in two separate states on account of their rivalry 
with sister subgroups. Minority demands were already influencing some subgroups of 
the major groups engaged in rivalry and competition to claim difference and make 
claims for separation. At the international level it could be illustrated with the 
threatening prospect that the cascading defection of the Soviet Republics posed for other 
heterogeneous states. The lesson of those defections was used by Russia to deny 
Chechnya’s claims to autonomy. 
 In addition, each of the three sets of regional elites perceived separation 
demands as threats to regional power and security and were out to resist it by all means 
including the use of force. For example, Northern leaders regarded the entire region as 
having been ruled by their ‘great-great-grandfather’s family through their Lieutenants or 
by the great Shehus of Bornu’. They wondered why ‘a long slice of country running 
along both sides of the Rivers Niger and Benue, with an extension to cover the Plateau 
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and Southern Zaria’, would be slashed off.181 They invoked war to defend the region’s 
territorial boundaries. Similarly, the NCNC leadership was strongly opposed to the 
division of the East, despite their argument for splitting the country into smaller regions 
to make for a stronger centre and a united country. While they declared that the region 
‘cannot stand dismemberment’ after the 1954 separation of the UN Trust Territory of 
Southern Cameroon, the Igbo State Union, a cultural organisation of Igbos all over the 
country threatened war if Port-Harcourt or any other Igbo land was separated.
182
 The 
position of the AG was clear: it would not gratuitously maximise the interest of its 
opponents by agreeing to the dismemberment of the West. It agreed to states creation on 
condition that it is carried out simultaneously in all three regions. 
 With these positions, acceding to minorities’ demands could precipitate conflict 
at two levels: one between a region’s majority group and its break-away minorities, and 
the other between rival regional elites patronising the exit of the other’s aggrieved 
minorities. In other words, doing what was right would have opened the gate to war and 
confusion.
183
 And therefore, the ought to was contradicted by practical realities on the 
ground. 
What option was desirable and feasible? The thesis would not provide a definite 
answer to this question at this stage, but it will try to spell out the dangers of prioritising 
the ‘is’ over the ‘ought’. One of the dangers is the transfer of minority problems into 
independence, together with the strategic power games of the regional elites. Political 
independence was expected to usher in liberal democracy whose defining attributes are 
its concern for (the Kantian) moral equality of persons and opposition to injustice that 
manifests as domination of some by others. Now, rejecting the claims of minority 
groups opened a gulf between democracy and justice, and aggrieved minorities entered 
independence demanding that justice to be done.
184
 Also, electoral politics which 
premises the formation of government on majority vote would prompt the dominant 
regional elites to link up with and patronise aggrieved minorities of rival regions. In this 
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context there was no way political confrontation was going to be avoided. The British 
played the role of third party mediators by responding to moments of crises and 
convening conferences to broker deals among the dominant regional actors. But, with 
their departure, the field was going to be open for a free fight and fall. 
 Another danger, and this is related to what has just been said is that, down the 
road, minority demands would have to be addressed and a showdown between the 
dominant regional actors would be inevitable. The 1957/58 Conference agreed on, and 
inserted in the new Constitution, specific procedures for states creation after 
independence. But, without the mediator role of the British, the three dominant parties 
were not going to come to a fair agreement on how many states should be created from 
each region. For example, during the 1957 Conference, the NCNC insisted on the 
division of the Western region into four states; namely, the Lagos and Colony State, the 
Midwest State, Central Yoruba State, and Kolanut and Cassava States.
185
 During the 
Willink Commission, the NCNC initiated demands for two of these, beside the Midwest 
which it supported. On its part, the AG, other than being the senior ally of the 
movements for the separation of minority groups in the Eastern and Northern regions, 
was also committed as ever to an adjustment of boundaries to bring the Yoruba of the 
North into the Western region. On the other hand, the NPC had always been consistent 
with its attitude of not breaching any violation of the North’s territorial boundaries. To 
postpone political separation until after independence, was to postpone the inevitable, a 
violent confrontation between the regional powers. The best way of avoiding conflict 
would have been for the British colonial administrators to use their position to separate 
aggrieved minorities in different regions. After all, political power- according to Hume 
is instituted in societies to promote justice. Therefore the British should have used 
Hume’s position to convince elites of the major groups to accept an arrangement that 
aimed at enthroning justice. 
 The practical difficulty that remains to be resolved was the refusal of some 
minorities to be included in the states that were demanded. The difficulty could be 
presented in this way: should just claims to separation be denied if they do not win the 
express consent of some groups, call them minorities within minorities whose territory 
are within the separatist unit? 
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 Reg Whitaker has examined a similar problem in Canada where French speaking 
Quebec has made repeated attempts at asserting sovereignty. Within the province are 
scattered Aboriginal bands that refuse to accept Quebec’s claim to self-determination as 
binding on them. In dealing with the problem of whether Quebec’s claim can be 
imposed on the Aboriginal people without their consent, Whitaker argues that there 
should be levels of negotiation: one, between the rest of Canada and Quebec for the 
right of the latter to separate; and two, between French Quebeckers and Aboriginals for 
mutual recognition of rights in the new unit that would come into being. Without 
negotiations for the recognition of rights, one party may resort to means that may 
prepare the way for mutual self-destruction.
186
 
 Whitaker’s argument is similar to the argument that was made earlier on, that 
Nigeria risked catastrophe if minorities asking for equal political recognition as majority 
groups were not separated in new states. The new thing that emerges from analysis of 
the Canadian case is that fractions of minority groups opposed to separation have moral 
claims that should be respected and that a clash of rights could be avoided by having 
negotiations. The fact that some minorities were opposed to other minorities was not an 
irresolvable problem. They were not as strongly opposed to separation as the dominant 
regional elites and those they were representing. Their opposition was more apparent 
than real, for they actively supported the demands when they were sure of commanding 
the most dominant and influential positions, but changed their mind when it was clear 
they would be disadvantaged. 
 Take the example of the demand for the Midwest State from the Western region. 
The sub-Igbo group such as the Ishekiri and Urhobo within it preferred a merger with 
the main Igbo of the Eastern region. But, they did not mind being in the Midwest, as 
they were sure of commanding a large share of influential political positions. This bred 
fear among the Edo who were to be the most numerically dominant.
187
 Also, take the 
example of the Rivers State demand: The Ikwerre and Ahoada people-who spoke 
varieties of Igbo dialect unintelligible to the hinterland Igbo, actively supported demand 
for the state, but changed their position on account of proposals for the inclusion of the 
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Western Ijaw with the Rivers Ijaw. Without the Western Ijaw they would have enjoyed 
numerical superiority, but with the inclusion they would have played second fiddle to 
the larger 1jaw group.
188
 These examples show that, despite the mutual distrust and fear, 
minority groups were not fundamentally apart on the desire for states. The issue was 
which group-members would rule and who would be ruled in the new states. Resolving 
this problem required rounds of Constitutional Conferences on power sharing and 
institutional checks to domination. 
 When the majority ethnic elites disagreed over membership of the political 
community, several Constitutional Conferences were held to negotiate an agreement. It 
was in the course of negotiations that minorities’ claims to equal membership arose. 
Logically, and to be fair, new sets of Conferences involving minorities ought to have 
been held. Minorities-focused Conferences would have produced compromises on 
power sharing and institutional checks to domination in the new states that were 
demanded. In sum, an alternative political arrangement in which minority groups would 
receive equal political treatment as majority groups was desirable and feasible. In fact, 
the British reluctantly suggested a plebiscite and further Constitutional negotiations to 
put such arrangement in place, but the majority ethnic elites opted to short change it for 
speedy independence. 
 
3.4 Summary 
This chapter aimed to discuss and evaluate competing claims for, and state building 
approaches and constitutional agreements regarding a desirable political arrangement 
for the country that were negotiated during the several Constitutional Conferences that 
preceded the formal grant of independence, and the minorities’ claims for recognition in 
separate states. 
After a detailed discussion of the various claims regarding the type of political 
arrangement and the claims of the minorities, the discussion shows conflicting claims 
for a political federation of ethnic groups. For instance, the Igbo group proposed a 
unitary system blind to ethnic difference and diversity, whereas, the Yoruba group 
proposed a loose political partnership of the three regions. Each of the types of political 
arrangement proposed by the three majority groups for the country had their own 
strengths and weaknesses. A desirable state building arrangement had to be one that 
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took account of the strength and weaknesses of all claims. In this respect, a political 
framework produced by the Rawlsian type of agreement would have been inadequate 
because of its bias for the minorities. An option could have been an arrangement that 
combined institutional elements of all the three political systems that were demanded by 
the three majority groups, but this is not feasible in view of the multi-ethnic nature of 
the Nigerian society. 
A more realistic alternative was a compromise arrangement that required 
claimants to soften their claims and make mutual adjustments and concessions. In this 
respect, the 1953/54 compromise agreement that nearly liquidated the centre and gave 
full autonomy to the three regions was a pragmatic one. But, it was grounded on the 
interest of the three majority groups and their elites who dominated both the regions and 
the national arena. Its pragmatism was contradicted by the unjust refusal to extend equal 
political recognition to some minorities who demanded separation in new states. 
Although there were practical difficulties regarding political separation, they were not 
beyond resolution. Evidence suggests that the British were prepared to convene further 
Constitutional Conferences to resolve any difficulty that would arise, if independence 
would be postponed. But having secured constitutional agreements that grounded 
political arrangements on the advantages of themselves and their groups, members of 
the majority group elite refused to compromise the immediate transfer of power by the 
British.
189
 
Based on the discussion in this chapter, it is clear that right from the pre-
independence days to the present, one of the greatest challenges facing Nigeria has been 
how to reflect its plural composition within the framework of a united country. This was 
manifested in the competing claims by the various dominant groups in the country on the 
type of political system to be adopted during the de-colonisation period. The type of 
political system was particularly important because it would structure power relations 
and determine which ethno-regional group would be politically dominant. 
Of all the opposing proposals/positions by the elites of the three majority groups 
on how best to accommodate multiple groups in the country, no doubt, each claim by 
the three regional elites had its own strengths and weaknesses. Thus, the critical issue is 
what alternative arrangement was desirable and feasible, given the strengths and 
weaknesses of each claim? Despite the conflicting nature of the demands, the political 
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elites of the major group were united by a common purpose: to achieve a fair and 
acceptable arrangement that would make for peaceful co-existence.  
Even though federalism triumphed over all the other types of political systems, 
and indeed validates the normative and empirical prescriptions that are the frameworks 
for discussing Nigeria’s attempts at coping with ethnic diversity, the federal 
arrangement that was negotiated in the pre-independence was imperfect because it 
rested on the mutual advantages of the regional leaders and the majority ethnic groups 
they were representing. It did not accommodate the interests and claims of some 
minority ethnic groups.  Because the three-group federal arrangement negotiated in the 
pre-independence serves as a connection point for discussion in the proceeding chapters 
of this thesis, the post-independence group based claims, government responses to 
them, and the recurrence of ethno-political conflicts and institutional instabilities.  
The discussion above shows that, because the type of political system that was 
negotiated was dominated by the majority groups, it generated tensions in Nigeria’s 
body politics not only among the big three, but also, as the fallout from the type of 
political system agreed upon became a platform for the minority groups to ask for 
recognition in separate states in the period immediately after the attainment of political 
independence. In conclusion, although there were practical difficulties regarding 
adopting a type of political system, the post-independence experience of group based 
claims, government responses to the claims, and the recurrence of ethno-political 
conflicts could have been resolved right from the pre-independence era through rounds 
of Constitutional Conferences that involved the representatives of both the majority and 
minority groups in the country. 
In the next chapter, the thesis shall be examining the carry-over of some of the 
group claims in the pre-independence that were not attended to, and government 
responses that are aimed at addressing the problems of multicultural composition of the 
country in the post-independence era.  
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                                                      CHAPTER FOUR 
  THE QUOTA SYSTEM AND SEPARATION OF MINORITIES APPROACH 
 
If merit and merit alone constitutes the yardstick for appointment to all jobs … including 
board appointments and award of scholarships, one would reach a position in which most 
jobs would naturally go to the most enterprising of the Nigerian tribes.
190 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Independence in 1960 marked the beginning of two important state building strategies 
for coping with ethnic difference and reducing conflict. The two strategies were 
characterised by the adoption of a Quota System of appointment into strategic 
institutions like the military and the re-division of the country into twelve states.  The 
re-division of the country into twelve states was carried out on the wake of the Nigeria-
Biafra civil war, and this was the reason for taking into account smaller groups that 
were previously denied political recognition.
191
 The chapter examines the Quota System 
and the recognition of minorities in separate states, and a normative evaluation of these 
state building strategies. 
 
4.2 The Quota System Approach 
The Quota System had its origin in the Nigerianisation policy adopted in the 1950s as 
the country moved closer to political independence. By the policy, Nigeria’s political 
achievement in terms of participation in the legislative and executive spheres of 
government was to be matched in the administrative sphere where expatriates 
dominated the civil service. The policy required the withdrawal of Europeans from both 
the federal and regional civil services and the appointment of Nigerians to fill the vacant 
positions.
192
 Since the two regions in the South had skilled personnel readily available, 
they easily filled available positions both in their regional and federal services. A large 
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number of people from the two regions, Eastern and Western, moved to the Northern 
region to take up positions in its regional service and in federal institutions.  It was 
because of this labour influx from both the Eastern and Western regions that the 
Northern regional government developed the policy of closing its public service to 
people who did not belong to the region. It did so by basing appointment into its public 
service on nativity which was depended on the ethnicity of one of the parents, while 
citizens from the two Southern regions were hired on a temporary basis. At the Federal 
level, the Northern regional government succeeded in negotiating a lower entry 
qualification for Northern applicants seeking to fill positions in the civil service.
193
 
 Restrictions regarding appointments into the regional service, and the lowering 
of Federal Civil Service entry qualifications for natives of some regions, were not 
provided for by the independence Constitution. In fact, Northern representatives to the 
independence Constitutional Conference tried, but failed, to secure an agreement for the 
use of quotas in filling the federal public service. It was the 1963 Republican 
Constitution, which while forbidding discrimination ‘against a particular community, 
tribe, place of origin, religion or political opinion’, permitted any region to implement 
policies that would protect the rights of its members to employment.
194
 This meant that 
balanced and representative appointment into the bureaucracy was not formalised at the 
national level.  
It was in the military institution that a balance was made among the three 
regions. From the mid-1950s to independence, when British disengagement was 
imminent and on course, merit was the criterion for recruiting Nigerians into the Army, 
and a greater number of applicants were from the Eastern region. Between 1955 and 
1961, about two-thirds of the officer ranks that were recruited came from the East, while 
80% of the other ranks came from the North, but two thirds of these were from the 
minority areas of the region. Fearing that one section of the country might use the Army 
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to dominate other sections, the NPC in control of the federal government, introduced 
balanced recruitment into the officer ranks in 1962. It adopted a recruitment formula by 
which 50% of military cadets were to originate from the North and the other 50% 
shared between the East and West. The 50:25:25 formulas were taken as a reflection of 
the distribution of national population among the regions. The Quota System was 
defended in the Senate by the then Minister for Army Affairs: 
We introduced the Quota System in the Army … thus preventing the possible fear that the 
Army would sometime become unreliable. If any part of the country is not represented in 
the Army, we harbour some fear that a particular section will begin to feel it is being 
dominated. But now … the country’s safety is assured.195 
 
One consequence of the quota recruitment was that the North’s share of officers 
commissioned in l963/4 rose to 42% compared with 21% in 1960. By 1966, the upper 
crust of the military was still dominated by Easterners mainly Igbo but the use of quota 
in appointment and promotion blocked the acceleration of the middle ranking level 
officers to captains and major levels from the East and West.
196
 It was this grievance 
that partly led to the January 1966 major’s coup that violently terminated the already 
fragile NPC/NCNC coalition government of the First Republic.
197
 
Another consequence was the reproduction of societal cleavages and conflict in 
the military. The coherence and command structure of the military was weakened as 
ethno-regional identification and attachment displaced loyalty to superior officers. Non-
commissioned officers openly flouted military norms by refusing to take orders from 
the superior officers who were not of their ethnic region. A case in point was a Northern 
sergeant who told a Brigadier of Western region origin, who was also the most senior 
officer in the Army in July 1966 ‘I do not take orders from you until my captain 
comes’.198 
Even with the above consequences of the Quota System, it was still in place 
until on the eve of the 1967 civil war, when the fear that Regional Armies will emerge 
within the military and the need to have a centralised and hierarchical, combat ready, 
espirit de corps Army that would defeat secession led to an abandonment of the Quota 
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System. It is important to note that the response to the fear came too late because, at this 
time, the Army was already divided along ethno-regional lines, and by 1966 there were 
infighting in the Army. For example, there were coups and counter-coups all of which 
resulted in the declaration of secession by the Eastern faction of the Nigerian Army led 
by Lieutenant Colonel Emeka Odumegwu Ojukwu. Because of the declaration of 
secession, recruitment into the Nigerian Army was instead reverted to be based on 
individual merit and fitness irrespective of region and ethnic of origin in order to have 
enough recruits to execute the Nigerian-Biafran war.  
After the civil war in 1970, the Quota System was thought to have been 
abandoned forever as some high ranking military officers publicly declared that there 
were no plans to introduce ethnic balancing in the post-civil war political 
rehabilitation.
199
 However, various segments of the Nigerian society made demands for 
the use of quota for admission into federal institutions including Universities and 
military schools. By 1975 the Quota System was back, this time not only in the military, 
but also in other civil institutions including the civil service. It was later formalised by a 
Federal Character Constitution that was designed in 1976 and which became 
operational during the civilian administration of Alhaji Aliyu Usman Shehu Shagari in 
1979.
200
 
 
4.3 The 1963 and 1967 Separation of the Minorities into States Approach 
The 1960s separation of ethnic minorities into new states was not consciously done; 
rather it was the unexpected outcome of power struggles among the dominant parties. 
The setting was provided by the 1959 Federal elections where no party won an absolute 
majority of votes, although the NPC won the greatest number. To form a government, 
NPC leadership invited its two major rivals, the AG and the NCNC to join in a three-
way coalition. The NPC leadership had the belief that Government and Opposition as 
inherited from the West was unsuitable for the country because of its multi-ethnic 
composition.
201
 However, the NPC needed both parties in order to form a government 
with the power to legislate in Parliament. The NCNC leadership accepted the invitation, 
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while the AG leadership turned it down and went to form the Opposition, very much to 
the consternation of a faction of its leaders who thought that joining the coalition would 
bring public service jobs and positions in government boards to the Yorubas. The 
refusal split the AG into two factions in 1962 setting off a crisis within the party. 
 As expected, the NPC/NCNC coalition soon ran into difficulties. As already 
discussed above, the introduction of the Quota System for recruitment into the Army 
worked against Easterners, especially Igbos. The NCNC also regarded the coalition as 
yielding more benefits to the NPC in terms of government jobs, patronage, and the 
location of infrastructural projects. For instance, by 1964, the NCNC had accumulated a 
list of grievances. An official document was released in that year which detailed 
Northern gains:  
Take a look at what they (i.e. the NPC) have done with the little power we surrendered to 
them to preserve a unity which does not exist: Kainji dam project- about 150 million 
pounds of our money when completed- all in the North; Borno railway extension- about 75 
million pounds of our money when completed- all in the North. Spending over 50 million 
pounds on the Northern Nigerian Army in the name of the Federal Republic; Military 
training and all ammunition factories and installations are based in the North, thereby using 
your money to train Northerners to fight Southerners. Building the dam site to link Sokoto 
cement works, - 7 million pounds when completed- all in the North. Total of all of these 
four projects is about 262 million pounds. Now they have refused to allow an iron and steel 
industry in the East and (have) paid experts to produce distorted report.
202
  
 
Despite the above long list of grievances, the NCNC did not break off from the 
coalition. Instead it sought to wrestle power from the NPC, its senior ally, and to do so 
it had to shore-up its strength in the Federal Legislature. The AG crisis provided the 
NCNC the opportunity for calling on the Coalition Government to divide the Western 
region with the expectation that the new units that would emerge would fall under its 
control. 
 The NPC saw the crisis within the AG and consequent breakdown of law and 
order in the Western region as an opportunity to eliminate the AG which had been 
carrying out its opposition in the Federal Legislature in a confrontational and 
embarrassing manner. It also saw the occasion as an opportunity to prove to the NCNC 
what would be its lot if it was not pliable and submissive as a junior ally.
203
 It was in 
this context that the Coalition Government used constitutional means to carve the 
Midwest out of the Western region in 1963, which immediately fell under the political 
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control of the NCNC, and this attempt thus increased the coalition party’s bargaining 
power.
204
 
In 1966 ethnic fighting within the military caused a coup and a counter coup in 
January and July, respectively. These events gave rise to an ad hoc Constitutional 
Conference held in September 1966 whose aim was to debate and recommend the most 
suitable Constitutional arrangements for the country. Debates shifted between claims to 
political confederation and arguments for the creation of new states from the existing 
regions. However, the killing of Igbos residing in the North, especially in Kano abruptly 
terminated the Conference. At the same time, the military government of the Eastern 
region under the leadership of Odumegwu Ojukwu convened a Consultative Assembly 
of Easterners to decide on the secession from the Federal Republic of Nigeria. To pre-
empt the declaration of Biafra Republic, the federal military government divided the 
country into a total of twelve states of which about six were controlled by minorities. Its 
goal was to fragment minorities of the East into new states so that they would challenge 
Biafran secession, and to meet the pre-independence aspirations of Northern minorities 
as a way of countering Igbo charges of Northern dominance of the federation.
205
 Just as 
in the case of the Midwest, strategic consideration also prompted the creation of the 
twelve states that separated ethnic minority groups from the three major groups. Thus, 
both the 1963 and 1967 boundary adjustments were undertaken purportedly to 
politically separate the minorities. However, strategic needs of the Nigerian Military 
leadership intersected with the pre-independence demands of the minorities for 
recognition in separate states. 
 
4.4 Evaluation 
This section of the chapter evaluates the quota policy, the creation of the Midwest 
region in 1963, and the creation of states in 1967. The evaluation attempts to determine 
if the policy and the political exercise of creating the Midwest region from the Western 
region and the subsequent creation of 12 states were morally right. This section 
proceeds with the assumptions that political units and employment positions in national 
institutions are goods that are generally desirable, and that the goods are relatively 
                                                 
204
 See inset Appendix B for the administrative borders of the Mid Western Region. 
205
 For more of this view see Rotimi T. Suberu, ‘The Travails of Federalism in Nigeria’, Journal of 
Democracy, 4 (4), (1993), 39-53. See also Ibid., ‘The Struggle for New States in Nigeria, 1976-1990’, 
African Affairs, 90 (1991), 499-522. See also, Ukoha Ukiwo, ‘Violence, Identity Mobilisation and Re-
imaging of Biafra’, Africa Development, XXXIV (1), 9-30. 
 
 95 
 
scarce. These two assumptions make social justice an issue. If there were no moral 
norms regarding things that are desirable and reprehensible, and if things were in 
absolute scarcity or in abundant supply, issues of social justice would not arise in 
human interactions. It is because this is not true that we have morality and laws to 
regulate our interactions and resolve conflicts that may arise. This section of the 
chapter, therefore, regards morality and laws as means to an end, the end being a well-
ordered and stable society. 
 
4.4.1 The Quota System 
Generally, there are two conceptions of justice in the distribution of societal goods. One 
is meritocratic and it holds that people should be treated according to their ability. In 
meritocratic conception, achievement is the chief criterion for determining the sharing 
of societal goods. Those who have achieved most receive the most, while those who 
have achieved least receive the least. The emphasis here is formal equality and 
competition in the public domain. Unequals are regarded as formal equals and are 
subjected to seemingly impartial universal rules, very much like the rule of law. This 
conception of justice is blind to the historical background of members of society and is 
intolerant of preferential treatment or temporary reservation of goods for the weak. Such 
practices are regarded as a violation of state neutrality and deviating from fairness.  
Similarly, by reserving positions for the weak, the state which is supposedly 
public and neutral, is considered to be taking side with or adopting the good of 
particular members of society as the public good. It is in this respect that the 
meritocratic conception of justice considers a Quota System or affirmative action as 
violating the equal treatment of citizens. Also, the reservation of positions for the weak 
is believed to work against the goals of organisations. Public institutions and offices are 
established to discharge particular social functions the effective realisation of which 
requires that only those with relevant qualifications be appointed. To hire people who 
do not have the required skills would undermine the social ends.
206
 
 Meritocracy might be a good principle for distributing goods, but it has some 
difficulties. First, it has been argued that hiring on the basis of skills is just if 
competence in producing specified outcomes could be measured objectively, or if 
technical skills translate directly into excellent performance, or if performance could be 
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judged individually. These conditions can hardly be met because: (a) most jobs are too 
complex to allow for a value-free measurement of individual performance; (b) 
production is by team work and therefore, it is not easy to identify the contribution of 
each worker; and (c) in the modern world where production process is automated, 
workers contribute little to actual production and, management level work entails the 
use of discretion.
207
 
Secondly, the merit principle wrongly assumes that people have equal 
opportunities, thus judging them strictly by achievement. Implicitly, it upholds 
underlying social inequality and fails to account for the social circumstances that 
produce it. With respect to the case at hand, the principle is incapable of offering a 
satisfactory moral account of why people of the Northern region should be responsible 
for their Western educational backwardness. It was not the people that closed the region 
to Western civilisation, it was their leaders. It is not clear why they should be 
responsible for what they did not do. Accepting the merit principle would be no more 
than holding the people accountable for the actions of their leaders.
208
 
 The above argument could be illustrated with the authoritarianism in some 
African countries. The current predatory actions of some leaders in Africa may or may 
not be acceptable to the people - the ruled. It is likely that they object to it because there 
is no society whose moral norms uphold oppression and looting. The people will be 
bewildered if they are to be held accountable for the unjust acts of their leaders. 
Obviously countries of the advanced democracies do impose sanctions on political 
leaders of some states. At the same time take appropriate measures to address the 
difficulties such sanctions might have on the people because they recognise that the 
latter as a whole should not be punished for the deeds of their rulers. 
 It might be objected that leaders are legitimate representatives of the people and 
the latter are accountable for what is done on their behalf. For example, if state officials 
contract a foreign loan, the citizens have an obligation to pay with their tax money and 
if the very leaders that contracted the loan cease to be in office on account of death or 
expiration of tenure the citizens are obliged to honour the debt. 
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 With respect to the case at hand, one would respond by noting that the context 
was quite different. The closure of the Northern region to Western influences was done 
in the context of resistance to foreign conquest and domination. In itself, political 
conquest was not a desirable thing because it brought both loss of freedom and lack of 
self-respect. The most denigrating and pernicious aspect of colonialism was the loss of 
self-worth, which arose from the replacement of indigenous culture with foreign culture. 
Within the Nigerian territorial boundary, resistance to both the political and cultural 
aspects of colonialism was universal. The difference was that the Muslim North was 
more effective at mounting cultural resistance than people of the South. There was 
resistance by both Muslims and non-Muslims, but one was more successful than the 
other was. Educational backwardness of the North should be understood as the result of 
its successful resistance to the cultural aspects of colonialism, while progress of the 
South the result of its less resistance. Therefore, one cannot be praised for putting up a 
weak resistance to the assault on self-respect, and the other blamed for mounting a 
successful one. Indeed, it is the latter that deserved respect. Seen from the Northern 
perspective, the educationally and economically backward North had every moral 
justification to demand preferential treatment if it suffered on account of its successful 
resistance. Explanations like these remain elusive to merit based conceptions of 
distributive justice. 
 The second conception of distributive justice is welfare. Drawing from stoicism 
and natural law theory, it holds that people are equal by nature, and as natural equals 
each has the same right to basic needs satisfaction. It is therefore, the responsibility of 
society to provide everyone with equal opportunity for the realisation of that right. This 
would entail the provision of compensatory treatment for those that are historically 
disadvantaged.
209
 With respect to the case at hand, the welfarist conception of justice 
would regard the quota put in place by the NPC government as not a violation of 
equality but as a way of off-setting historically rooted inequalities. Using ethnic 
balancing to temper merit would be seen as necessary for accommodating the 
historically disadvantaged people of the North and a requirement for long term 
substantive equality. The assumption here is that the state’s subscription to formal 
equality in constitutional texts would not really produce substantive equality of 
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opportunity unless concrete measures are adopted to advance weaker members of 
society. In fact, some theorists of democratic equality argue that state institutions have 
social responsibilities in the environment in which they operate and that some of 
responsibilities include the representation of diverse social interest in order to avoid 
false uniformity and to ensure that services get to diverse populace.
210
 
 There are two problems with the welfare notion of justice. First, social justice 
does not arise among people who are perfectly equal as in a pre-social state, but among 
those who interact and influence one another in a civil state.
211
 Equality of opportunity 
derived from the idea of human equality is only practical in a non-human society- e.g. 
Rousseau’s savage state where none is subject to the influence of the other. In so far as 
people interact and influence one another, inequality is bound to arise. It is precisely for 
this reason that we have justice. Still, a well-devised system of justice ought to reduce 
inequality and, in fact, the former is unfair if it fails in reducing the latter.
212
 Second, it 
suggests equal treatment of people irrespective of their historical circumstances, and by 
extension, has the danger of rewarding those who are responsible for their misfortune. 
On the other hand, as already discussed, the people of the Northern region were not 
responsible for their educational backwardness so this criticism would not really stand. 
 What emerges from the above discussion is that, equality is the substantive goal 
of social justice and that it could not have been met by the sole use of either the merit or 
welfare principles as the standard for recruitment into national institutions such as the 
military. By itself, the merit principle was unjust because it did not promote the good of 
all sections of the country, although the interest of those sections that benefited by it 
should not be discounted. Therefore, a system of justice that takes account of the 
interest of all sections ought to balance merit with welfare. Balancing both would 
depend on the goals of the community, the choices the people have made as to type of 
country they want to live in. This is explained as follows. 
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 The existence of morality or moral discourse within any given society 
presupposes some desired ends. If not, what is right and what is wrong would hardly be 
an issue.
213
 A society that agrees on justice as one of its goals, and one should think that 
every society would agree on this, would also agree that it is desirable to promote the 
general good instead of only the good of some. It would agree that it is desirable to 
adopt measures that improve the general quality of life rather than those that increase 
and generalise poverty. The Nigerian people could not have been against these ends, for 
the independence Constitution of 1960, and indeed all the subsequent Constitutions to 
the present time, enshrined social justice as one of the fundamental objectives and 
directive principles of state policy. If these ends were desirable- and agreed upon tacitly 
or explicitly, and if justice required that people be treated equally, then there was 
enough moral ground to use principles other than merit for including Northerners in 
national institutions. Ethnic balancing was required to promote their interest just as 
merit promoted the interest of people in the two Southern regions. Therefore, the use of 
the Quota System was not wrong. Although it worked to the disadvantage of the more 
qualified, its use was justified by an overriding moral consideration. 
 Some might argue that the Nigerian Constitutions enshrined equal rights and 
opportunities before the law, and that the administration of justice should entail 
appealing to the laws of the land not to morality. A policy like the Quota System is 
illegal and unjust if it is not in accordance with clearly written down laws. To deal with 
this objection, one might have to take note of the fact that laws are not independent of 
morality. They are derived from the latter and they seek to realise some moral 
principles. For example, the legal equality of citizens as enshrined in liberal 
constitutions has its foundation in Christian morality. It is a moral value specified, but 
this is not to mean that laws and morality always coincide. What is legal might not be 
morally right, just as the morally right might be illegal. An impartial judge who follows 
the judicial process and dispenses justice according to the law can be said to have acted 
within the bounds of legality. He/She is legally right if he/she nullifies a quota-based 
appointment on ground that it violates prescribed laws. However, the laws could be 
unjust if they violate or deviate considerably from moral principles.  
In the similar reasoning, the judge who follows the law to its letters might be 
reluctant to nullify the appointment that is done on quota because the law is unjust. He 
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might heed the voice of morality by either setting the legal precedent of upholding the 
appointment or resigning from office on account of injustice of the existing law. In 
other words, moral considerations can override legal claims, as in the case of Socrates’s 
madman and the borrower of his weapons, or Hegel’s economically distressed debtor 
whose right to life had priority over his creditor’s legal claims. A morally acceptable 
greater good of society could justify revision of the existing laws to make them less 
morally repugnant. Injustice rules if legality is not brought in tune with morality. 
 
4.4.2 The 1963 and 1967 Separation of Minorities 
The previous section argued in defence of the Quota System. This section will proceed 
to evaluate the creation of the Midwest region in 1963 and of the 12 states in 1967.  
Political events between 1960 and 1963 indicate that the creation of the Midwest 
region was the result of power struggle between the NPC and its NCNC junior ally. 
Each of these parties in a fragile coalition wanted exclusive control of federal power and 
to achieve that objective, each tried to increase its strength in the Federal Legislature by 
annexing part of the Western region. It was in this circumstance that the opposition, 
AG-controlled Western region became a victim in 1963. The strategic need of both the 
NPC and NCNC to fragment the West intersected with the long standing claims by 
minorities of the region for separation in a Midwest State. Now, a puzzle arises: if 
claims to separation by minorities of the West had normative weight as argued in the 
previous chapter, were they met by the 1963 exercise that was driven by considerations 
for power? Before answering this it would be necessary to raise another related puzzle. 
Debate in the 1966 ad hoc Conference shifted between the issues of 
confederation and creation of new states from the existing regions. As it was, the 
Conference was inconclusive with no agreement. The federal military government, led 
by a Northern minority, tried to pre-empt the declaration of Biafra republic in 1967 by 
first, separating minorities of the East into new states so that they would resist Biafran 
secession, and second, by meeting the pre-independence aspirations of some Northern 
minorities for political separation as a way of countering Igbo charges of Northern 
dominance of the federation. As in the case of the Midwest, the need to defeat Biafran 
secession through state creation converged with the decade old claims of the minorities 
for separation. But, if claims by minorities to separate regions in 1963 were morally 
justified, were they met by the 1967 military strategy? In his memoir Udo Udoma stated 
 101 
 
that: ‘to those who for years had crusaded … their dreams had come true by the grace of 
Lieutenant Colonel Yakubu Gowon. There were rejoicings’214 If the above expression is 
true, was the state creation exercise in 1967 not praiseworthy? 
 The two puzzles are the same, for they address the morality of the creation of the 
Midwest region in 1963 and creation of states in 1967. To address these two dilemmas, 
it would be necessary to recall John Stuart Mill’s distinction between intention and 
motive. According to him, intention is ‘what (an) agent wills to do’, while motive is ‘the 
feeling which makes him will so to do’.215 The former is what the agent aims to achieve 
in a particular act, while the latter is the mental and emotional qualities that produce the 
act. Thus, the morality of an action depends on the agent’s aim, that is, what she wants 
to do. The mental quality from which the act emanates makes no difference to, and has 
nothing to do with its moral justification. Ethically, an act is not judged to be blameable 
or praiseworthy because it is done by a humble person, a rude person, an honest person, 
or a dubious person. These considerations only count in estimation of the person’s 
moral worth. No one is judged in a court of law by the qualities of his character. What 
counts is the person’s intention. It is common for us to think that motive matters, but 
Mill’s distinction shows that we should be speaking of intention and that it would be a 
misunderstanding the concept of motive if we use it in our judgements. 
Application of the above distinction would lead one to understand the 1963 and 
1967 internal boundary adjustment exercises strictly in terms of their aims. One would 
regard the exercises as having been driven by strategic consideration for power and 
military success, not by considerations for local self-determination and equal 
recognition on which claims of minorities were rooted. The distinction would prompt 
the judgement that minority claims provided rationalisations for the exercises and 
helped to mask the real agenda. Following this line of thought, the 1967 creation of two 
minority states out of the Eastern region would be regarded as an attempt to place the 
territorial areas covered by the two states under the control of their indigenous 
inhabitants who would then position themselves against Biafran secession.  
Irrespective of its outcome, the exercise would be regarded as a crime because it 
was used as pretence to meet normative claims, while actually sending the claimants to 
war. And this is a crime even if the end is to save the state. Mills makes moral 
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judgement of a related but different issue while discussing the difference between 
intention and motive. According to him, anyone who saves another fellow from 
drowning does a morally right act, whatever the motive might be. But anyone that 
betrays a friend who trusts him is guilty of a crime, even if the aim is to save another 
friend in danger.
216
  
 The above Mill’s inspired moral interpretation is helpful, but it is narrow 
because it does not account for the overall outcome of the state creation exercises. Pre-
independence claims of minorities were ostensibly used to mask some hidden agenda 
but the moral importance of the rationalisations remains unexplained. Mill’s account of 
what constitutes a moral act does not provide an adequate tool for understanding the 
issue under discussion. Instead, a better alternative is provided by Hegel’s account. 
Hegel discussed what make people morally responsible for their actions when he 
differentiated between intention and purpose. With Hegel, intention is knowledge of 
anticipated consequences of an action, as for example, applying a match to papers in 
order to burn them. Purpose is the relation between an action and its overall outcome 
both intended and unintended, as when the application of matches not only burns the 
papers but also sets the house in flames. The relation between the physical act of 
applying a match and the house going up in flames makes one morally responsible for 
arson. However, lunatics have defective mental capacity as such they are not morally 
responsible for their actions. Similarly, children have uninformed and weak mental 
capacity for which reason they are not morally accountable for what they do.
217
 
 In relation to the case at hand, the act of fragmenting the country into twelve 
states produced a sequence of events. First, minority states came under the rule of their 
indigenous inhabitants. Then, to be masters of their new units, it became imperative for 
indigenous of minority states in the East to expel Igbos and seize their real estate. Recall 
Rousseau’s argument that the easiest way to subject a people is to occupy their land.218 
In this context, Igbos had taken up resident in minority regions of the East, especially in 
Rivers province where they owned significant landed property in the city of Port-
Harcourt and had emerged as rulers. To control their new unit, the indigenous peoples 
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of Rivers state opted to expel the Igbos and confiscate their property.
219
 In turn, there 
was a deadly battle in Rivers state. Secession was defeated, a peace agreement was 
signed, and the unity of the country was preserved. Here, there was a relationship 
between the act of separating minorities and the sequence of events that followed. The 
act produced internal self-determination for minorities thereby meeting their pre-
independence demands for equal political recognition, and it saved the country from 
disintegration. Separation was desired not for the evil intention of sending minorities to 
war but for the larger purpose of freeing them and saving the country from disaster. In 
other words, stability of the country was found in a normative arrangement in which, 
states were created to adequately recognise groups. 
 The moral weight of the 1963 and 1967 exercises could be appreciated if it is 
considered that the dominant parties of the pre-independence and post-independence era 
were opposed to any arrangement that would dismember their regions. They were 
determined not to let their ethnic minorities go and only force could bring about that 
desired arrangement in which the latter would be well accommodated. For the Midwest 
region to be created in 1963 the Western region had to be placed under a state of 
emergency and some key AG leaders were imprisoned on charges of treasonable felony 
for plotting to overthrow the federal government. In other words, those who had 
opposed it all along and were in the position of power to continue with the opposition 
had to be forcefully silenced. This was done in the context of power struggle between 
the NPC and the NCNC. Similarly, force had to be used in the dismembering of the 
Eastern region. It was done under contingencies of secession and war, the very 
contingencies that also made for the dismemberment of the North in order to free and 
win the support of its ethnic minorities. Conditions on the ground in the country 
required the use of force if the three regions were to be divided, and the 1963 power 
tussle between the NPC and the NCNC along with the 1967 secession attempt by the 
Biafra provided the opportunities. Therefore, based on the above discourses, regardless 
of the intentions behind them, the two internal boundary adjustment exercises in the 
country were morally justified.
220
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4.5 Summary 
The aim of this chapter was to discuss and evaluate the quota policy for appointment 
into, and promotion within, the Nigerian military, and the 1963 and 1967 separation of 
ethnic minorities in new political units. The Quota System greatly disadvantaged people 
in the Western and Eastern regions, more especially the latter, as it reduced the positions 
they would have filled under the merit system slowed their upward ascendancy into the 
top hierarchy. Although grievances about the Quota System contributed to the first 
military coup by young Igbo officers in 1966, critical evaluation of the policy showed 
that the historically rooted educational backwardness of the Muslim North required the 
use of a distributive principle other than merit for a just allocation of positions. 
Educational backwardness was the result of resistance to the cultural aspect of 
colonialism, and the people ought not to be excluded from national institutions - 
through the merit principle for resisting the most denigrating aspect of colonialism. It 
might not be unreasonable to suggest that to insist on merit is to insist on punishing 
people in the predominantly Muslim North for securing their culture against Western 
values and to reward people in the South for their failure to do it. This historical cause 
of educational backwardness of the North would justify the adoption of quota policy. 
The justification is more strengthened by the Constitutional subscription of the 
Nigerian-state to justice and equality. The adoption of these prescriptions as the 
fundamental objectives of state presupposed a desire to promote the common good. It 
presupposed a desire for the general well-being, not the well-being of some. Actualising 
the general well-being required a set of distributive principles that take account of the 
circumstances and interest of each section of the country. Merit principle reflected the 
circumstances and interest of the Southern regions, while reservation of spots through 
quota addressed the circumstances and interest of the North. A combination of both 
principles was reasonably fair. 
Regarding the 1963 and 1967 political separations, they were done in a context 
of power struggle and imminent secession by the Eastern region. The circumstance of 
the time could prompt one to argue that the separation exercises were purely strategic, 
and that they were not actually meant to address minority claims for internal self-
determination. This argument is narrow and unsatisfactory because, it does not take into 
account the normative and political importance of the arrangements that were to be 
produced by the separation of minorities. It is true that strategic considerations were 
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behind the exercises, but it is also correct to infer that, there was clear knowledge that 
the exercises would meet the pre-independence claims of minorities and make for an 
arrangement that adequately accommodated difference. There were some ulterior 
motives, but the overall larger purpose of the two internal boundary adjustment 
exercises were an arrangement that was fair to both the majority and the affected 
minority groups in the country. 
On the basis of the above, the conclusion one can make for the purpose of policy 
recommendation as far as the quota approach to state building in Nigeria is concerned, 
is that the essence of the Quota System was to ensure the representation of diverse 
social interest in order to avoid false uniformity, and to ensure that services benefit all 
the entire population. This thus means that, the quota approach is in agreement with the 
normative and empirical prescriptions. Therefore, the use of the Quota System was not 
wrong. Although it worked to the disadvantage of the more qualified, its use was 
justified by an overriding moral consideration. After all, one may argue that the 
educational backwardness of the North that justified the introduction of the quota may 
not be the fault of the ordinary people of the North. But the question remains, for how 
long would the North continue to hide under the Quota System to fill positions in the 
public service? And, what educational strategies have the Muslim the North put in place 
to bridge the gap with the Southern states? Lack of definite answers to the above 
questions has generated recurrence of ethno-political tensions between the North and 
the South. It is practically very difficult to change the attitude of the Muslim North 
about the quota approach which they consider as a right to the sharing of the national 
cake. But the ethno-political tensions arising from the quota approach can be bridged 
over time if the Muslim North takes concrete measures that include, among others, 
embarking on Nomadic education, and socio-cultural orientation. The socio-cultural 
orientation should be aimed- as Roman Loimeier argues - at ‘demystifying the negative 
impact of Western education on Islamic beliefs’.221  
 Similarly, claims to separation in 1963 by minorities of the West genuinely had 
normative weight. This is because there was a longstanding claim by minorities of the 
region for separation to a Midwest region right from the pre-independence era. But, as 
argued in this chapter, the creation of the Midwest region was the result of power 
struggle between the NPC and its NCNC. The means, the carving of the Midwest region 
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out to the Western region had the purpose to fragment the West, and thus increase the 
bargaining power of the coalition. In just the same manner as in the Midwest, in 1967, 
strategic consideration for power also prompted the creation of the twelve states that 
separated ethnic minority groups from the three major groups. The implication of both 
the 1963 and 1967 boundary adjustment exercises is that they were driven strictly by 
strategic consideration for power and military success, not by considerations for local 
self-determination and equal recognition on which the minorities, right from the pre-
independence era, based their claims. Thus, despite the claim that the 1963 and 1967 
exercises were to save Nigeria from disintegration, the exercise could be inferred to 
have been used as pretence to meet normative claims.  
 In the above context therefore, the conclusion one make out of the discussion on 
the separation of the minorities approach is that, apart from the fact that they failed to 
meet its normative claims, the exercises generated an inevitable slippery slope. For 
instance, since recognition of groups in separate states during the 1963 and 1967 
exercises by the Nigerian Military leadership, Nigeria’s internal boundaries has been 
adjusted and re-adjusted over and over again, and many more demands are being made. 
Worse still, the circumstances and speed with which states are being created are 
generating recurrence of ethno-political conflicts and institutional instabilities in the 
Nigerian federation. Even though separation of minorities to some large extent meets 
normative claims, there is the need to apply break, and therefore, the Nigerian 
government should begin to think about putting in place Constitutional provision that 
limits creation of states only at an interval of twenty five years. 
 In spite of the adoption of a Quota System of appointment and the re-division of 
the country into twelve states to take account of smaller groups that were in the 1960s 
denied political recognition, due to fresh group claims, search for strategies that would 
accommodate diversity and ensuring political and social stability was embarked upon in 
the 1970s. The following chapter shall be examining these fresh group claims that 
reared their heads in the 1970s. 
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                                                    CHAPTER FIVE 
          THE FEDERAL CHARACTER (PRINCIPLE) APPROACH  
The creation of Midwest state, Sir, will only set the ball rolling for the creation of all other 
states in the federation of Nigeria … the creation of states is the only basis on which the 
unity of this country is going to continue and it is upon the creation of states that the 
breaking of the monopoly of all other regions by one region which constitutes an 
unbalanced structure in the federation will be achieved.
222 
 
5.1 Introduction 
The inadequacies of the 1960s Nigerian state building approaches and the resultant three 
year civil war prompted the search for a new strategy that would accommodate diversity 
in order to deal with the ethnic and cultural fragmentation of the country to ensure 
political and social stability. The new strategy, born from the inclusion of policy makers 
from different ethnic backgrounds, adopted different policies. One of the proposed 
approaches was the restructuring of the federation into nineteen states to reflect 
ethnicity, and the divisions of the states into local government areas to further reflect 
sub-ethnic differences.
223
 Another element was the adoption of a policy that required 
membership in federal institutions to reflect the constituent states, and in turn 
membership in institutions at the state level was required to reflect the constituent local 
governments.
224
 This chapter offers a contextual analysis and a critical evaluation of the 
constitutional strategy with the aim of determining its desirability.  
 
5.2 The Background 
Nigeria emerged from a three year civil war with a new approach to governance.
225
 The 
county’s military rulers tried to promote inter group equity by resorting to the use of 
what Rothchild has called the ‘informal proportionality principle’ for appointments into 
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high offices of state and the civil service and for the allocation of resources.
226
 A 
reconstruction programme designed to rebuild infrastructures destroyed during the war 
came into force. It allocated projects ranging from highways and airports to housing and 
to University campuses to various geo-ethnic sections of the country. The adoption of 
the ad hoc proportionality principle coincided with the emergence of petroleum exports 
as a major source of national revenue. To apply the principle, the rich natural resource 
was first brought under the control of the central government through various decrees, 
and its revenues claimed for allocation through the Distributive Pool Account (DPA) 
established in 1959.  
It is important to remember that under the 1953 Louis Chick revenue allocation 
agreement, each region received full share of contribution to the Federation Account. 
Implicitly, the above means, the Derivation Principle was applied 100%. However, it 
was criticised on the ground that it was divisive. It was in response to this criticism that 
the independence Constitutional Conference of 1958 set up a Commission to look into 
it. This resulted in the introduction of the DPA in 1959 which tempered derivation by 
allocating revenue among the regions on the basis of equality and population. The 
growth in the importance of mining royalties during the late 1960s prompted the federal 
military government under General Yakubu Gowon to reduce to 45% the proportion of 
revenues going back to the mineral producing states.  This reduction increased the 
amount going back to the DPA, 50% of which was shared among states on the basis of 
equality and the other 50% on the basis of population. 80% of the incomes of the then 
12 states were from the DPA.
227
 The use of DPA proportionality in the allocation of 
revenue reduced to 20% the share of mineral rent and royalties going back to states 
from which they were derived, and the implication was ‘the near elimination of the 
derivation formula gave a considerable boost to the resources of the Federal Pool to the 
benefit of non-oil-producing states’.228 
 The central government’s pooling of resources for redistribution to states and its 
post war reconstruction projects triggered competition for patronage. States became 
clients of the central government while groups and individuals also competed for 
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patronage of both levels of government. According to Richard Joseph, government as 
the key decider of who gets what is being distributed and how, subjected it to real 
pressures for the conversion of what was being dispensed into ‘means of individual and 
group appropriation’.229 The pressures included memoranda ‘demanding separate states 
to bring government nearer to the people’.230 As a consequence, an avalanche of 
demands for new states hit the federal government from all parts of the country, the 
intensity of which was reported to have reached a crisis point by 1973.
231
 The new 
demands emerged mostly from states of the majority groups (East Central and Western 
states), not minority states as the 1957 Minorities’ Commission had earlier 
anticipated.
232
 
 
5.3 The 1975 Panel on States Creation  
It was in response to the above mentioned demands that a Panel was set up in August 
1975 to examine the issue of creating new states. It is important to mention here that the 
circumstances which led to the setting up of the 1975 Panel dated back to 1967 when 
the 12 states were created by military fiat. For instance, the war-time military 
government of General Yakubu Gowon carried out the state creation without consulting 
those who were affected. The boundaries were therefore taken to be temporary pending 
the appointment of a Boundary Delimitation Commission (BDC) that would look into 
the re-adjustment or confirmation. Delays in setting up the Commission invited 
petitions from various parts of the country. It was the intensity of the demands that 
forced the military government to set up a Panel in 1975.
233
 Requests for internal self-
determination that were made before the Panel were all based on the need to: 
(a) Make government more democratic by bringing it nearer to the people. 
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(b) Quicken the pace of development by bringing state capitals nearer.  
(c) Assuage fears of new minorities.  
(d) Guarantee a balanced federation.
234
 
In its report, the Panel observed that the demands were economic, more of a ‘booty 
sharing exercise’.235 This played against the idea of the creation of new states because it 
would neither accelerate economic development nor solve the problem of new 
minorities. Instead, it would lead to state proliferation to the point that each town or 
village would be a state.
236
 Yet, the commission went on to recommend the creation of 
eight new states, seven of which were accepted by government and distributed among 
various groups in the country. Apparently, the only state that the government rejected 
was the one recommended for some of the minorities in the oil producing areas in the 
Niger Delta. 
 During its public sittings, the Panel had observed ‘the strength of ethnic loyalty, 
mutual suspicion and even hatred among the diverse peoples which make up Nigeria’, 
and was convinced that ‘political stability cannot be guaranteed’ if states were not 
created.
237
 It held the view that more states would foster ‘greater participatory 
democracy’ and ‘produce … a balanced and stable federation.238 It was on this basis that 
the Panel turned round to make positive recommendations. Both the Panel and 
government verbally rejected ethnic difference as a criterion in the drawing of 
boundaries, but still took account of it in practise. The redrawing of boundaries to take 
account of difference permitted several minority groups in the North to be clearly 
separated in a number of states from the majority Hausa/Fulani. In turn, the country was 
divided into 301 local government units of uniform population range. Their boundaries 
closely followed the colonial local administrative units that enclosed subgroups of 
larger groups and smaller groups. At the end each of the 19 states consisted in a local 
government whose boundaries were drawn to accommodate diversity at the lower level. 
Membership of both the states and local governments were determined by parental 
descent.  
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It is important to mention here that ten of the nineteen states were in the North, 
while the remaining nine states were in the South. Of the ten States in the North, six 
were predominantly made up of minority groups, while the remaining four states were 
made up of the dominant group- Hausa/Fulani. On the other hand, of the nine states that 
were created in the South, the Igbo had two, the Yoruba had four including Lagos, 
while the minority groups were grouped into three. An extensive forest at the centre of 
the country was mapped out as the new Federal Capital Territory (FCT) and Lagos soon 
ceased to be the operational capital of Nigeria.
239
 
 
5.4 Federal Character Policy 
The creation of states and of local governments turned out to be one of two elements in 
a Constitutional design for avoiding political dominance by a few ethnic elites. The 
other element was the drafting of a Constitution that would require the origins of 
members of governmental bodies to reflect the 19 states which were assumed to reflect 
ethnicity. The then Head of State, late Brigadier General Murtala Mohammed enjoined 
a Constitution Drafting Committee (CDC) of 49 members inaugurated in September 
1975 to ‘eliminate ‘over centralisation of power in a few hands’. Instead, it was advised 
to devise a Constitution that would both decentralise power and require the choice of 
members of higher offices of state to reflect the federal character of the country.
240
  
A point to take note of regarding the manner in which this Committee was set up 
is that, unlike the Constitutional debates of the 1950s where delegates submitted issues 
they want to discuss prior to the commencement of the Conference, and after a long 
argument, the terms of reference were agreed upon beforehand. In the post-civil war era 
the position was different. The military were in office and the country’s finance was 
centralised. This supremacy allowed Brigadier General Murtala Ramat Mohammed’s 
regime to avoid the pre-independence procedures. Hence, the observation that the 
Committee ‘was not to carry out negotiations, nor even to discover what would be 
acceptable to entrenched interests: its task was more technical’.241 
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 The CDC took its task seriously. It recognised that the country included multiple 
ethnic and linguistic groups which, for the sake of convenience, were referred to as 
communities. With this recognition, the CDC tried to make a provision that would make 
for proportional representation of ethno-regional groups in the composition of 
government, but was divided on it.
242
 A faction disagreed altogether, arguing that ethnic 
identity is irrelevant in the determination of a person’s human qualities and should not 
be used a basis for appointments. Another faction insisted that an equitable treatment of 
groups had already been met by the creation of states, and it was unnecessary to make 
constitutional provision for the participation of all communities in government. A third 
faction argued that ethnic dominance had occurred at various levels in the past and, to 
effectively guard against it, political inclusion should be deepened beyond the federal 
level to the state and local government levels as well as to government agencies.
243
 
 Despite the differences, the CDC formalised the proportionality principle that 
had been in use since the end of the war. Adopted as the federal character principle, it 
stated that: 
The composition of the federal government or any of its agencies and the conduct of its 
affairs shall be carried out in such manner as to reflect the federal character of Nigeria and 
the need to promote national unity, and also to command national loyalty. Accordingly, the 
predominance in the government or in its agencies of persons from a few states, or from a 
few ethnic groups or other sectional groups shall be avoided. The composition of a 
government other than the federal government or any of the agencies of such government 
and the conduct of their affairs shall be carried out in such manner as to recognise the 
nature and character of the peoples within their area of authority and the need to promote a 
sense of belonging and loyalty among all such people.
244 
 
State membership was defined in biological terms. For example, according to the CDC, 
to ‘Belong to … when used with reference to a person in a state refers to person who 
either of whose parents or any of whose grandparents was a member of a community 
indigenous to that state’.245 With this clarification, federal character was applied to the 
most sovereign office that was to be a single Chief Executive known as President. 
He/She was expected to derive his/her authority directly from the people, for which 
purpose the entire country was to be regarded as one single constituency. However, they 
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tried to avoid the creation of an all-powerful leviathan by recommending the office of a 
Vice-President not as a counterpoise, but as a co-pilot to the President.
246
 
 For electoral purposes, the President and the Vice-President were required to 
secure widespread geographic support by obtaining the highest number of votes which 
must not be less than 25% (one-quarter) of the votes cast at the election in at least 
two/thirds of all the states in the federation and the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja.
247
 
The idea of dividing the country into geo-political zones for purposes of rotating the 
offices of the President and Vice-President was raised, debated and abandoned.
248
 
 Federal character was also applied to political parties. It was required that party 
membership be open to every citizen irrespective of ethnicity, and the headquarters be 
situated in the federal capital. In addition, it was required that two-thirds of members of 
the executive committee of the political parties should be drawn from at least two-thirds 
of the states that make up the federation.
249
 The federal character principle was also 
applied to federal institutions, then to the states and local governments. Thus, political 
inclusion was attempted at all levels of government. The constitutional device was 
topped with a provision making it difficult to further multiply the number of units. The 
innovations in the federal character approach was immediately put into work in 1979 
when the five registered political parties, namely the National Party of Nigeria (NPN), 
Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN), Peoples Redemption Party (PRP), Nigerian Peoples Party 
(NPP) and Great Nigerian Peoples Party (GNPP) contested for various offices in the 
Second Republic general election in 1979.
250
  
The five political parties mentioned above reflected Nigeria-wide membership in 
their executive bodies, but their leaders were still the same First Republic party leaders. 
Just as the First Republic, the parties drew a bulk of their supporters from ethnic origins 
of the party leaders. In a keenly contested election, the NPN nevertheless won the 
Presidential election by obtaining 25% of votes in twelve states and a fraction in the 
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thirteenth state. The controversy over the interpretation of the requirements for electing 
the President and the subsequent Supreme Court ruling that upheld the decision of the 
Federal Electoral Commission (FEDECO) thus set the stage for antagonistic alliances. 
For instance, the making and unmaking of alliances with the aim of unseating the NPN 
from the Federal power, or eliminating the other parties as actors in the same manner as 
in the First Republic, revealed some of the defects in the federal character approach 
enshrined in the 1979 Constitution. 
 
5.5 Evaluation 
What emerged from the discussion above is the definite commitment by the post-civil 
war Nigeria to the adoption of a constitutional strategy for coping with difference and 
conflict. The creation of seven new states and the adoption of a federal character 
principle were two interrelated elements that defined the strategies. The following 
section of the chapter attempts a critical evaluation of the federal character approach. 
 
5.5.1 Demands for more States 
The 1975 government Panel viewed the demands for more states as purely economic 
which, if met, would lead to state proliferation and the destruction of the principle of 
federation. Thus the Panel considered the creation of additional state highly undesirable. 
However, during its visit to different parts of the country, the panel realised the strength 
of ethnic loyalty and came to the conclusion that meeting the demands would spread 
power and guarantee political stability. It considered this political factor as having 
greater weight than the economic factor. The critical issue here is the conflict between 
economic and political considerations and the one that should take precedence. 
 Neo-Marxist-inspired views would regard the demands as class demands that do 
not merit attention. The class aspect might be true, but it is also necessary to go beyond 
narrow selfish motives to consider the intersection of interest between elites and the 
groups to which they belonged. Like all human beings, elites have their personal interest 
to satisfy, but as members of groups that have common consciousness and purpose, they 
may promote the salient interests of the membership. They claim legitimacy of group 
leadership not through election, but by advancing common interests in the state arena. 
They can authoritatively advance meaningful claims by first holding consultations and 
negotiating common positions within the group. They can move back and forth between 
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the state arena and the group, continually negotiating salient interests within the latter 
and continually making demands at the former. Hence, in the public, elites can enjoy 
considerable support of their ethnic members and are able to mobilise them for action 
when the need arises. 
 The above assertion, therefore, means that, the demand for states was not 
necessarily done only to satisfy the ambitions of few individuals in search for power. 
Rather, there was unity of purpose between elites and their group, which the Panel 
identified to be a share of national wealth. The unity of interest could be discerned in 
the following findings of empirical research conducted in the mid-1970s: 
After 1967 all the new state capitals began to enjoy the paraphernalia associated with 
government headquarters. Hospitals were expanded, water supply, urban roads and 
drainage were improved, and various governmental institutions were established. They 
became centres of intense economic and political activities. Other infra structural facilities 
such as trunk roads, neglected by former regional governments were reconstructed. More 
scholarships were awarded for higher education, many rural areas obtained electricity and 
local entrepreneurs were helped to industrialise. The notion of bringing government closer 
to the people, which had wide currency in official circles, was seen to have a positive value 
for the lives of the people. If … oil revenue had not proved so buoyant it would have been a 
different story. But the federal government was the greatest provider especially through the 
Distributive Pool Account … It is this factor which no doubt explains the acquiescence of 
Kano State in the status quo and the large number of proposed states from East Central and 
Western States.
251 
 
The implication of this observation is that the federal military government’s assertion of 
claims to most of the revenue from oil immediately put premium on further devolution, 
especially in those parts of the country where the demand for services of one kind or 
another was most intense. A greater share of the federally distributed revenues could be 
obtained simply by multiplying the number of units of government, each of which could 
then claim its share of the national cake. For example, intense demands on the Kogi 
State government to provide services could be achieved by simply splitting the state into 
more number of local government units thereby increasing the share of the federally 
distributed revenue coming to the state.
252
 
The relevant issue that has to be addressed is whether ethnic based demands 
driven by desire for public resources have merit. In dealing with competing claims to 
justice, the argument of Aristotle is relevant. For instance, he argues that a political 
society is not a business venture that exists sorely for the economic benefit of its 
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members. Drawing from Aristotle’s judgement regarding competing claims to justice, 
therefore, one could argue that competition for national wealth should not translate into 
claims for internal self-determination.
253
 Wealth is temporary, not something that lasts 
forever. Although a country that witnesses a good turn in its economic fortunes might 
be able to sustain it. If self-determination is granted on account of it, and while it lasts, 
political disaster would likely set in as endless demands would have to be met with 
endless internal partitioning of territories until there is nothing to partition. But it is also 
probable that economic decline would set in at some point in time. In which case the 
partitioned units would either, collapse or be merged. In conclusion, wealth is too 
transient to justify claims to internal self-government. 
 An alternative but competing option would be to regard the demands as driven 
by the need for justice. This option requires an understanding of the state structure that 
emerged from the 1967 state exercise as unbalanced and working to the disadvantage of 
groups who did not have their proportionate share of states. In this case the demands 
have to be regarded as political claims made to redress injustice. For example, the 1967 
creation exercise grouped Igbos in one state, while the Yorubas and the Hausa/Fulani 
had three each. By being in only one state, Igbos and their elites were not treated 
equally as the Yorubas, but were almost equal to them in terms of population. The 
Panel’s observation that there were mutual ethnic suspicion, and that demands were 
made in bitterness should not be taken at face value because underneath, were perceived 
injustice in the state structure which served to disadvantage some in the distributional 
sphere. Therefore, while political claims were not justified by competition for economic 
goods, the need for equity was also very compelling.  
What did justice require given the two competing options? One possible 
response would have been to uphold the economic argument. Instead of endorsing 
wealth based claims that could result in endless fragmentation of units that would also 
not be self-sustaining, power bearers might as well have ensured stability by retaining 
the 12 state structures already in place. This might have been a desirable option but it 
would have been unrealistic given the conditions on the ground. Facts about some 
groups like Igbos being grouped in one state and of others like the Yoruba being in 
three would have rendered such decision highly biased and politically imprudent. More 
especially, attempts at building legitimate governance and winning the confidence of 
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groups through the use of proportionality principle would have been undermined. 
Equity would have been vitiated, for government would have been perceived as 
dispensing social goods unequally among groups and their elites. In this case, those 
vanquished during the civil war would have considered themselves targets of political 
domination. 
 The other option was to uphold the justice-based argument and risk the 
proliferation of unviable states. This option would have dispensed justice by 
accommodating groups proportionately in accordance with their demography or 
geographic distribution. The state would have freed itself from charges of domination 
by elites from a few groups, and a framework for mutual trust and conciliatory politics 
would have been established. On the basis of the above arguments, despite the potential 
risk, the decision of the Panel on state creation to meet group’s demands for state of 
their own was justified. 
 
5.5.2 Federal Character Policy 
This sub-section of the chapter analyses the desirability or otherwise of federal character 
as a strategy for ensuring equity in the composition of government. Recall that the 
constitution makers were split between two broad strategies: one considered state 
creation to have adequately accommodated difference and that ethnic membership was 
irrelevant in appointment and recruitment; the other emphasised the use of ethnic 
identity for appointments at all levels of government in order to prevent domination by 
elites from a few ethnic groups. Was the CDC right to have adopted the latter? This 
question is answered by weighing the merits of both strategies, beginning with the 
former that is generally referred to as the winner- takes- all system. 
 The winner-takes-all system required treating citizens as bearers of equal legal 
rights and as having equal opportunity to compete at the political market place. With 
this strategy, universal criteria like competition and qualification forms the basis for 
recruiting public officials both high and low. Reward is tied to performance and the 
decision making process is free of ascriptive considerations. All these make for the 
exercise of fundamental rights and liberties without identity constraints. Thus, justice is 
grounded on open competition in the political market. Desirable as it is, this strategy has 
its difficulties. It presupposes that free electoral competition would yield a majority 
party endowed with authority to govern the entire country. While elections may, and do 
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result in majoritarian rule, the government that emerges responds to the numerical 
majority who often turn out to be of one or a few ethnic segments that make up the 
country. Therefore, free political competition without brakes produces a government 
that does not consider the political community as made up of parts, each of which has to 
be given weight in decision making. Calhoun regarded this form of government as 
absolute, for it considers the interest of one segment of the community- the majority.
254
 
 Was the alternative strategy adopted by the CDC better? The federal character 
strategy could be best assessed by looking at its presuppositions. First, it assumed that 
state creation had levelled both majority and minority groups by dividing them up into a 
number of small separate units. Those that dominated politics and controlled power by 
virtue of number were assumed to have been reduced to the same level as those that 
were numerically weak. With this assumption, it was believed that group equity could 
be achieved in the composition of government if elites were drawn from each of the 
units. 
 Secondly, the electoral requirements of federal character assumed that victory at 
the polls would no longer be pre-ordained by demography. Conditions for the 
registration of political parties and for the successful election of their candidates for the 
highest offices of state required reaching out to other geo-ethnic segments. It would 
therefore, not be possible for any one or three large groups to grab power by uniting 
behind their favoured candidates. Instead, parties and their candidates were expected to 
reach out, co-operate with other ethnic segments, and work out a deal up-front on 
equitable distribution of offices and resources. 
 Thirdly, federal character assumed that electoral requirements would induce the 
selfish calculation of elites to make for social co-operation. Selfish calculation was 
expected to drive a set of ethnic elites to reach out and accommodate elites of other 
ethnic regions. They would have to reach out and accommodate not because they 
wanted to, but because their personal interests would demand that they do so. In the 
course of time, group interests would intertwine in a complex manner to produce 
enduring accommodative institutions. Based on the above mentioned presumptions, 
minority rights and Constitutional safeguards were incidentally rendered unnecessary. 
And impressed by the presumptions, Horowitz thought that the Nigerian design, that is, 
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the federal character approach to state building, was a model for other deeply divided 
African societies in search of democracy.
255
 
 It is evident from the above that federal character had many virtues. It was 
derived from the ethnic make-up of the country and informed by the bitter experiences 
regarding exclusive control of state power. It accepted group equity as a major rule in 
the political system and it also aimed at ensuring that. More especially, the assumed 
levelling of groups through their separation into several small states created the 
condition for their elites to be fairly recruited by electoral means into office. Federal 
character could therefore be regarded as democratic, just and making for stability. It was 
not for anything that Horowitz equated it to the Rawlsian social contract made by 
representatives in the original position. According to him: 
The Nigerians had been through severe conflict and civil war, and they did not want a 
repetition. Since no one could be sure which group might be on the receiving end in any 
future round of ethnic conflict and civil strife, the Nigerians made, not a bargain but a real 
constitution, not a contract among groups that knew what their interests would be but a 
social contract among groups that were not sure what their interest might be the next time 
around. They made a blind, Rawlsian contract. That is, one based on original position 
reasoning, not present position reasoning.
256
 
 
In a similar reasoning, it has been observed that federal character made for alliance that 
‘crosses ethnicity, region and religion as impressively as any political coalition in 
modern history’.257 
Despite the above virtues, Federal character had some problems. First, by 
targeting the selfish interest of politicians, it could only succeed in inducing and 
emphasising the most efficient means of acquiring power, in so far as the conditions 
were not violated. Selfish calculation would dictate that the most efficient means for 
reaching out be adopted. Therefore, elites from a particular geo-ethnic segment of the 
country could form a party and appear to reach out by recruiting clients in other geo-
ethnic areas, very much like the colonial system of establishing legitimacy through the 
appointment of local Chiefs into some visible roles of government.
258
  
In an empirical research on Nigerian politics, Richard Joseph has found that 
parties usually adopted a clientèle’s strategy for mobilising political support of different 
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ethnic sections of the population.
259
 According to him, individuals did not belong to 
parties in a random fashion rather they were linked in a clientèle network. Party bosses, 
usually the real founders, linked individuals who belong to other ethnic groups and were 
acknowledged influential figures of their particular communities. In turn, the latter acted 
as patrons by setting up subordinate brokers among notable persons who, on their part, 
mobilised and delivered political support of their communities. So equal participation in 
political parties was somewhat unequal, and the regime that emerged from the electoral 
process remained under the effective control of powerful elites from a few ethnic 
segments of the country. The NPC in the First Republic, 1960-1966, the NPN in the 
Second Republic, 1979-1983, and PDP in the Third and Fourth Republic, 1999 to the 
present, used the clientèle’s- patron-client strategy to successfully create political 
outposts across the country. 
 A second important difficulty with federal character is the ethnic criterion in the 
determination of the political rights of citizens. The requirement that government at the 
federal, state and local levels be composed in a manner that reflected the ethnic make-
up of each of the three political units required sensitivity to parental origins of 
individuals whenever appointments were being made. At the federal level this required 
potential appointees to declare their ethnic origin. Although this did not matter much, it 
carried an enormous consequence at the state level. Here ethnic origins of those seeking 
elective and non-elective offices had to be ascertained. Those who were born in or had 
lived all their lives in a state not of their parental origin had to be denied the right to be 
appointed or elected into public office of those very states in which they were resident. 
Such affected persons could not exercise political and social rights unless they returned 
to their places of origin. What applied at the state level equally applies at the local 
government level.
260
 The operation of federal character, therefore, involved violating 
fundamental human rights. In fact, some analysts of Nigerian politics have regarded it 
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as an attack upon standard.
261
  Do these difficulties rule out federal character? Would 
the winner-takes-all system of politics be a better option? 
 The multi-ethnic composition of Nigeria and the violent experiences the country 
had with procedural democracy made federal character a more desirable option. It may 
have violated the rights of some individuals, but it had the greater advantage of doing 
justice among groups and avoiding self-destructive conflict. More importantly, it did not 
renounce democracy rather it sought to temper the elements that permitted some ethnic 
elites to exercise power to the exclusion of others. However, its electoral inducement 
did not produce the anticipated inclusive political parties. The problem of unequal 
inclusion and regimes being effectively controlled by a few ethnic elites was damaging 
inter-ethnic relations in Nigeria. For instance, the Nigerian Governments in all of the 
Republics have been firmly controlled by the Hausa/Fulani elites who also occupied 
strategic cabinet posts such as Defence, Internal and External Affairs, Mines and Power 
including Petroleum Resources, Education, and Agriculture etc. The lack of inclusive 
government had to be addressed if federal character were to ensure equity. The 
proceeding section will attempt to show in a preliminary way that solutions were 
possible. 
 
5.6 Desirable and Feasible Alternative Strategies 
The previous section of the chapter argued that federal character was timid. Its main 
assumption was that political parties would gain cross-ethnic support if their executive 
members were drawn from diverse ethnic regions, and that victory at the polls will 
produce an inclusive government. These assumptions turned out to be faulty because the 
1979, 1999, 2005 and 2010 elections confined parties that emerged to their various 
ethnic regions, excepting of the National Party of Nigeria (NPN), and Peoples 
Democratic Party (PDP) whose effective use of clientèle’s strategy gave it some support 
outside its base. The narrow confines of parties demonstrated both the influence and 
resilience of group solidarity in political competition and the difficulty of reaching 
across to obtain trans-ethnic support. Thus, party focused inducements could not 
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produce the expected results in government. The above analyses should prompt one to 
accept the reality that, no matter the inducement to reach-out, political parties in deeply 
divided societies such as Nigeria would remain ethnic in essence, and therefore, an 
effective strategy for equal political inclusion has to go beyond individuals and groups 
and directed at government itself.  
 Perhaps, one alternative to the problems of federal character would have been 
the abandonment of the strategy and the adoption of what Charles Taylor has referred to 
as procedural liberal democracy. Citing Ronald Dworkin and Immanuel Kant, Taylor 
shows that liberal proceduralism is committed to treating people with equal respect and 
dignity. This requires that the substantive good of groups or their views about life 
should not be the goal of public legislation by the state. Given the diversity of modem 
societies, the substantive good might not be everyone’s good and it is likely to be that of 
the majority. In which case, the life goals of some people would be officially raised over 
those of others. To avoid this discriminatory treatment, the state remains neutral on the 
good life and merely restricts itself to treating individuals as bearers of equal legal 
rights. Thus the political arena is viewed as a market place where individuals have equal 
opportunity to compete. Competition is governed by universal and impartial rules 
inscribed formally in constitutional texts. Thus, in procedural democracy the business of 
politics is conducted with reference to formal constitutional rules that do not 
accommodate publicly espoused notions of the good life.
262
 
 The above model of democracy was practised in Nigeria during the 1950s and 
1960s, but it proved to be incompatible with the multi-ethnic composition of the 
country. Theoretically, the model promises a free and responsive government emerging 
from open political competition, but in practise it was contradicted by ethnic voting and 
the emergence of governments responsive to the groups that brought them into office. 
Its failures accounted for the pre-independence debates about the sharing of seats in the 
central legislature and about the dominance of the federation by the then Northern 
region. It also accounted for minority fears of domination and demands for separation. 
The political convulsion of the mid and late 1960s taught Nigerians to seek an 
alternative to proceduralism for which federal character emerged in the 1970s as the 
most desirable. Although federal character has proved to be inadequate, it would be 
regressive and counter-productive to abandon it to resume the past. 
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 Another alternative would have been a proportional representation of parties in 
cabinet as South Africa implemented later in 1990s. In the South African case, 
proportional representation in Cabinet was a formula for sharing power between the 
African majority and the White minority, and at another level between the African 
National Congress and several other parties both racial and non-racial.
263
 Agreeing on 
this strategy for Nigeria would have been a bold response to some of the inadequacies 
of federal character. 
 The strategy could be defended on grounds of the importance attached to the 
executive arm of government and the passion with which elites and their groups fight 
for its control. During the 1950s and 1960s, it was worthwhile to fight intensely for the 
latter because, under the then parliamentary system, legislative majority was the 
condition for controlling the Executive. With the abandonment of the Westminster 
model for the American Presidential system, groups and their elites aim directly at the 
Executive considered the real centre of power. The Legislature, which ought to be the 
repository of the vox populi, is seen to be nominal in power and less importance is 
attached to its offices. This could be seen in the fact that elections into its seats pass 
with minimal conflict and are sometimes unnoticed. Although the Executive ought to be 
the repository of administration, it has come to be regarded as the seat of power, a sort 
of governing council, not just in Nigeria but in most of African states.
264
 In a similar 
mode of thought, K.C. Wheare observed that:  
If a general survey is made of the position and working of Legislature in the present 
century, it is apparent that, with a few important and striking exceptions, Legislatures have 
declined in certain important respects, and particularly in powers in relation to the 
Executive arm of government. A feature of the development of political institutions in the 
period has been the growth of Executive power.
265
  
 
What the above observation means implicitly is that, to some extent, Western 
democracies have witnessed an increase in the importance and power of their executive 
branch of government and a concurrent decline in that of the legislature. What has to be 
taken note of is that, if that arm of government where power is believed to be 
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concentrated is to be truly democratised, that is, if members of various ethnic segments 
are to participate equally in that arm of government, an inclusive strategy has to zero on 
it. This may entail opening the cabinet to competing parties which are assumed to 
reflect the interest of various ethnic segments. Although such a strategy entails bringing 
members of different political parties into the Cabinet, this should not mean doing away 
with the idea of “government and opposition”. 
 Government and Opposition are a necessary part of liberal democracy, which 
require the winning party to form the cabinet while the losing ones’ stay outside the 
corridors of power to act as checks for four years at the end of which roles change. They 
are an inheritance from Western political thought and practise, but have been carried out 
in a violent and politically damaging ways in deeply divided countries such as Nigeria. 
To illustrate, at the beginning of the Second Republic in 1979, the triumphant National 
Party of Nigeria (NPN), dominant among the Hausa/Fulani, formed a coalition with one 
of its vanquished rivals, the Nigeria People’s Party (NPP) - essentially an Igbo party. 
The other defeated parties, namely the Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN) Yoruba based, the 
Great Nigeria People Party (GNPP), an ascendant Kanuri party and the People’s 
Redemption Party (PRP) supported by the Hausa underclass formed an opposition 
alliance with the aim of blocking the passage of bills in the Legislature and making the 
government unworkable.
266
 The pact signed between the NPN and NPP soon broke 
down on account of other issues and the latter joined the opposition to form the 
Progressive Parties’ Alliance (PPA) whose express purpose was to unseat the NPN 
government from power. The political conflict that triggered from all this was one of the 
reasons that brought the government of the Second Republic to an abrupt end. 
 A similar event occurred during the First Republic when key Action Group 
(AG) leadership turned down the Northern People’s Congress (NPC) invitation to the 
three major political parties to join in the formation of government. The NPC eventually 
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formed a fragile Coalition Government with the National Council of Nigerian Citizens 
(NCNC). The refusal of the AG to join the Coalition Government tore the party into two 
factions because some of its leaders felt that being in the opposition was of no benefit to 
Yorubas. The coalition broke down anyway, and the NCNC joined a faction of the AG 
in opposition.
267
 This brought the Southern parties into full collision with the Northern 
parties resulting in all-out political war. All these were in spite of repeated warnings by 
the late Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, the then Prime Minister and also leader of the NPC, 
that ‘we are not ripe for a system in which there is a full-fledged opposition’.268 Political 
tragedies in Nigeria have largely been scripted by the conventional understanding that 
power has to be in the exclusive control of the winning party. The understanding has to 
be revised if governments are to be truly inclusive. Arthur Lewis made the argument in 
an extreme form when he said, ‘Government and Opposition is … in fact unsuitable to 
West African conditions’.269 
 An inclusive cabinet could be engineered in a variety of ways: one is the use of 
coalition technique prescribed in the consociational strategy of Lijphart and in the six 
conflict reduction techniques of Nordlinger discussed in chapter two of this thesis.
270
  
The problem with this consociational technique is that ethnic groups are often divided 
within into rival subgroups and they rarely unite under one set of leaders or one political 
party. This limits the feasibility of coalition, and when it is attempted it does not last. 
For example, during the First Republic Prime Minister Abubakar Tafawa Balewa’s 
insistence that there be a coalition of three major parties was futile. Similarly, it has 
already been mentioned above how disagreement within the AG and how a faction 
spearheaded by Samuel Akintola tried to and actually sold out to the NPC. The coalition 
that was eventually formed between NPC/NCNC proved too fragile to last. The same 
happened during the Second Republic as already mentioned above. 
 Another alternative is to use electoral requirements to induce parties into the 
executive cabinet. Since the electoral inducement to reach out and obtain plurality of 
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votes is in place, a possible way of ensuring inclusive government is to adopt a model 
that requires parties that obtain a minimum of votes to participate in the constitution of 
the executive cabinet. During the Second Republic, political parties tried to reach across 
other geo-ethnic areas in order to be victorious at the polls, but were unable to go 
beyond their home base. It was only the NPN that was marginally successful, for which 
reason it had the cabinet to itself while the other parties were punished by being 
excluded from the corridors of power. The electoral inducements of federal character 
could be refined by doing away with its punitive aspects. Instead of wholesale 
appropriation of power by marginally successful party, the cabinet might as well be 
opened to every party that obtains a threshold of votes. The fear of not being able to 
reach across to secure wide cross-ethnic support, that fear which makes parties to adopt 
efficiency means instead of legitimate means for mobilising electoral support, has to be 
allayed by putting in place a reward system for parties that have some minimum 
electoral vote. 
 One difficulty with the inducement strategy is that the different parties that 
would compose the cabinet might have policy issues and goals (manifestos) in conflict 
which will make it difficult for government to move on smoothly. Technically, there 
will be opposition within the cabinet as its members take conflicting party positions on 
policy issues. This might not be a major problem if account is taken of John Calhoun’s 
compromise principle that Nordlinger also presented as one of his six conflict regulation 
practices. The compromise principle calls for mutual adjustment of positions on 
conflicting issues in order to arrive at common ground.
271
  
The problem with compromise is that they hardly endure. They are no more than 
pacts in which preferences are traded. Unequal preferences might be traded with the 
hope that its returns would be great. But the return might turn out to be less than 
expected, or the other party might be perceived as gaining more from the compromise. 
For example, during the Second Republic, the NPP walked out on its NPN coalition 
partner when its share of contracts and other forms of patronage were not coming as 
expected. Also, the First Republic NPC/NCNC Coalition Government disintegrated 
because the NCNC felt its partner was benefiting more from it. Historically, 
compromises have proved to be unreliable technique for engineering an inclusive 
government. 
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 Another difficulty with the electoral inducement strategy is that, it ends up 
producing a coalition cabinet not different from the consociational coalition of Lijphart 
or the coalition prescribed by Nordlinger. The latter presented mutual veto or what 
Calhoun called the concurrent majority principle as necessary for the successful 
operation of such Coalition Government. The presupposition is that, the party with the 
greatest numerical strength in cabinet could impose itself on others and if this is to be 
avoided then the mutual agreement of all the parties has to be a condition for the 
adoption of policy decisions.
272
 As earlier argued in chapter two of this thesis, Lijphart’s 
and Nordlinger’s coalition strategy grants too much autonomy to elites and does not 
consider the structural constraints imposed by the dynamics within their groups. Intra-
ethnic rivalry and factional leadership constrains the ability of party elites to act on 
behalf of groups.  
 Do these difficulties undermine the argument for inclusive government? No, 
they do not. It should be recognised that an electoral induced inclusive government has 
more depth than the Coalition Government prescribed by Lijphart and Nordlinger. In 
Nordlinger’s case, a party may not adequately or legitimately represent an ethno-
regional group if it is fractured into rival groups and its leaders equally divided. But in 
Lijphart’s case, parties representing factional groups could find themselves in 
government if they meet the minimum vote requirement. With electoral inducement, 
each of the split-up parts of a group may be induced to support and vote in a party 
representing their interest, and as a consequence, be legitimately represented in 
government if the minimum vote requirement is met. This is not so with Lijphart and 
Nordlinger’s coalition that presents party leaders as representing coherent groups and 
who may deliberately and spontaneously resort to political co-operation without 
inducement.
273
 
 In addition, a cabinet inclusive of various parties does not necessarily translate 
into one with conflicting policy goals that are irresolvable. The determination with 
which the federal character constitution was designed demonstrates the willingness of 
elites to adopt unifying policy options rather than contentious and damaging options. In 
fact, since the 1970s when the federal character policy was adopted, conflict between 
ethno-regional elites and their parties have been on issues rather than on policy, very 
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much unlike the early 1960s when conflict had to do with disagreement over policy 
issues such as affirmative quota appointment. There has been that tendency to discuss 
and settle contentious and conflicting issues in the political arena. The problem is more 
of equal sharing of executive power and not one of policy differences. 
 
5.7 Summary 
The objectives of this chapter were to attempt a description and evaluation of the early 
1970s demand for more states and to determine the desirability of federal character 
policy as a strategy for ensuring equity in the composition of government. The findings 
are as follows: 
a) Demands for more states were driven by elite and group competition for public 
wealth, and by the need for equal political accommodation of groups. Wealth 
was found to be a weak basis for political claims and that if internal self-
determination were granted on account of it, there would be endless demand for, 
and creation of new units. On the other hand, demands for equal accommodation 
were found to have emanated from unequal distribution of states during the 1967 
states creation exercise, and could be properly regarded as claims to redress 
injustice. Denying the claims on account of their economism had the advantage 
of avoiding the emergence of new and endless claims. But groups that felt 
cheated during the 1967 exercise would have been treated unfairly. The other 
option was to meet the claims on ground of equity and risk proliferation of new 
units. This approach was better because groups would have been accommodated 
equally, the state would have emerged as a neutral body, and a framework for 
mutual trust would have been laid. On this ground, the chapter is endorsing the 
decision of the 1975 government Panel to create new additional states on the 
condition that to avoid slippery slope and the attendant institutional instabilities, 
there should be a Constitutional provision that limits creation of states only at an 
interval of twenty five years.  
b) Federal character policy was a reflection of the multi-ethnic make-up of the 
country, and was informed by real historical experiences regarding the 
monopoly of power by elites of a few ethnic regions. It was aimed at ensuring 
balanced representation in public institutions through the combination of free 
competition and geo-ethnic appointments. One of the key assumptions behind 
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the policy was that its electoral requirements would induce ethno-regional elites 
to reach across ethnic lines and build inclusive political parties which would in 
turn, be induced by the same electoral requirements to reach across groups in 
order to win their support. The expectation was that the government that would 
finally emerge will be highly inclusive. This turned out not be very correct. The 
electoral requirements of federal character succeeded in inducing the most 
efficient means of acquiring power. Political parties remained under the firm 
control of a few ethnic elites who recruited clients from other geo-ethnic areas in 
order to give their parties a veneer of legitimacy. Governments that emerged 
equally remained under their firm control and were less inclusive. 
In conclusion, the weakness of federal character may prompt one to think of the winner-
takes-all system, which characterised the politics of the 1960s, and the immediate pre-
independence era as an alternative. But the violent and tragic experiences the country 
had with the winner-takes-all system does not make it a better alternative. Thus, the 
adoption of the federal character was at the time a better option. However, since the 
limitation of the federal character principle has shifted ethno-political tensions to equal 
sharing of executive power, it is hereby suggested that the problem of unequal inclusion 
of groups in government could either be addressed by thinking of a governing cabinet 
inclusive of all relevant competing parties, similar to the type proposed by Arthur 
Lewis, or full implementation of power shift, for instance, rotating Presidency among 
the five geo-political zones in the country. 
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     CHAPTER SIX 
THE REVISED FEDERAL CHARACTER (PRINCIPLE) APPROACH 
 
Political recruitment and subsequent political support which are based on tribal, religious 
and linguistic sentiment contributed largely to our past misfortune. They must not be 
allowed to spring up again. These negative political attitudes like hatred, falsehood, 
intolerance and acrimony also contributed to our national tragedy in the past: they must not 
be continued. These negative attitudes must not be allowed to enter into the practice of the 
new political system.
274 
 
6.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter the thesis discussed how, in an attempt to achieve the triple 
national goals - recognition and accommodation of ethnic diversity, achieving national 
unity and political stability - the Nigerian government adopted the federal character 
approach to state building. This approach was in response to the need to recognise and 
accommodate diversity, as well as preventing domination of the minority by the 
majority groups. The previous chapter also saw how the implementation of the federal 
character approach to state building generated ethno-political conflict and institutional 
instabilities. The mid-1980s marked the beginning of another phase in Nigeria’s state 
building approach to its diversity. The new phase entailed the revision of some of the 
elements in the federal character principles of the 1970s to make it more inclusive. This 
involved the division of the country into greater number of states to adequately reflect 
ethnicity, and the convening of a Constitutional Conference to resolve group based 
claims and counter claims to alternative political structure, power sharing, revenue 
allocation, and ownership and control of oil resources.
275
 This chapter discusses and 
subsequently makes a critical evaluation of the main elements of the revised version of 
the federal character principle with the purpose of ascertaining the desirability or 
otherwise of its outcomes. 
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 The speech by Lt. General Olusegun Obasanjo on 21 September, 1978, on the occasion of signing into 
law the 1979 Presidential Constitution of Nigeria. The subject of this speech became more or less the 
mandate of the Political Bureau that was set up by Ibrahim Babangida in 1986 to conduct a national 
debate on the political future of Nigeria. Citation adopted from James O. Ojiako, ‘13 Years of Military 
Rule, 1966-1979’, the Daily Times, 1978, 200. Also cited by Richard Joseph, Democracy and Prebendal 
Politics in Nigeria: The Rise and fall of the Second Republic (Ibadan: Spectrum) 1991, 93. 
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 Because of the strategic importance of revenue allocation and oil resource ownership and control in 
Nigeria’s political economy, both are discussed in separate ensuing chapters of this thesis. 
 131 
 
6.2 The Political Bureau and Federal Character 
The previous chapter examined two interrelated elements of the federal character 
strategy for accommodating ethnic difference in politics. These elements were the 
separation of groups into several states, and the policy requirements that political parties 
and governmental appointments reflect the country’s multi-ethnic structure. The chapter 
defended the creation of states on grounds of equity and the need to build group trust 
and confidence in governance, but cautioned that it had the potential risk of triggering 
new demands for and endless creation of new states. It was also argued that the policy 
requirements were well intentioned, but not sufficient to make for ethnic inclusion in 
government. It was some of these issues that the Political Bureau tried to address when 
it was instituted in 1986 to identify the causes of past political failures and make 
recommendations for a new Constitution that would guide the country’s Third 
Republic.
276
 
The first element of federal character was an issue for the Political Bureau 
because it triggered new and overwhelming demands by elites claiming to represent 
new groups. The 1976 state creation exercise conveyed to people the message that state 
creation had material windfall. It also became clear that the creation of states came 
along with the duplication of Executive, Legislative and Judicial offices. It also came 
with the duplication of the civil service, the development of a capital city, contracts for 
construction projects, and guaranteed representation in federal institutions because of 
the federal character policy requirement. Above all of these, the demand for states was 
triggered by the federal government’s full appropriation and take-over of petroleum 
resources and the proportional allocation of revenue among the states. It was these 
material benefits to the states that activated an overwhelming 53 new state creation 
demands between 1979 and 1982, and 17 formal requests from the Political Bureau in 
1986. 
Despite some expressed views by sections of the public that most of the existing 
states were not viable and should be either abolished, merged, or left as they were 
without further fragmentation, the Political Bureau found it necessary to recommend the 
creation of a few more states. The number was placed at two at the minimum, but not 
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 The Political Bureau headed by Samuel J. Cookey was set up in January 1986 by General Ibrahim 
Babangida to conduct a national debate on the political future of Nigeria. Among its mandate was to 
‘establish a viable and enduring people oriented political system devoid of perennial disruptions’. See 
Federal Republic of Nigeria, Report of the Political Bureau (Lagos: Federal Government Printer, 1987), 
3. 
 132 
 
more than six at the maximum. The Bureau felt that it was necessary to separate some 
groups that were in conflict in the North, and do justice to a minority group in the 
South-East whom government refused to group separately during the 1976 state creation 
exercise, and this is despite earlier recommendation by the 1975 government Panel. The 
Bureau tried to respond to the problem of slippery slope by suggesting that a 
Constitutional provision be made to prohibit more creation of states for at least twenty 
five years starting from the date its own proposed states would come into being. There 
was, however, a Minority report that emerged from the Bureau that disagreed from the 
above position- the Minority report instead opted for the retention of the 19 state system 
on the grounds that the existing Federal structure was decentralised enough to cope with 
the challenges of federalism.
277
 
It is important to remember that in 1957, the Minorities Commission had judged 
that the multiplication of internal political units to recognise smaller groups would be 
the beginning of an endless process. However, the post-civil war Nigerian Governments 
regarded continued multiplication as necessary for justice. Later, in 1986, Political 
Bureau’s suggested that a 25-year moratorium be placed on further political 
fragmentation was not enforced. Its proposal for 2 states at the minimum was 
implemented and then followed by the creation of another nine in 1991 and a further six 
in 1996.
278
 Some have argued that the state creation in 1991 was a strategy by the then 
General Ibrahim Babangida regime to win group support for his planned prolonged stay 
in office. The regime, however, explained its decision to further recognise groups in 
new states as having been based on three interconnected principles, namely: the 
‘principle of social justice, the principle of development, and the principle of balanced 
federation’.279 
 Furthermore, the Constitutional Conference convened in 1994/5 by the regime 
of General Sani Abacha to work out a framework for good governance received 35 
requests for creation of additional states and 1002 requests for the creation of new local 
government units- the local governments had already increased from 301 in 1978 to 593 
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 See Federal Republic of Nigeria, Report of the Political Bureau (Lagos: Government Printer, 1987), 
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 See Figure 1 for the major state building/constitutional events, and ethno-political/religious violence.  
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 Ibrahim Babangida, ‘Agitation for New States is Healthy’, cited from Simeon O. Ilesanmi, Religious 
Pluralism and the Nigerian State (Ohio: University Centre for International Studies, 1997), 142. 
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at the time of the Conference.
280
 Currently, in 2012, there are 774 local government 
units in the country. Some delegates thought that such demands were ‘motivated by the 
selfish ambition of those who aspire to rule them and should be ignored’. But the 
Conference endorsed the calls, saying that it thought additional units were necessary to 
‘redress inequity’, ‘to guarantee justice and fair play’, to ‘give minorities a voice in 
local and national affairs’, and to ‘reduce the marginalisation of disadvantaged areas or 
communities in national politics.
281
  
To this purpose, a Commission was subsequently set up to examine these 
demands, and the Commission eventually recommended an additional set of states. At 
first, the Abacha regime asserted that most of the existing states and local government 
units were not capable of performing the functions of government, that they were 
completely dependent on the centre and that their proliferation had destroyed the 
principle of federalism. The regime made a decision to merge them into a few large 
regions. But this plan was quickly abandoned when it was realised that such a strategy 
would unite the Yorubas who felt humiliated by the 12 June, 1993 Presidential election 
result annulment and encourage them to secede. Instead of a merger, the Abacha regime 
created 6 additional states to further separate groups and ensure the continued existence 
of the country.
282
 So, group separation has indeed become an endless process, but the 
need to achieve justice and ensure the continued existence of the country cannot be 
divorced from its internal logic. 
 The second element of federal character, being the policy requirement that 
origins of members of national institutions reflect the constituent states and the latter 
should also do the same by reflecting their local government units in political 
appointments, was also revisited. Section 277 of the 1979 Constitution had given legal 
effect to the 1976 CDC recommendation that the criterion for membership of sub-
political units be parental descent. With the operation of the indigeneity policy, 
Nigerians resident in another state not of their biological and ethnic descent were denied 
indigenous status and considered to be non-members. So were their children even if 
they were born and had lived all their lives there. To claim indigenous status they had to 
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 For more discussion of the Constitutional Conference, see Nahzeem Oluwafemi Mimiko, ‘Between 
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go back to their states of biological descent, and more so, the federal character clause on 
citizenship made no provisions for change and or/review over time. Discriminatory 
practises emerged as state governments excluded non-indigenes from political 
appointments. Even educational programmes, housing schemes, access to health and 
market stalls were not immune as those whose parental descent were not traceable to 
groups within the state were excluded.
283
  
Given the above policy gap, in most cases, positions in some federal agencies 
became exclusive preserves of those who were indigenous to the state where the 
agencies were located. This was particularly true of Federal Universities where 
appointments into Vice Chancellorship, Registrarship, Deanship, and Departmental 
Chair positions became very sensitive to the indigeneity policy. To attest the ethnic 
origin of candidates being recruited into positions, or being considered for University 
admissions or scholarships, it became a policy that identification letters be produced 
from either a recognised chief in the village or a chairperson of the local government of 
ones’ ethnic origin. 
 The 1986 Political Bureau, composed mostly of academics that have had first-
hand experience of rights violation in their Universities, critically examined the 
problem. In a section of its report entitled ‘Citizenship and Nationality’, the Bureau 
observed, ‘the employment of Nigerians in certain states of the federation under alien 
conditions; and denial of employment opportunities to Nigerians on the basis of non-
indigeneity’, ‘alien’ or ‘outsider’.284 It tried to do away with what it considered to be the 
impediments of indigeneity to the development of Nigerian citizenship by 
recommending full residency rights for all citizens who have lived in a state for ten 
years at the least.
285
 The Babangida regime took note of the recommendation and 
promised a national policy on it, but nothing was done and the Constitution that 
emerged in 1989 had little to say about it. The citizenship and indigeneity provision in 
the 1989 Constitution was replicated without change and/or review in the 1999 
Constitution as amended in 2011. 
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6.3 The 1994/5 Constitutional Conference and Power Sharing Claims 
Chapter five noted that the electoral inducement of federal character was not enough to 
produce a truly inclusive regime, and that achieving the latter would require 
proportional representation of political parties meant to reflect group interests in the 
executive branch of government. The 1986 Political Bureau did not really address the 
problem of balanced representation in government, despite its formal endorsement of 
federal character. The General Muhammadu Buhari regime that terminated the Second 
Republic had deviated from the policy requirement by making key appointments and 
allocating resources in favour of Northerners, despite the federal character policy in 
place.
286
 The successor regime of Babangida tried to balance sectional and regional 
interests in political appointments, but the commitment soon fizzled and Southern and 
Middle Belt elites lost out at the centre. It is important to mention here that the palace 
coup that brought the regime of Ibrahim Babangida to power in 1985 was believed to 
have been motivated by the need to address grievances about power imbalance. It was 
the biased distribution of power in favour of the North, together with Babangida’s 
personal determination to be in office for as long as he wished, that generated 
competing claims regarding the political structure of the country, power sharing, and 
ownership of revenue yielding resources- the discontent caused a failed military coup in 
1990 by some Southern and Middle Belt military officers who gave a radio address 
about monopoly of power by people of the North and announced the excision of five 
Northern states from the country.
287
 The claims were fuelled by the annulment of the 
1993 Presidential election results that would have transferred power to the South 
Western part of the country and were further amplified when a Constitutional 
Conference was convened to diminish tension in the country.
288
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At the Conference there were claims by the ‘Councils of Obas- Chiefs of Lagos, 
Ogun, Oyo, Osun and Ondo states’ and Yoruba states for a loose federation and the 
adoption of a rotational Presidency.
289
 There were also claims by interest groups and 
elites in Igbo states of the East for regrouping the country into six geo-political zones 
within a federal framework and rotating the Presidency among the regions. They also 
demanded the adoption of a revenue allocation formula that emphasised derivation.
290
 
There were contradictory claims by ‘Emirs and Chiefs of the Northern states of Nigeria 
and The Middle Belt Council for a retention of the existing state structure’ and a 
reduction in the ‘incessant demand for more states through a revenue allocation formula 
that de-emphasised equality of states’.291 
 There were radical claims by various interest groups and elites representing 
different oil producing ethnic minorities of the Niger Delta for political autonomy 
‘outside the present Nigerian state and nation’, for the right to control and use their 
natural resources and to protect their ecology from further degradation. The Ogoni 
ethnic group specifically demanded that ‘each ethnic group that can exist on its own 
should constitute a political unit within a loose federation. While those without 
economic resources to support the paraphernalia of statehood should negotiate to live 
with their neighbours’.292 Grievances that informed these radical claims were the 
distribution of greater number of states among majority groups thus permitting them to 
have greater representation in national institutions, and the federal government’s 
appropriation and distribution of oil wealth on proportionality principle that allowed 
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majority groups- spread in several states to have a greater share. For instance, Ken Saro-
Wiwa, - the executed minority rights activist observed: 
The Constitution gives so many states to the Yoruba people, so many to the Hausa/Fulani 
people, so many states to the Igbo people … population is that the only determining factor 
in place? People are only using the fact of their numerical superiority to undo those who are 
inferior in terms of numbers.
293 
 
In another related statement - though not to the Constitutional Conference - the Urhobo 
communities in the Niger Delta expressed their anger with these words: 
The three big brothers, the Hausa/Fulani oligarchy, the Yoruba, and the Igbo, sought the use 
of the minorities and the resources of the minorities to enhance their way of life and to 
force them to serve willy nilly … The area considers itself as alienated territory and worse 
still, the people are evidently regarded as second-class citizens whose talents and natural 
wealth must go to serve the well-being of the three brothers.
294
 
 
After a critical analysis, the response of the Constitutional Conference to the above 
claims was to revise the federal character strategy designed between 1975 and 1978, but 
simultaneously retain its structural features. First, it recommended that the country 
continue with federal arrangement, after considering alternatives like confederation to 
be ‘unsuitable for Nigeria,’ and a political break up as undesirable and without popular 
support. For example, the Conference during the submission of its report observed that: 
At the time the Constitutional Conference was inaugurated, the tension in the country was 
so high that many people thought the Conference would not last. There were some who 
believed that blows would be exchanged inside the Conference hall. To the pessimists, the 
end for Niger was insight. Contrary to these fears, however, the Conference began so well 
and throughout the general debates, no member called for the disintegration of Nigeria. 
When Committee No. 1 began its sittings, it commenced on a position where it was not 
necessary to consider the disintegration of Nigeria. It proceeded with a position of One 
United Nigeria and then progressed with its deliberations … As has been noted above, there 
was not a single call for the disintegration of the country; most complaints were centred on 
the manner the country was governed. There were cries of neglect by certain areas and of 
inequality in sharing power and resources. More than anything else, it was this unfairness, 
inequity and injustice in the governance of Nigeria that worried a number of people who 
nonetheless did not opt for a break-up of the country.
295 
  
 After painstaking deliberation, federalism was considered by the Conference to be 
suitable because: ‘it would fit a heterogeneous society and sustain unity … provide 
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opportunity for the people to participate in … governance, … minimise fears of 
domination,  and inspire development’.296 
 Second, the Federal Executive Cabinet was made more inclusive with provisions 
which required political parties with no less than 10% of seats in the National Assembly 
to be represented in proportion to their number of seats, very much in the manner 
prescribed by Arthur Lewis.
297
 The arrangement was made more inclusive by having the 
office of the Chief Executive rotated between the North and South every five years. To 
ensure the accomplishment of this arrangement, the report provided the following 
definitions: 
The North as the states, including the Federal capital Territory, Abuja, carved out from the 
former Northern region of Nigeria as at 1 October, 1960, and the South on the other hand 
was also defined as the states carved out from the former Eastern and Western regions of 
Nigeria including the territory of Lagos as at 1
st
 October, 1960.
298 
  
However, the likelihood of ethnic minorities of both regions not having a fair chance at 
the office, and the possibility of violent competition between Igbos and Yorubas in the 
South, prompted the Abacha regime to make a modification because some feared that 
under a North-South rotation, minorities would have no chance of producing a President 
and, in the South, warfare politics would arise from competition between the Igbo and 
Yoruba. As a consequence, instead of two regions- the North and South, power was to 
rotate for every 5 years among each of six geo-political zones- the North-East, the 
North-West, East-Central, South-West, North-Central, and South-South- into which the 
country was divided.
299
 The power sharing mechanism was also to apply to each of the 
constituent states and local government units.  
The 1975 Constitution Drafting Committee (CDC) rejected proposals by its sub-
committee on the Executive and Legislature for a rotation of the office of the President 
among the zones. However, the Constitutional Conference of 1995 not only adopted 
what was rejected in 1975, but went ahead to borrow something similar to Joe Slovo’s 
proposal on system of power sharing, the one-time leader of the South African 
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Communist Party. The Slovo system of power sharing arrangement requires 
proportional representation in both regional and central legislatures. It also entitles a 
party that holds at least 5% of seats in the National Assembly to have cabinet portfolios 
in proportion to the number of seats it has in the Assembly. Negotiated between 1991 
and 1993, the formula made for power sharing between the African majority and the 
White minority, and at another level between the African National Congress (ANC) and 
several other parties both racial and non-racial. It was this formula that the 
Constitutional Conference copied and combined with rotational Presidency.
300
   
 Unlike claims for power sharing that were fully addressed, claims to rich natural 
resources were not given adequate attention. The Conference stopped short of 
addressing them by making provisions that required the President, on the advice of the 
National Revenue Mobilisation Allocation and Fiscal Commission, to make proposals 
to the National Assembly for revenue allocation. The Assembly was expected to use the 
principles of population, equality of states, and derivation in determining an allocation 
system, but with the condition that at least 13% derivation be constantly reflected.
301
 
 
6.4 Evaluation 
From the above discussions, three relevant issues have emerged, namely: (1) the tension 
between the political necessity to separate groups in different states and the slippery 
slope it engenders; (2) the federal character policy requirement and its impediments to 
national citizenship; and (3) claims and agreements regarding political structure of the 
country, and power sharing. The next section of the chapter will evaluate of these issues 
and consider if alternative policy choices were desirable and feasible. 
 
6.4.1 Recognition in Separate Units and the Problem of Slippery Slope 
It is evident from the detailed analyses given above that attempt at accommodating 
groups in different sub-units has given rise to endless demands for, and multiplication 
of such units. The historical analyses shows that continuous multiplication is being done 
with some concern for equity and unity of the country, but should it go on forever? 
Should internal multiplication of units be carried out endlessly in the name of justice or 
should the brakes be applied at some point? 
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 Nigeria is highly heterogeneous, and Constitutional instruments have 
deliberately been used since the 1970s to reflect it in political arrangements. Its degree 
of heterogeneity can be best appreciated when it is considered that most groups have 
subgroups differentiated by dialect and customs. Subgroup rivalry and conflict tends to 
be as intense as, and some times more violent than those between groups. They are, 
however, overshadowed and subordinated to the latter because of the narrow geographic 
scale and political level at which they occur. For example, conflict between Yoruba 
subgroups is as violent as conflict between Igbos and Hausa/Fulanis, just as rivalry 
between Igbo subgroups is as intense as conflict between Yoruba and Igbos. Separate a 
group, and before one knows the difference and conflict within it become more 
pronounced and visible.
302
 
 The multiplicity of subgroups within a group does not help.  For example, the 
Ijaw who do not rank among the three major groups in the country consist of over 40 
subgroups some of whom have little in common, except their similarity in language. To 
use federal territorial units to accommodate ethnic difference is to be confronted by 
groups who are differentiated into multiple parts within. While the need to 
accommodate diversity requires that territorial units be created for those that are 
different, as successive Nigerian regimes have done since the late 1960s, prudence will 
also dictate that not all subgroups of larger groups or every small group can be 
separately accommodated. The line has to be drawn at some point. 
 Perhaps, one way of dealing with the problem is to adopt a policy that prohibits 
further fragmentation of units. This might be considered a reactive and vexatious policy 
and new regimes might set it aside, as was the case during the Second Republic of 
Nigeria. Recall that the 1975/76 Constitution Drafting Committee reacted to pressure 
for additional states by drafting Constitutional provisions, which required that certain 
procedures are followed. The Committee technically prohibited further multiplication of 
units by making the procedures difficult and complex, yet the civilian regime that 
assumed power in 1979 tried to undermine the Committee’s goal by slowly navigating 
its way through. Similarly, the 1986 Political Bureau prescribed a 25-year moratorium 
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after which new states can be created. But it was the same Babangida regime to which 
the Political Bureau owed its existence that set aside the prescribed 25-year moratorium. 
This thus means that, a prohibiting policy may not endure because different regimes 
will regard it as not reflecting the social circumstances that confront them. 
 A second option is to listen to separation claims and evaluate them to determine 
those that do not merit attention. This is what successive government commissions in 
Nigeria have been doing since the mid-1970s. The advantage of this option is that it 
steers the state away from an authoritarian policy approach to ethnic demands by 
providing institutional mechanism for the expression and peaceful resolution of 
grievances. The Nigerian approach in the above context unlike other African States such 
as Sudan, Ethiopia, Ghana, Chad, and Sierra-Leone, who in the sixties and seventies 
developed avoidance policy for dealing with ethnic claims, gives a feeling of security to 
groups and confers legitimacy on the system. However, this does not resolve the 
problem at stake because the readiness of regimes to listen and evaluate claims for their 
merit stimulates fresh demands by new groups. It was precisely the willingness of 
successive Nigerian regimes to receive and consider new claims that produced an 
endless state creation exercise. 
 A third alternative is to emphasise the viability requirement. While it is fair to 
listen to claims and resolve them in light of the requirements of justice, it is also fair 
that an economic viability requirement be not sacrificed. If the various government 
Commissions had given weight to the requirement, it is likely that the demand for states 
would not have continued endlessly. To pay little or no attention to the economic 
viability requirement is to be blind to the need for self-sustenance and financial 
autonomy of the units. For example, the 1976 government Panel recognised that ‘all the 
existing states except possibly Lagos were heavily dependent on the federal 
government’.303 The marginal attention paid by successive Nigerian regimes, since the 
1970s to the notion of economic self-sustenance in their treatment of group claims, may 
have been responsible for the dramatic increases in the number of units. In fact, the 
government Panel that examined claims in 1976 did emphasise that economic viability 
was not relevant because: 
Each state was not, and should not be required to function as self-contained or self-
sufficient unit. In other words, the country as a whole constitutes a single economic system 
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and so long as this system is viable, the viability of the component units can be assured 
through the normal process of exchanges and distributive actions of the federal 
government.
304 
 
Subsequent government Commissions have adopted the same attitude, an exception 
being the 1994/95 Constitutional Conference which gave critical weight to economic 
viability but still went on to undercut it by recommending the creation of eleven states, 
all of which were to be dependent on the central revenue for survival. 
The economic viability option seems reasonable, but it would be fruitless 
because in the Niger Delta every village that has rich oil resources under its soil could 
easily meet the requirement. In which case every village in that part of the country 
would make claim to statehood and meeting such claim would not only trivialise state 
creation, but also be unjust to millions of people living in the rest part of the country 
without oil or sustaining mineral resources. 
On the other hand, the normative argument for political recognition of groups 
collapses if the economic requirement is not one that can be easily met. If much 
emphasis had been placed on self-sustenance in the past, it is likely that the thirty six 
state structures would not have emerged as it did in 1996 and the adoption of federal 
character would have been severely compromised. Emphasising the economic viability 
would seriously question the multi-state structure that has been used to separate groups 
and has served as the basis for nurturing difference in politics. 
 Perhaps a better alternative is to adopt a policy that would allow the existing 
state structure to stabilise. In the first twenty years after independence, political sub-
units were created on the average of every 7 years and in the last twenty five years, the 
average has been 5 years. After each round of division, the units were barely operated 
before being subjected to another round of division. One good thing that emerged from 
the rapid and successive fragmentation is that groups have been significantly separated 
and accommodated within the 36 states and 774 local governments units that have 
emerged, at least when considered against the fact of three regions that existed in the 
1950s. The multiplication has gone a long way in accomplishing the objective for which 
it was conceived and what is required is a consolidation not a trivialisation of the 
accomplishment. Consolidation could be achieved if the units are given time to operate. 
A policy that requires the existing units to remain intact for some decades would lead to 
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an adjustment process whereby ethnic elites and their followers get accustomed to 
operating within the framework of the states in which they are grouped. Over time they 
will adjust to accommodate themselves and build up networks of political, social and 
economic exchanges. To this extent, they get used to living in the units and develop a 
sense of attachment to the unit in which they are grouped. Thus, the continuing demand 
for creation of state syndrome will fizzle away and the state system will stabilise. 
 For example, the Midwest region that was created in 1963 was not fragmented 
until in the 1990s. While its internal boundary remains, its nomenclature was changed to 
Midwestern state in 1967 by General Yakubu Gowon (Rtd) and to Bendel state by the 
late General Murtala Mohammed in 1976. It was the only state that remained intact for 
about 30 years even though demands for a new state out of it began in the early 1970s. 
The argument here is that, while it lasted, its inhabitants got used living together. A 
dense network of exchanges and interactions were forged, and when the state finally fell 
to fragmentation in the 1990s there was public lamentation.
305
 Headlines in the local 
press read, ‘Good Old Bendel,’ ‘The Demise of Sweet Old Bendel’. It is this type of 
adjustment, continued interaction, and emotional connection that can make for stability 
in the state system. 
 
6.4.2 Federal Character and the Problem of National Citizenship 
As discussed in the first section of this chapter, the problem of citizenship rights derive 
from the commitment to ensure even access to political and economic resources through 
the creation of political units around groups and the federal character policy requirement 
regarding appointment at each of the three levels of government. The federal character 
policy called for differentiated group rights even though there were Constitutional 
commitments to liberal individual rights. The conflict between the policy and individual 
right is best appreciated when it is considered that the progressive reduction in the 
territorial span of political sub-units through the creation of additional new units also 
increases the number of citizens living outside their units of biological origin. Thus, a 
greater number of citizens are subjected to second class treatment. This is beside the 
problem of naturalised citizens and their offspring who do not trace parental descent to 
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any community of any sub-unit within the country and, as a consequence, are not in a 
position to enjoy same rights as other citizens.
306
 
 Perhaps one way of dealing with the problem is to abandon the indigeneity 
requirement for appointment and recruitment and to adopt competition and achievement 
as the basis for treating citizens equally. This will mean the abandonment of federal 
character and a reversion to the winner-takes-all political competition that was practised 
and proved to be fatal in the 1960s. This option is not helpful. It is retrogressive because 
it means going back to the past. Its inequity and associated violent conflict led to its 
abandonment in the early 1970s, so it won’t be of much use bringing it back. In fact, to 
bring it back is to court disaster. 
Another alternative is to regard what is the best option and accept the 
indigeneity clause as unavoidable inconveniences. After all, the indigeneity requirement 
does not deny citizens of their rights. It only requires that certain rights be enjoyed by 
citizens through their states of biological origin. It is a requirement that applies 
generally, and its inconveniences could be regarded as an unavoidable cost of equitable 
access to public institutions. We could accept the inconveniences with regrets, but they 
affect the real life chances of some individuals and accepting them with regrets is not 
the best way of dealing with the problem. 
 Another alternative, perhaps a better one, is to reform federal character by 
substituting residency for indigeneity. Instead of basing appointment and recruitment on 
membership of a particular ethnic community within sub-unit, residence in a relevant 
political unit and or/community should serve as the criterion. This is what the 1986 
Political Bureau opted for when it recommended that citizens should have full residency 
rights in any state in which they have lived for 10 years. Some might argue that group 
members living outside their state of parental origin could find themselves in the most 
important positions within their resident state and, as a consequence, undercut the very 
objective of federal character. For example, some members of the 1978 Constituent 
Assembly argued that, at the national level, the President might end up appointing 
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people who belonged to a few ethnic groups if indigeneity was diluted.
307
 In fact, the 
Political Bureau’s recommendation was not implemented because of the fear that non-
indigenes that have residency rights might displace members of the indigenous 
community from key public positions. The fear is taken too far because the likelihood of 
non-indigenes occupying the most important positions is thin. Even if it were true, such 
presence in public offices would not be in the extreme. At any rate, the fear could be 
addressed by placing some percentage limits on non-indigenous appointments. 
 
6.4.3 The 1995 Constitutional Agreements on Political Structure and Rotational 
Presidency 
 
This sub-section begins by acknowledging the dubious origin of the Constitutional 
Conference. Dubious in the sense that, it was a ploy by the late General Abacha to 
divert attention of Nigerians from the illegitimacy of his regime and also to get 
Nigerians occupied with the General Ibrahim Babangida (Rtd) cloned endless transition 
program.
308
 Despite its questionable origin and legitimacy, the Conference provided an 
outlet for aggrieved cultural groups, interest groups, elite groups, and traditional chiefs 
to express their concerns about ethno-regional power imbalance. It also provided an 
institutional framework for addressing competing claims to alternative political 
structure and power sharing arrangements.  
The Conference may have been strategic given that it was used to serve a hidden 
political agenda, nonetheless, the important normative claims were made and 
Constitutional arrangements that were negotiated equally had normative importance. It 
would be worthwhile to discuss the claims for their normative relevance, and to evaluate 
the negotiated arrangements to determine if they were the possible best, and if not, what 
feasible alternatives could have been, given the claims and conditions on the ground. 
 What would justify claims for the abandonment of federalism in Nigeria for 
alternatives like confederation or political break up? What conditions would justify the 
parting of ways by the various ethnic regions in Nigeria? One may argue that the strong 
hold on power by one ethnic section of the country and its treatment as a birth right 
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could justify claims for dissolution of the polity. To hold-on-to power permanently like 
a feudal inheritance is to deny citizenship status to others. Citizenship, in its unqualified 
sense means legal membership of a state. The most important criterion for determining 
citizenship is legal possession of political right, or what Aristotle referred to as the right 
to rule.
309
 People without formal right to rule are subjects not citizens, perhaps best 
exemplified by people in colonial territories who have no right to participate in 
government. It amounts to internal colonialism if one cultural section of the country 
monopolises power and refuses to allow it shift to other sections even when won in 
democratic elections. The historical grasp on power by the Emirate North, and the 
annulment of the 12 June, 1993 Presidential election results, which would have shifted 
power to the South Western part of the country, amounted to a denial of citizenship.
310
 
Long term political subjection is enough to justify confederation and political break up 
calls. 
 In a similar vein, insecurity of life may provide reasonable ground. The classical 
social contract theorists all identified generated insecurity as the condition that makes 
people to form a commonwealth. They also identified the point at which people, in their 
right senses, would meaningfully quit the commonwealth. This is when security of life 
can no longer be guaranteed, as when the commonwealth comes under the subjection of 
a foreign power, or the regime becomes tyrannical and people can no longer tolerate it. 
The chief reason for constituting political society is defeated if the vulnerability of 
citizens to arbitrary power cannot be reduced, and more so if agents of the state are the 
very ones unleashing terror on the people. Military campaigns against defenceless 
citizens, unlawful detention, kidnapping, torture, whether carried out by agents of the 
state or not, are manifestations of absence of security of life and they would establish 
valid claims to a new political order that is free of fear. The periodic deployment of 
heavily armed military units against some oil producing ethnic minorities making 
compensatory claims and the subsequent carnage in Ogoni land and the rest part of the 
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Niger Delta region before the introduction of the questionable Niger Delta Amnesty 
programme in 2009 by the late President Umaru Musa Yar’Adua definitely provided a 
valid ground for self-determination claims by the people of the Niger Delta.
311
 
 The Constitutional Conference summed up the two above mentioned issues in 
the country when it stated that public fears about possible political break up rested on 
‘unfairness, inequity and injustice in the governing of Nigeria’.312Given the 
reasonableness of the claims, would it have been best to have a structural arrangement 
different from what the Conference decided on? Confederation and/or a structure in 
which groups enjoyed complete autonomy were the alternatives that were demanded. 
These alternatives were undesirable and unpractical for a number of reasons. 
 Firstly, they entailed the weakening of the centre and the conferment of 
sovereign status on ethno-regional units. This would have amounted to a political break 
up which the Ijaw actually demanded, and most Nigerians were not prepared for the 
incoherence and chaos that would trigger. The memories of the Nigeria-Biafra civil war 
were not yet lost and most people did not want a repeat of the experience. In fact, it is 
generally believed that Nigeria’s existence after the annulment of the 12 June, 1993 
Presidential election results was saved by the memories of the Biafran war.
313
 
 Secondly, the interdependence of various parts of the country made 
confederation or political break up unpractical. Over the years, networks of social and 
economic interactions had developed between different geo-ethnic regions to make the 
country a complete system with interdependent parts. The functioning and progress of 
one part is tied to exchanges and interactions between all the parts and a break up will 
spell disaster. For example, the landlocked Northern part of the country is as dependent 
on the coastal ports for sea haulage as it is dependent on oil revenue derived from the 
Niger Delta and off-shore. Thus, dependence on the coastal seaports had led to disputes 
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over the status of Lagos during the pre-independence period and the Northern threats of 
running over the South if the seaports were to be closed. Also, the South has become 
increasingly dependent on the North and the Middle Belt for agricultural food and 
industrial raw material requirements. There are also people from various ethnic regions 
that reside and conduct their business in places other than theirs and, as a consequence, 
their economic survival is tied to the continued existence of the country. By implication 
therefore, the 1930s remark by Governor Donald Cameron that, for geographic and 
economic reasons, no part of the country would ‘likely be a separate, self-contained 
political and economic unit in the future is as valid today as it was when he made it.
314
 
 Thirdly, it would have been most difficult to draw determinate internal 
boundaries to arrive at acceptable political units for a confederal arrangement or for 
political break up. The Northern part of the country housed and continues to house 
multiple mutually non-agreeable groups of different religious persuasion. Religious and 
communal conflict has been endemic and there is also the perceived political oppression 
of some minorities by the Northern political power elites.
315
 The frequencies of such 
conflict and the related loss in human lives have always featured in global statistics on 
violent communal and ethnic conflict.
316
 Mutual suspicion would, therefore, have made 
it difficult to find groups willing to live together in the same polity. 
 The problem of drawing determinate boundaries would have been as difficult in 
the South where Igbos and Yorubas are internally differentiated and hardly act as 
unitary actors. For example, Abiola’s claim to the Presidency was betrayed by some of 
his own Yoruba kinsmen who volunteered to head the puppet Interim National 
Government set up by the General Ibrahim Babangida regime to douse the tensions that 
arose from the annulment of the 12 June, 1993 Presidential election results. Yorubas 
have always been fragmented, disunited, and mutually locked in conflict. Put them in 
one polity and they will fall apart in no time. With the Igbo, they are fractured into 
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competing Anambra and Imo Igbos. For example, one can easily make reference to the 
memorandum submitted on their behalf, but was unsigned by some representatives who 
were claimed to be representing both Imo and Igbos of Rivers and Delta States.  
Minorities on the other hand were not free of the problem of disunity either. For 
example, on the eve of the Constitutional Conference of 1994, the Southern Minorities 
Group, an interest group embracing elites of several minority groups in the South, held 
a series of meetings to take a common position on political arrangement in which those 
they claimed to be representing would be grouped into one large territorial unit. A 
splinter body developed to express fears that ‘if minorities are granted independence, as 
is being canvassed by Akobo and the late Ken Saro Wiwa, former President of the 
Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP), the rate of ethnic 
domination may be worse’.317 These are examples of the difficulties of drawing internal 
boundaries if the country was to be broken into confederal units. Walzer may have been 
justified when he stated that, arguments for the right of cultural groups to self-
determination do not provide a single best answer to all situations.
318
 
 On the whole, there were, and there have been reasonable grounds for making 
claims to confederation and political break-up of the country, but these arrangements 
were not better alternatives to federal system. Infact, all the other structural 
arrangements to the federal system were recipes for disaster. It was Anthony Birch who 
argued that temporary grievances, no matter how strongly felt, should not be used as 
plausible grounds for breaking up a state ‘unless they have “history” and the state does 
not provide mechanisms for peaceful adjustment of policies’.319 Nigeria meets the first 
requirement because grievances regarding monopoly of power and domination by a few 
groups date back to the 1950s. One cannot say so about the second requirement 
because, since the 1970s, the country has adopted Constitutional strategies for avoiding 
political domination by a few powerful groups except that they have not been quite 
effective. Indeed, Nigeria’s problem is not the federal arrangement, but power 
imbalance among the ethno-cultural regions of the country. In this respect, the 
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Constitutional Conference agreement for proportional representation in the Executive 
Cabinet and for circulation of the office of the President might be a better solution. 
 Was the negotiated strategy for power sharing a desirable means of ensuring 
equity among various groups? The question is answered by noting, for the second time, 
two main requirements of the power sharing strategy: proportional representation in the 
executive cabinet and rotation of the office of the President among six geo-political 
zones every five years. The first requirement has already been argued in chapter five 
where it was mentioned that federal character was timid and should be deepened in the 
Executive Arm of government to make the latter inclusive of parties representing 
various geo-ethnic segments. For this reason, the arguments will not be repeated here; 
instead this section will evaluate the strategy that required that the most sovereign office 
of state be rotated. 
 The strategy of rotating the office of the President has received some criticisms. 
Some have argued that it has the danger of denying most citizens of their right to 
contest for the highest offices of state.
320
 In liberal democracy official recruitment into 
public offices is open to all citizens and it is done under free and equal conditions. In 
this case it is not so. For every five years offices of the President, Vice-President and 
State Governors have to be portioned to members of particular geo-ethnic zones, thus 
violating freedom and right of citizens to compete for them. It is this undemocratic 
nature of the requirement for power sharing that made the 1975 Constitutional Drafting 
Committee (CDC) to drop rotational Presidency from its federal character formulation. 
 A decade before it was negotiated by the 1994/5 Conference, the strategy had 
been discussed by the Nigerian public during the great debate organised by the Political 
Bureau in 1986. A section of the public felt that the strategy would elevate ethnic 
loyalty over national loyalty and create a fertile environment for buccaneer politics. 
That is, it would risk the subordination of national loyalty to ethnic loyalty and prompt 
political incumbents to preoccupy themselves with the annexation of public wealth for 
themselves and their ethnic communities. Incumbents and their geo-ethnic units would 
fear that power would not rotate to them again until after several decades, a fear that 
would make them to use power for the exclusive interests of their members while it 
lasts. In fact, the Political Bureau of 1986 rejected arguments for the entrenchment of 
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rotational Presidency in the 1989 Constitution on ground that it ‘amounts to an 
acceptance of our inability to grow beyond ethnic or state loyalty’.321 
 What alternatives were available to the constitutional negotiators if these 
shortcomings were to be taken seriously? A possible alternative was to go the way of 
the 1975 CDC and 1986 Political Bureau by requiring that the offices in question be 
filled using Anglo-American liberal universalist criteria in which case, the problem of 
monopoly of the Presidency by one ethnic section of the country would have remained 
unsolved. 
 Another alternative was to simply do nothing and let power coagulate in one 
section of the country the way it has been. This option had the prospect of fuelling 
political and social unrest. If anything, the wave of violence and political uncertainty 
that arose from the late General Sani Abacha’s determination to transform himself into a 
civilian ruler was an indication of the conflict that would ensue if power were allowed 
to freeze in one section of the country. A similar example was in 2007, when after 
completing two terms in office, Chief Olusegun Obasanjo declared and pressed his 
intention to contest election for a third term in office. 
 In the absence of better alternatives, the negotiated requirement that power be 
circulated emerges as the best possible means of doing away with remnants of old 
patterns of political domination. It has the advantage of taking cognisance of the diverse 
ethnic composition of the country and the need for equity among them. In fact, the need 
for this form of power sharing mechanism had long been recognised and ethnic elites 
had been working it out informally over the years. For example, the 1975 CDC rejected 
rotational Presidency but, at the commencement of the Second Republic, the National 
Party of Nigeria (NPN) - the party identified with Hausa/Fulani elite during the Second 
Republic, informally divided the country into a number of zones for purposes of 
circulating its Presidential, Vice-Presidential and Chairmanship candidates.  
Although, there was an element of deception in the rotation policy of the NPN, 
the prospects of other group elite becoming President, Vice-President or Party 
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Chairman gave the party a large national following and ensured its electoral victory 
during the 1979 election. For instance, Alhaji Shehu Aliyu Shagari, a Fulani and the 
NPN Presidential candidate won the 1979 election on the basis of the rotation policy. 
However, in 1981, when Moshood Abiola, a Yoruba attempted to compete for the NPN 
Presidential ticket in order to stand for the 1983 elections, the party retracted its policy 
on the rotation of its Presidential candidates.  The same Moshood Abiola contested the 
12 June 1993 Presidential election, but the regime of General Ibrahim Babangida 
annulled it.
322
 
 Similarly, although the Political Bureau of 1986 rejected the arguments for the 
entrenchment of rotation in the 1989 Constitution, each of the two parties that were 
instituted during the endless transition under General Babangida tried to reflect the 
reality of Nigerian cultural pluralism. They tried to do so by informally dividing the 
country into geo-ethnic zones and agreeing to rotate their Presidential and Vice-
Presidential candidates, candidates for Senate and Deputy Senate Presidents, and Party 
Chairmanship candidates among them. 
Although government proscribed the zoning of offices by the two parties, they 
were nevertheless, compelled by their diverse ethnic composition to draw up informal 
agreements for the rotation of important elective offices.
323
 The 1994/95 Constitutional 
Conference agreement to rotate offices was therefore a formalisation of what had been 
tacitly accepted as a desirable and equitable mode of sharing power. With it, the 
question of who controls power or owns the state will not arise. Neither would it be 
necessary to look at the ethnic origins of political incumbents in order to draw inference 
about who controls power, for there is the guarantee that power would one day rotate 
among the rest of the ethnic regions.
324
 
 Earlier observation that the rotation of the highest offices of state violates the 
freedom of citizens to contest for them is certainly valid, but for the Nigerian 
experiences, it is here argued that rotation of the offices of the state is necessary for 
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equity and fairness. To begin with, the division of the country into six geo-ethnic 
regions for purposes of rotating power reduce both majority and minority groups to 
equals. Minorities are grouped into three ethnic regions, two in the North one in the 
South and, as a consequence, stand to produce the leadership three times in 30 years. 
Similarly, the three major groups are in three geo-ethnic regions, one in the North two 
in the South, and have the same chance as minorities. 
 Rotation therefore, makes for equal opportunity to exercise right to rule. The 
five year restriction of leadership to members of a particular ethnic region does not 
abolish rights of members of other regions. It only places them on hold until the offices 
in question rotate to their region. What applies to one equally applies to the other. The 
temporary suspension of right applies universally but is alternated. It is a regulation that 
is necessary for fairness and order. It creates condition for equality rather than negating 
it. It eliminates political subjection and permits everyone to have equal expectation 
about right to governance. 
The other observation that power rotation enthrones ethnic loyalty and 
buccaneer politics might be valid in the short term, not in the long run. One of the 
advantages of the rotation arrangement is its prospect of liberating sections of the 
country whose elites would not have had the chance of being in the highest office of 
state under conventional democratic practice. Leadership choice, instead of being 
confined to a few geo-ethnic zones, is broadened but alternated. This extension of right 
to political leadership gives a sense of belonging to those that otherwise would be 
excluded and facilitates their identification with the state. Over time people will develop 
mutual trust and confidence in the system, and as this works itself into the social fabric, 
ethical principles will take roots. As Arthur Lewis rightly argued, mutual security 
created by the absence of adversarial politics allows democratic norms to habituate.
325
 
 
6.5 Summary 
Nigeria’s revised approaches for coping with ethnic difference were informed by the 
inadequacies of the federal character strategy adopted in the mid-1970s, and consequent 
group based claims for a more equitable arrangement. What emerged was not really 
abandonment, but a revision of the federal character policy. One aspect of the revision 
was the successive creation of more states and local government units to further 
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accommodate groups. This was necessary for group equity but the problem was that the 
multiplication of units turned into an endless exercise that risked trivialising what it was 
meant to accomplish. There might be no specific limit on the desirable number of units 
for accommodating groups, but the current structure of 36 states and 774 local 
government units should be given some time to function. There is really no point in 
creating additional units if they would not be allowed to stabilise or if those for whom 
they are meant would not learn to accommodate themselves in them. It is in this respect 
that the thesis is arguing for a policy that requires that existing units be allowed to 
function for some decades with the hope that elites and groups will get used to living 
within what is currently in place and overtime the demand syndrome would fade. 
Another aspect of the revision was the failed attempt at doing away with the 
indigeneity requirement for political appointment and recruitment. The requirement 
amounted to discriminating against citizens resident in states not of their biological 
descent and, in this respect violated their right to equal treatment as citizens. But there 
were no better alternatives to the requirement. Reverting to unrestrained Universalist 
criteria for appointment and recruitment would have meant going back to the winner-
takes-all system of political competition that resulted in civil war. Substituting 
residency for indigeneity requirement was not a better alternative either, for it would 
have made room for some groups to be dominated in their own states. The indigeneity 
requirement may have violated equal citizenship rights, but there was no better 
alternative for ensuring group equity in appointment and recruitment. But also perhaps, 
the indigeneity clause in the federal character principle could be allowed to stay with 
amendment to include residency right. This means, the fear that non-indigenes could 
displace members of the indigenous communities from key positions could be addressed 
by placing percentage limit on the appointment of non-indigenes resident in states not of 
their biological descent. 
Federal character revision also involved constitutional agreements on competing 
claims to alternative political structure, power sharing arrangements, and revenue 
generating natural resource ownership. Claims to confederation and political break-up 
as alternative forms of structural arrangement were defensible on ground of denial of 
right to exercise political leadership to members of some geo-ethnic sections of the 
country- a case in point was when Moshood Abiola legitimately won in a free and fair 
election, but the election was annulled by the military junta from another section of the 
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country.
326
 They were also defensible on ground of military campaigns against some 
ethnic minorities of the South-South demanding equitable share of wealth derived from 
their land. However, confederation or political break up posed frightful political and 
social costs. They were not alternatives that offered hope for peace and stability. If they 
were not desirable options, then the problem of monopoly and unjust use of power by 
one geo-ethnic section of the country has to be addressed within the framework of 
federal arrangement. This is where the agreement to divide the country into six geo-
ethnic regions for purposes of rotating state executive power has some merit. Although 
it has the danger of constraining the freedom of citizens to compete for the office in 
question, it nevertheless makes for groups equity in recruitment into the highest office 
in the land. 
Overall, the conclusion one can make on the key issues contained in the revised 
federal character approach to state building in Nigeria are as follows: On the endless 
multiplication of the internal political units into states and local government areas in 
order to recognise smaller groups, the government should respond to the problem of the 
slippery slope by making a Constitutional provision that place moratorium for the 
creation of states to twenty five years at the least. 
On the indigeneity clause, the clause could be amended to incorporate some 
elements of residency rights. This in essence means, constitutionalising provision for 
certain percentage right that allows non-indigenes to take appointment in states not of 
their biological descent. Regarding the political structure of the country, in line with 
what was discussed in section 6.3.4 of this thesis, all other political structures- unitary 
and confederation are not better alternatives to the present federal arrangement. 
Federalism itself is not the problem, but the inherent tensions such as electoral 
corruption and the continuing domination of the political scene by the military are the 
paramount issues that the government need to address. 
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Finally, the present arrangement that allows political power to be confined to 
and or dominated by a section of the country could be remedied by embracing the 
proportional representation in the executive cabinet and rotation of the office of the 
President among six geo-political zones every five years. This would allow equal 
opportunity to all the geo-political zones in the country to exercise the right to rule. 
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      CHAPTER SEVEN 
      THE REVENUE ALLOCATION APPROACH  
 
We believe that fiscal arrangements in this country should reflect the new spirit of unity to 
which the nation is dedicated … it is in the spirit of this new found unity that we have 
viewed all sources of revenue of this country as common funds of the country to be used for 
executing the kinds of programmes which can maintain this unity.
327
 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 Governments need money to operate, and the viability of political units is very much 
determined by the wealth that they generate and control. Like political representation in 
the legislature, the sharing of national revenue has been a fiercely contested issue 
among the various groups in Nigeria. In an attempt to achieve its triple national goals, 
and at the same time ensure even development and fairness among the competing 
groups in the country, one among the series of state building strategies that successive 
governments in Nigeria have adopted is the Revenue Allocation approach. 
The major problem of revenue allocation in Nigeria is how to evolve an 
acceptable formula inclusive of both sharing rates and sharing principles.
328
 In the 
process of attempting to evolve formula, the revenue approach has generated 
controversies, dissatisfaction and suspicion among ethnic groups because successive 
government have been accused of distributing wealth according to jurisdictional 
population and equality of states, rather than by factors associated with economic 
development. This chapter examines the background, trend and development of 
Nigeria’s Revenue Allocation System (RAS), and how it has generated controversies, 
dissatisfaction and suspicion among Nigeria’s ethnic groups. It will also examine the 
relevant and potential issues in the RAS, and it finally evaluates the various revenue 
allocation formulas, and upon which it considers a desirable framework for revenue 
allocation. In order to contextualise the RAS and its consequences it is necessary to 
introduce some facts and figures of Nigeria's economy.  
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7.2 Background to the Nigerian Revenue Allocation System 
The contemporary controversy over revenue allocation dates back to the origin of 
Nigeria. In 1906, when Southern Nigeria and Lagos became one administrative entity, 
the financial resources of the south increased rapidly, leaving Northern Nigeria behind 
in its economic development.  For this reason, in 1914 the colonial government, in order 
to reduce its subsidy to the North Nigeria, decided to unify the two regions and to use 
the surpluses from the South to finance the North.  
The Northern region with its meagre resources that was mainly derived from 
direct taxation found it difficult to balance its budget. It therefore had to heavily rely on 
grants from the Imperial government to function. For instance, from 1901 to1914, 
Northern Nigeria was dependent on outside assistance in order to balance its budgets. 
Each year it received a large grant from the Imperial government. It also received 
contributions from Southern Nigeria, but these were contributions in lieu of customs 
revenue, not grants or gifts of any kind. This apportionment of customs revenue was the 
only link between the annual budgets of the South and of the North.
329
 Amalgamation 
therefore became a ploy by the colonial government to reduce the dependence of 
Northern Nigeria on British taxpayers. Along these lines, it has been argued that: 
The decision … to create a unified Nigeria on 1 January 1914 did not result from the 
pressure of local political groups; it derived from considerations of administrative 
convenience as interpreted by a colonial power. Lugard considered it unnecessary to carve 
up a territory undivided by natural boundaries, more so since one portion (the South) was 
wealthy enough to commit resources to even “unimportant programmes” while the other 
portion (the North), could not balance its budget necessitating the British taxpayer being 
called upon to bear the larger share of even the cost of its administration. This partly 
explains the amalgamation, an act which provoked bitter controversy at the time, arousing 
the resentment of educated elites and of some British administrators. It, nevertheless, 
saddled the country with an issue- the relationship between North and South- that has 
dominated its politics to this day.
330
 
 
With the amalgamation of Northern and Southern Nigeria, the colonial authorities 
established a Legislative Council with responsibilities only for the colony of Lagos, 
while the legislative powers for the Protectorate of Northern and Southern Nigeria were 
vested in the Governor General of Nigeria. In 1923, an enlarged and partly elected 
Legislative Council was established for the Lagos Colony and the Southern provinces of 
the Protectorate. The Council, however, did not have powers over the Northern parts of 
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the Protectorate as the legislative powers for that part of the protectorate were vested in 
the Governor General. This was how Nigeria essentially became a unitary state. How 
the administrative unification of Nigeria took place and the implications of this 
arrangement can be deduced reading the Hicks-Phillipson Report: 
It may be taken for granted that this position was not the result of any desire to exclude the 
north; it was rather a reflection of the fact that the North showed no desire at the time to 
join with the South in the working of institutions uncongenial to their mode of thought and 
general outlook. …  Had the Northern provinces joined earlier in the framing of national 
legislation and in particular in the consideration and passing of the annual budgets, it is 
probable that more of the available public revenues would have flowed North-wards than 
was in fact the case. The leaders, official and unofficial, of the North were, however, during 
the inter-war period …  content to stand in comparative isolation and to concentrate their 
main energies on building up their strong system of Native Administration supported by the 
Native Administration share of the relatively high Northern rate of Direct Tax.
331
  
 
It was later, after World War II that the colonial authorities decided to move the country 
from a unitary state towards a federal state. The Richards Constitution of 1946 despite 
its criticisms thus marked the beginning of this shift. Essentially, it recognised the three 
regions that already existed in Nigeria since 1939: North, East and West. Each of these 
regions had a Legislative Council, for instance, House of Assembly dominated by 
British officials.
332
 The roles of these Councils were purely advisory. The 1946 
Constitution also established for the first time, an all Nigeria Legislative Council which 
was inclusive of representatives from the Northern provinces. Like its regional 
counterparts, its role was purely advisory and it had no powers over budget.
333
 The 
interesting aspects of the 1946 Constitutional provision for Nigeria have been first, the 
country formally became a federal state and remained one despite a series military 
intervention in politics, and second that any successive independent Nigerian 
government had to deal with the administration of inter-governmental fiscal relations in 
a multicultural and highly fragmented society. 
  In this context, fiscal matters became from time a very contentious and 
controversial issue between the North and South geo-political zones of the country. 
Perhaps, the following section will throw more light on this assertion.  
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7.3 Trends and Development in the Revenue Allocation System 
The formal adoption of the federal system of government as provided in the 1946 
Constitution raised the controversial question of how revenue was to be shared between 
the federal government, regional governments and the Native Authorities. This led the 
colonial authorities to appoint Sir Sydney Phillipson, the then Financial Secretary of the 
Nigerian Colony to investigate the problems of the distribution of financial and 
administrative powers between the various tiers of government.
334
 In his report, 
Phillipson was of the opinion that the devolution of powers from the centre to the 
regions was desirable. Essentially, he argued that: 
The natural and … desirable development of the new constitution will be towards 
progressive devolution, and the time may well come when the regions will exercise, within 
their areas, powers akin to those normally exercised by colonial governments, the general 
government retaining direct authority in practice only over services not transferred to the 
regions.
335 
 
Based on the agreed formula for sharing the revenue of the country, the Phillipson 
report argued that the apportionment of revenues to the various arms of government 
should be correlated with the apportionment of duties to the various arms of 
government. It, therefore, recommended the gradual evolution to a revenue sharing 
system mainly based on the derivation principle. The report envisaged a situation where 
each regional government would be credited with the full amount of the tax collected 
under the Direct Taxation Ordinance of 1940, as amended. All regions would also 
receive grants from the other non-direct tax revenues and from other public funds of the 
country in strict proportion to the contribution that the region makes to those other 
revenues.  
With regards to the derivation principle that was introduced by the Phillipson 
report, the Dina Committee report later observed that, the preference of Phillipson for 
the derivation principle was based on his belief that there was need to inculcate in each 
region, a sense of responsibility so that they will all learn to cut their coat according to 
their cloth. 
336
 Thence, the Phillipson report then went on to prescribe the horizontal 
table for the distribution of the said revenues amongst the various regions as follows: 
Northern region: 46%, Western region: 30%, Eastern region: 24%.  
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It is important to mention here that, the unreliability of the data from which the 
above figures were arrived at became a rallying point for critics of the Phillipson report 
and indeed all subsequent revenue allocation reports. It has for instance been observed 
that:  
Each Commission has been plagued with statistical problems. From Phillipson (1946) to 
Aboyade (1977), problems of measurement have seemed insuperable and have wrought 
havoc to each successive effort at devising a workable formula for allocation. In some 
cases, for example, Phillipson, they led to the abandonment of particular principles; in 
other, for example, Aboyade, they led to the abandonment of the recommendations. Data on 
regional consumption of imports became the centre of controversy in the 1950’s while data 
on population took on an additional explosive political significance in the 1960’s. Only the 
data on rents and royalties and export duties were politically neutral: but the allocation of 
revenue even from these sources created political controversy.
337 
 
From the above, the Phillipson report can therefore rightly be described as the first 
revenue allocation committee to prescribe the derivation principle as the basis for 
revenue sharing among the various tiers of government in Nigeria. Incidentally, the 
derivation principle overtime turned out to be a factor that greatly impacts the debate on 
revenue allocation in the country. 
In 1947, a year after the adoption of the Phillipson report, Sir John Macpherson 
replaced Arthur Richards as Governor of Nigeria. He soon initiated constitutional 
reforms which culminated in the Macpherson Constitution of 1951. This process in turn 
culminated in the need to review the revenue sharing formula of the colony. This is 
because  
Dissatisfaction with the Phillipson Scheme and the changes envisaged by the Macpherson 
Constitution of 1951 which introduced a quasi-federal system of government led to the 
appointment of Professor John Hicks and Sir Sydney Phillipson to develop a new system of 
revenue sharing for Nigeria.
338
  
 
Thus, dissatisfaction with the Phillipson revenue allocation formula which emphasised 
derivation necessitated the appointment of a review Committee consisting of Dr. John 
Hicks, Mr. D A Skelton and Sir Sydney Phillipson. The terms of reference of the 
Committee includes among others:  
(a) An expert and independent enquiry should be undertaken in consultation with all 
concerned.  
(b) To submit proposals to the Governor-in-Council for division of revenue over a 
period of five years between the three regions and the central Nigerian services, 
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in order to achieve in that time a progressively more equitable division of 
revenue as between the three separate regions and the centre.  
(c) If investigation by the Expert Commission proves that one region has been 
unfairly treated during the last few years, the region should be allowed a block 
grant to make up for part of what it has lost.
339
  
After a concerted deliberation, the Hicks-Phillipson report criticised the extensive 
reliance on the derivation principle adopted by the Phillipson report. According to the 
Hicks-Phillipson report: 
The application of the single principle of derivation to the division of the entire non-
declared revenues represented an over-emphasis of the principle of regional self-
dependence and tended to obscure the equally valid and perhaps more important principle 
of the needs of the people viewed as citizens of a united Nigeria. … the unlimited 
application of the principle of derivation would be more appropriate in a loose 
confederation of almost independent states than in a federal constitution of the kind which 
Nigeria is about to achieve. It is not only, however, the principle of national unity, of the 
whole being greater than the part in more than a physical sense and of the well-being of one 
part being dependent to a real extent on the well-being of other parts, that was obscured; the 
actual fact of mutual dependence tended to be forgotten. To measure what one region owes 
to the efforts of its people, past and present, and what it owes to the efforts, past and 
present, of the peoples of other regions, is an impossible task, but it is clear that the second 
debt exists, a fact which derivation as the sole principle of revenue division in some 
measures hides.
340 
 
Despite the above observation and criticisms of the Phillipson Committee report, the 
Hicks-Phillipson Committee report did not altogether reject the derivation principle. 
Rather, the Hicks-Phillipson Committee report retained the derivation principle for the 
allocation of such taxes as could be allocated with simplicity and certainty to the 
regions. An example was taxes on tobacco where for instance, the Hicks-Phillipson 
Committee report recommended that 50% of the revenue from it was to be allocated to 
the regions on the basis of derivation. Non regional revenues on the other hand which 
constituted the majority of the Nigerian budget were to be shared based on the principle 
of ‘need and national interest’.341 Based on its second terms of reference, the Hicks-
Phillipson Committee report also recommended the payment of a one off grant of two 
million Pounds to the Northern region. This was to make up for what it considered to be 
its relative deprivation in the past years.
342
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Essentially, the Hicks-Phillipson report materially altered the derivation focus of 
the 1948 Phillipson report. However, this new arrangement that was recommended by 
the Hicks-Phillipson Committee was received with mixed feelings. The Western region 
for instance, which was rich thanks to the cocoa boom, clamoured for a reversion to the 
old revenue allocation regime that was mainly based on derivation, but the Eastern 
region took an opposite stand.
343
 By 1953, two years after the Hicks-Phillipson report, 
the need arose again to review the revenue allocation system of the country. This was as 
a consequence of the Constitutional developments of the time. Events at the time 
sensitised the British Colonial government of the need to change the Constitutional 
arrangement from that of ‘democratic centralism’ to ‘federalism’. For instance, it has 
been observed that 
After only two years of operating under the system of revenue sharing recommended by the 
Hicks-Phillipson Commission, it was realised that “democratic centralism” or “quasi 
federalism” must give way to federalism in the country’s constitutional arrangements if the 
various parts of Nigeria were to remain together. The breakdown of the Hicks-Phillipson 
revenue allocation arrangements was due mainly to the limited federal structure of the 
Macpherson Constitution rather than to the failure of the scheme itself. The size and 
diversity of Nigeria coupled with the intense regional loyalty and rivalry of the people 
rendered the 1951 Constitution unworkable.
344
  
 
The change in the constitutional arrangement culminated in the replacement of the 
Macpherson Constitution with the Littleton Constitution- named after Sir Oliver 
Littleton, who was then the British Colonial Secretary responsible for the colonies. The 
revised Constitution provided the regions greater autonomy to make laws for 
themselves on residual matters not specifically included in the exclusive legislative list. 
The regions were also granted the powers to legislate again for themselves on matters 
contained in the concurrent legislative lists which it shared with the federal government. 
It was however made explicit that in the event of conflict, the Federal Legislature was to 
be considered superior.
345
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The move towards federalism had become imperative with the developments in 
1953. That was when Anthony Enahoro, a Southerner, moved a motion on the floor of 
the House of Representatives calling for the independence of Nigeria by 1956. The 
Northern members of the House opposed the motion. For instance, Sir Ahmadu Bello, 
the Sardauna of Sokoto explained the position of the North in the floor of the House as 
follows: 
The North does not intend to accept the invitation to commit suicide … as representatives 
of the people, we from the North feel that in all major issues such as this one, we are duty 
bound to consult those we represent … if the Honourable members from the West and the 
East speak to this motion un-amended, for their people I must say here and now, Sir, that 
we from the North have been given no such mandate by our people … we were late in 
assimilating western education yet within a short time we will catch up with the other 
regions, and share their lot … we want to be realistic and consolidate our gains. It is our 
resolute intention to build our development on sound and lasting foundations so that they 
would be lasting.
346 
 
At the time the above changes were being proposed to the Macpherson Constitution, it 
was realised that the changes would also impact on revenue allocation in the Nigerian 
Colony. There was, therefore, the additional need of reviewing the financial 
relationships between the regions and the federal government and amongst themselves. 
This led to the appointment of Sir Louis Chick Commission of Inquiry. The 
Commission’s terms of reference, which stressed the importance of derivation as the 
basis for revenue sharing, reflected the colonial Government’s thinking of moving 
towards federalism at the time. The Commission was specifically mandated to 
Enquire how the revenues available, or to be made available, to the regions and to the 
centre can best be collected and distributed, having regard on the one hand to the need to 
provide to the regions and to the centre an adequate measure of fiscal autonomy within their 
own sphere government  and, on the other hand, to the importance of ensuring that the total 
revenues available to Nigeria are allocated in such a way that the principle of derivation is 
followed to the fullest degree compatible with meeting the reasonable needs of the centre 
and each of the regions.
347 
 
From the above terms of reference, it is clear that the colonial authorities chose not to 
give the Chick Commission much room for manoeuvre. Given the cultural differences 
especially between the North and the other regions, it believed that there was need for 
the establishment of true federalism that would give each region room to develop at its 
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own pace. Granting the regions greater fiscal autonomy was therefore necessary if the 
above goals were to be achieved.  
In compliance to the terms of reference of the Commission, it was therefore not 
surprising that the Chick Commission recommended that less emphasis need to be 
placed on need and national interest as determinants of revenue allocation in the 
colony. The report also showed strong preference for fiscal autonomy and materially 
increased the weight allocated to derivation as a basis for revenue sharing. For the sake 
of detail, the Chick Commission report recommended as follows:  
(a) The federal government should keep 50% of the general import duty while 50% 
should go to the regions on derivation basis. 
(b)  The federal government should keep 50% of the import and excise duty on 
tobacco, the rest going to the regions based on derivation.  
(c) 100% of the import duty on motor vehicle and spirit should go to the regions.  
(d) 100% of the mining rent and royalty should go to the regions.  
(e) Both levels should share the export duty on hides and skins on a 50-50% basis. 
In addition to above recommendations, the Chick Commission report also enjoined the 
federal government to maintain a discretionary power to make grants to regions in need 
in serious difficulties.
348
 However, the Chick Commission revenue allocation formula 
was fundamentally altered in 1958 when a new Revenue Allocation Commission was 
set up. This also coincided with the discovery of oil in the then Eastern region of the 
country. 
The discovery of oil in some parts of Eastern Nigeria and the potential it had for 
growth altered the thinking about the place of minerals in the revenue allocation 
formula. As already mentioned, up till then, royalties from minerals fully belonged to 
the region of origin. In 1958, however, the discovery of oil in Nigeria coincided with 
the need to review the existing revenue allocation schemes, which were fallout of the 
1957/58 Constitutional Conference and the imminence of political independence. The 
Colonial government subsequently appointed Sir Jeremy Raisman and Professor Ronald 
Tress to review the federal fiscal structure. Among others, the Committee was mandated 
to ‘examine the present division of powers to levy taxation in the federation of Nigeria 
and the present system of allocation of the revenue thereby derived in the light of:  
(i) Experience of the system to date.  
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(ii) (ii) the allocation of functions between the governments in the federation 
(iii) (iii) the desirability of ensuring that the maximum possible proportion of 
the income of the regional governments should be within the exclusive 
power of those governments to levy and collect, taking into account, 
considerations of national and inter-regional policy. 
(iv) (v) insofar as the independent revenues that can be secured for the 
various governments are insufficient to provide not only for their 
immediate needs but also for a reasonable degree of expansion, and 
bearing in mind the federal government’s own further needs, the 
desirability of allocating further federal revenue in accordance with such 
arrangements as will best serve the overall interests of the federation as a 
whole.
349
  
After a concerted deliberation, the Jeremy Raisman Committee among others 
recommended that the regions should have authority over produce sales tax and sales 
tax on motor vehicle fuel. It also recommended the establishment of a Distributable 
Pools Account (DPA) for the purposes of sharing federally collectible revenues. 
Perhaps the most significant proposal of the Jeremy Raisman Commission was 
the recommendation that the then practice of returning mining rents and royalties to the 
regions should be discontinued. Such revenues were now to be shared through the DPA 
with the region of origins getting 50% for the federal government, 20% and 30% for the 
remaining regions. Although oil was a new discovery in the colony, and the revenue 
from it at the time (1958/59) was estimated to be only £65,000, it had great prospects. 
According to the Jeremy Raisman report: 
The allocation of the proceeds of mining royalties has presented us with a most perplexing 
problem. Although the revenues from columbite royalties rose rapidly at the time of the 
American stockpiling in 1953-55, royalties on tin, columbite and coal, normally yield a 
fairly constant annual sum. If these were the only minerals concerned, there might be no 
difficulty in our recommending the continuation of the present system … the problem is oil. 
Test production of oil has already started in the Eastern region and exploration is being 
undertaken in both the North and the West. While the yield from oil royalties is at present 
comparatively small … we cannot ignore the possibility that the figure may rise very 
markedly within the next few years … there is therefore a double obstacle in our 
recommending the simple continuation of the existing method of allocating mineral 
royalties. First, it would involve us, in our revenue assessment for the next few years, in 
crediting the Eastern region with a source of income which is at once too uncertain to build 
upon, and too sizeable to ignore. Secondly, it would rob our recommendations of any 
confident claim to stability for the future since oil development might take place in any one 
of the regions on a scale, which would quite upset the balance of national development, 
which is part of our task to promote … our considered conclusion therefore is that the time 
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for change is now, while there is still uncertainty as to which of the regions may be the 
lucky beneficiary or which may benefit the most.
350 
 
On this basis, the Raisman report significantly reduced the use of derivation as a 
principle for sharing the DPA. In its place, it introduced four variables: continuity, 
minimum responsibility, population and balanced development of the federation.
351
  
As mentioned above, oil was not the first natural resource to be exploited in the 
country. Prior to its discovery, tin and bauxite were being exploited in the Northern 
region solely for the benefit of the North.
352
 The Western region could not be bothered 
because it was the wealthiest of the three regions, thanks to the cocoa boom. But 
according to Chief Obafemi Awolowo, a one-time Premier of the Western region: ‘It is 
dishonest to the extreme for a relatively poorer state to expect to have a share from the 
revenue derived from a relatively richer state’.353 The Eastern region had very little 
natural or agricultural resources. Although it was unhappy with the concept of 
derivation, it was forced to develop other sources of income in its bid to survive. In 
1956, for instance, the then Finance Minister of the Eastern region, Dr. S.E Imoke, 
proposed a Finance Bill to the regional House of Assembly. One of the propositions of 
the bill was to replace the old income tax with a regional income tax based on the Pay 
as You Earn (PAYE) system. Essentially, the old tax system at the time was a direct tax 
based on a flat rate, and collected by the local authorities. On the direct tax, the regional 
government then charged only a small capitation levy. 
Despite its revenue from tin and bauxite, the Northern region also was still 
concerned with the generation of additional revenues to help it meet its minimum needs. 
In 1954, for instance, the regional Executive Council at the recommendation of the 
Financial Secretary approved a series of measures in order to help boost the finances of 
the Northern region: it increased the toll of trade in cattle moving both by foot and rail, 
introduced a tax on kola nut, increased the rates for the licensing of cars and lorries, 
imposed a bicycle licensing, doubled licensing fees for arms, and the re-introduced the 
produce sales tax.
354
  
From the above, it is clear that at the time when the derivation principle ruled 
the distribution of revenue in Nigeria, the less endowed regions tended to be more 
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innovative in their bid to improve their finances. Essentially, each of these regions tried 
to take advantage of its own endowments and peculiar circumstances in their quest to 
generate additional revenues. However, all these changed with the discovery of oil in 
the Eastern region. The de-emphasis of derivation as a basis for sharing revenue and the 
adoption of factors like even development led the Raisman Commission to recommend 
the unification of some aspects of the Nigerian tax system.
355
 The implication of this 
was that, the flexibility of regions with respect to adapting to their unique circumstances 
for generating revenues was greatly reduced. This marked a fundamental shift of focus 
from revenue generation to revenue allocation. As will be seen later, most regions 
subsequently used various overt and convert ways in their attempt to increase the 
revenues derived from the DPA. 
In 1964, in accordance with Section 164 of the new Republican Constitution of 
1963, the federal government appointed Mr. K.J. Binns as Fiscal Commissioner with 
the mandate to review the appropriateness of: the existing formula for the allocation of 
the proceeds of mining rents and royalties; the proportion of the proceeds of duties 
payable in respect of import into Nigeria of any commodity other than motor vehicle, 
spirit, diesel oil, tobacco, wine, portable spirits or beer payable to the DPA; and the 
existing formula for the distribution of funds in the DPA.
356
 The Binns Commission 
overall did not recommend any fundamental changes in the existing revenue sharing 
formula of the country. One of the main recommendations of the report was that, when 
excise duty is imposed on locally produced motor vehicle, spirit and diesel oil, the 
federation shall pay to the regions, proceeds of the duty based on the consumption in the 
each individual region.
357
 
The Binns Commission report formed the basis of the revenue allocation 
practice in Nigeria until the military Coup of January 1966 brought General Aguiyi 
Ironsi to power. Perhaps because of the command structure of the military, the new 
government quickly moved to consolidate its hold on the entire country. In May 1966, 
via Decree Number 34, the new ruler abolished the federal structure of government and 
the regions thereby converting Nigeria into a unitary state. This, however, proved to be 
a costly mistake for General Aguiyi Ironsi as his government was not only overthrown, 
but he was in the process killed in July, 1966. The new Leader, Lieutenant Colonel 
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(later General) Yakubu Gowon immediately restored the regions back and abolished the 
unitary system.
358
 
Political tensions arising from the coup and counter coup in 1966 encouraged 
Lieutenant Colonel Odumegwu Ojukwu, the Governor of the Eastern region, which was 
custodian to majority of Nigerian oil wells to threaten secession.
359
 Partly because of the 
revenue implications of such secession for the entire federation, the federal government 
was unwilling to allow it. As tension escalated, the federal government moved to reduce 
the powers of the regions by creating twelve states out of the existing four regions.
360
 Of 
these 12 newly created states, the Eastern region was strategically divided into three 
states. Essentially, the government skilfully carved out two states- Rivers State and 
South Eastern State from the main oil producing areas, which incidentally belonged to 
the minority tribes in the former Eastern region. The third state, dominated by the Igbos, 
instantly became an impoverished and landlocked state. It was therefore not surprising 
that it was on the same day that Gowon created the 12 states that Lieutenant Colonel 
Odumegwu Ojukwu proclaimed the entire Eastern region as an independent Republic of 
Biafra.
361
 The declaration of Biafra as a republic culminated in the 30 month Nigeria-
Biafra civil war between 1967 and 1970.  
With the creation of 12 new states in the embattled Nigerian federation, a 
revision of the revenue sharing arrangement became imminent. The federal government 
subsequently promulgated the Constitution (Financial Provisions) Decree Number 15 of 
1967. Essentially, this Decree divided the revenue share of the Northern region from the 
DPA equally amongst the six states created from it. Similarly, the revenue of the 
Eastern and the Western regions were shared among their emerging states on the basis 
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of their population.
362
 The above arrangement thus marked the origin of the introduction 
of the population principle into the revenue sharing formula of Nigeria.
363
  
Criticisms of the modified Binns revenue allocation formula led to the 
appointment of another Revenue Allocation Committee headed by Chief I.O. Dina in 
1968. In the course of their deliberation, the Dina Committee identified some of the 
criticisms levelled against the Decree 15 of 1967 to include among others the following: 
(i) that it contained arbitrary provisions being the result of hurried decisions taken in the 
exigency of creating additional states under conditions of a national emergency; (ii) that 
it dealt only with the Distributable Pool Account and therefore failed: (a) to take 
cognisance of the additional administrative costs involved in the creation of states, (b) 
to realise that the status quo can no longer be assumed in deciding the revenue 
allocation arrangement, (c) to take account of the basic elements which formed the basis 
of the original allocation of revenue between the constituent units of the federation.  
Essentially, the Dina Committee was asked to examine and suggest changes to 
the existing system of revenue allocation in the country. Its mandate extended to all 
forms of revenue going to each level of government besides and including the DPA. 
The Committee was also mandated to suggesting new sources of revenue for both for 
the federal and state governments.
364
 The Dina Committee which based its 
recommendations on the need to maintain national unity also expanded the role and 
revenue base of the federal government to the detriment of the state governments. 
According to the Dina report: 
The existence of a multiplicity of taxing and spending authorities with regard to the same 
revenue source or expenditure function not only generates major administrative problems, 
but also reduces the effectiveness of any fiscal coordination effort … the logic of planning 
renders invalid the dichotomy between public finance and development finance, and 
demands that revenue allocation be seen as an integral part of the later. Once it is accepted 
that the overwhelming social urge is for accelerated economic development as a major 
prerequisite for expansion of welfare services, then the point must be sustained that 
financial relations become only meaningful in the context of integrated development 
planning.
365 
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It was on this basis that the above background that the Dina Committee recommended, 
among others, that the DPA should be renamed States Joint Account (SJA) and the 
creation of the Special Grants Account (SGA). The Planning and Fiscal Commission 
with the responsibility of administering the funds and direct them to the regions was 
established. And Allocation of funds from this account should be based on the 
following principles: tax effort, balanced development and national interest.  
The Dina Committee report for the first time also introduced the on-shore/off-
shore dichotomy in the sharing of oil revenue in Nigeria. All revenues gained from off-
shore operations should be shared along the following percentages: Federal government, 
60%, SJA, 30%, and SGA, 10%. Royalties from on-shore operations was to be assigned 
on the following basis: Federal government, 15% State of Derivation, 10%, States Joint 
Account, 70%, and SGA, 5%. Revenue from Excise Duty was to be allocated on the 
following basis: Federal government, 60% , SJA, 30%, and SGA, 10%,  while that from 
Import Duty was to be shared on the following basis: Federal government, 50% and 
SJA, 50%. Finally, revenue from Export Duty was to be shared as follows: Federal 
government, 15%, State of Derivation, 10%, SJA, 70%, and SGA, 5%.
366
 
In line with the increase of its revenues, the federal government was also 
inundated with additional responsibilities. It had to be responsible for the financing of 
higher education, prisons, public safety and scientific and industrial research. The Dina 
Committee, like the Raisman Commission also recommended the introduction of 
uniform tax legislation for the entire country.
367
 
While the report favoured the federal government, it was vehemently opposed 
by most of the states. In fact, the report was in April 1969 rejected by the meeting of 
Commissioners of finance of the federation. This was possible because of the peculiar 
circumstances of the time. It has for instance been argued that: 
In 1969 the Commissioners of finance at the federation were mostly seasoned politicians 
led at the federal level by Chief Obafemi Awolowo, who chaired the meeting at which the 
report was rejected in April 1969. In the early years of Gowon rule, the regime needed the 
politicians more than the politicians needed the regime. This was true of the period of civil 
war when it was most difficult to release army officers to hold political offices. In other 
words, in 1969, unlike in the years after the civil war when civil Commissioners were 
relegated to the corridors of power by super permanent secretaries, the politicians played a 
critical role in government decision making. It should be added here that some of these civil 
Commissioners expected a return to civil rule soon after the civil war and because of the 
opportunity of staying in the limelight during the period they expected to be in a stronger 
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position to determine the nature and pattern of revenue allocation through a Commission 
chosen by them.
368 
 
Despite the rejection, the federal government later implemented most of the 
recommendations of the Dina Committee report. This was done with the promulgation 
of Decree Number 9 of 1971. Essentially, this decree transferred rents and royalties of 
off-shore petroleum mines from the states to the federal government. The oil producing 
states were most unhappy about this development. According to one of them:  
This state government is unable to appreciate the rationale behind this distinction drawn 
between oil mined from its mainland and the oil extracted from the adjoining continental 
shelf which is an integral part of the total economic resources which the people of this state 
have tapped from ancient times to sustain themselves.
369
  
 
The argument of the state in question is that, before the arrival of oil industry which 
imposed some restrictions on fishery in the Niger delta area, the continental shelf of the 
state offered ideal fishing grounds for the local inhabitants. However, to the 
consternation of many, the Decree 9 was passed and this annulled section 141 (b) of the 
1963 Constitution which provided that the continental shelf of deemed to be part of that 
region. The implication of Decree 9 of 1971 thus means that a region can be a littoral 
state, but could no longer derive any benefit from the oil extracted from the continental 
shelf. The above development in essence was tantamount to adopting the 
recommendations of the Dina report which was rejected in 1969 through the back door. 
For instance, according to the official biography of the then Head of State, General 
Yakubu Gowon,  
The Dina Committee report was rejected by the states essentially because of its political 
assumptions … Gowon did not raise dust over the issue, but quietly implemented most 
aspects of this report through the back door.
370
  
 
In 1975, the government promulgated the Constitution (Financial Provisions) Decree 
Number 6. This Financial Provisions decreed that all revenues shared by the states, with 
the exception of the 20% of on-shore mining rents and royalties belonging to the states 
of origin, based on the derivation principle, should pass through the DPA. In other 
words, 80% of mining rents and royalties, 35% of import duties, 100% of duties on 
motor vehicle, spirits, tobacco and hides and skin and 50% of excise duties, all now had 
to pass through the DPA. The Decree further stipulated that the DPA be divided among 
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the states on the following basis: 50% based on equality of states and the remaining 
50% based on population.
371
 
Shortly after the promulgation of Decree 6 of 1975, General Yakubu Gowon 
was overthrown and replaced by Brigadier- later General Murtala Mohammed. The new 
Military government via Decree Number 12 of 1976 increased the number of states in 
the country from 12 to 19.
372
 Although the revenue sharing scheme was not 
immediately affected, this development further weakened the powers of the states 
relative to the federal government. Some of the states became increasingly dependent on 
grants from the federal government for such basic needs as administration.
373
 
The military regime of late General Murtala Mohammed also made explicit its 
intention to hand over power to civilians. The regime subsequently appointed a 
Constitution Drafting Committee (CDC) to prepare a draft constitution that would aid 
the transition. A Technical Committee on Revenue Allocation was also appointed under 
the chairmanship of Professor Aboyade. Its propositions were to be submitted to the 
CDC and if adopted made part of the new Constitution. In summary, the Aboyade 
Committee recommended that all federally collectible revenues without distinction 
should be paid into the Federation Account. It also for the first time took into account, 
local governments in the vertical distribution of the Federation Account. The 
Committee for instance recommended that, the proceeds of the Federation Account 
should be shared between the federal, state and local governments in the following 
proportions: 60%, 30% and 10% respectively. From its own share, the federal 
government was required to set aside 3% for the benefit of mineral producing areas and 
areas in need of rehabilitation from emergencies and disasters.
374
 On the horizontal 
allocation of revenue amongst the states, the Aboyade Committee revoked the existing 
principles of revenue sharing arguing that 
Population has been characterised by illogicality, inconsistency and inequity; derivation had 
done much to poison intergovernmental relations and hamper a sense of national unity; 
need had little if any operational relevance; even development was analytically 
ambiguous … (and was) not technically feasible to measure in any meaningful way; 
equality of status of states was a consolation price to states not favoured by the population 
and derivation principles; geographical peculiarities defied any concise definition … (and 
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had) little or no merit; national interest was capable of many interpretations (and) 
circumstances.
375
 
 
On the basis of the above arguments, the Aboyade committee then recommended the 
adoption of the following five new principles. These were: Equality of Access to 
Development Opportunities, National Minimum Standards for National Integration, 
Absorptive Capacity, Independent Revenue and Tax Effort and Fiscal Efficiency.
376
 The 
Aboyade report was however extensively criticised. The economic background of its 
prescriptions was especially attacked. For instance, Sylvester Ugoh, a member of the 
Constituent Assembly questioned the wisdom behind the Committee report’s reliance 
on the data based on the 1975-1980 National Development Plan. According to him, 
some sections of the report were based on the 
Implicit assumption that the 1975-80 Plan would be fully or largely implemented. As such, 
the projects which are represented by these allocations would be realised. In such a 
situation, what the measure would show would be the socio-economic gaps that will arise 
from the full implementation of the Plan. But the fact is that our National Plans, and 
especially that of 1975-80, are usually expressions of pious hopes and wide expectations. In 
fact, the 1975-80 Plan has proved to be mostly a national dream. And if that is the situation, 
how can we use such dream- like allocations, which are unrealistic and unrealisable to 
measure socio-economic gaps in our development.
377 
 
Similarly, another member of the Constituent Assembly, Dr. Pius Okigbo, also heavily 
criticised the vertical distribution of revenue amongst the various tiers of government 
arguing that the Aboyade report unduly favoured the federal government. In a 
statement, Okigbo said:  
I think that the shares of the joint account going to the federation can be reduced to much 
less than 60%, without emasculating the federal government. I would have been quite 
happy with a share of 45% for the federation and 55% for the states combined with 10% 
being reserved for the local government out of the 55%.
378
  
 
Based on this kind of criticisms, the Constituent Assembly rejected the Aboyade report. 
In 1979, the newly elected government of Alhaji Aliyu Usman Shehu Shagari appointed 
a new Committee headed by Dr. Pius Okigbo to review the ‘formula for revenue 
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allocation having regard to such factors as the national interest, derivation, population, 
even development, equitable distribution and the equality of states.
379
 
On the sharing of revenue among the various tiers of government- vertical 
allocation, the Okigbo Committee recommended the following formula: Federal 
government (53%) state governments (30%), local governments (10%). 7% was to be 
set aside as special funds for the following purposes: development of the Federal 
Capital Territory, 2.5%; special problems of mineral producing areas, 2%; ecological 
problems, 1%; and Revenue equalisation Fund, 1.5%.
380
 For the horizontal allocation of 
revenue among the states, the Okigbo Committee report adopted four criteria. These 
were: minimum responsibilities of government (40%), population (40%), Social 
development factor/primary school enrolment (15%) and internal revenue effort 
(5%).
381
 
The government white paper adopted the Okigbo recommendations only with 
slight modifications. For instance, on the vertical distribution of revenue amongst the 
various tiers of government, the federal government modified the Okigbo 
recommendations as follows: Federal government, 55%; state government, 30%; local 
government, 8%; and Special funds, 7%.
382
 As a consequence, this culminated in the 
promulgation of the Revenue Allocation Act Number 1 of 1981.  
In summary, the 1981 Revenue Allocation Act provided that the Federation 
Account shall be shared amongst the various tiers of government as follows: Federal 
government, 58.5%; state governments, 31.5%; local governments, 10%. 26.5% of the 
state allocation shall be allocated to all states, while the remaining 5% shall be allocated 
on the basis of derivation. Two- fifths of the 5% of this derivation fund shall be paid out 
to the states in direct proportion to the value of minerals extracted from their areas while 
the remaining three- fifths shall be paid into a special fund to be administered by the 
federal government for the development of the mineral producing areas. The 26.5% 
outstanding to the credit of all states shall be distributed amongst them using the 
following criteria: equality of states (50%), population (40%) and land area (10%). 
Finally, the 58.5% allocated to the federal government shall be subdivided as follows: 
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responsibilities and duties of the federal government (55%), development of the Federal 
Capital Territory (2.5%) and ecological problems (1%).
383
 
The Financial Provision Act of 1981 was however widely criticised mainly on 
the grounds that it allocated too much revenue to the federal government to the 
detriment of the states and local governments. The result was that the federal 
government could afford to waste valuable resources in the financing of unprofitable 
white elephant projects, while the states and local governments were starved of funds. 
According to the Editorial of the Daily Sketch: 
To expect an allocation which gives the federal government 55% and the 19 states only 
30% to achieve the contrary will be like living in a world of fantasy. There is sufficient 
evidence to prove that the ugly phenomenon of growth without development arises from the 
spending of too much money on a few growth industries to the neglect of people-
development oriented projects. … Yet do we have to build giant industries and make our 
people sub- human? Tens of millions of our people are wallowing in abject poverty. States 
and local governments whose pre-eminent job is to see to their welfare are helpless. They 
are starved of funds while the federal government soaked in Billions of Naira, fritter away 
much needed money on fruitless and worthless grandiose projects. How human is it to give 
Abuja 2.5% while even the most populous state cannot get 2%? The average is less than 
1.6% for millions of people.
384 
 
The Financial Provision Act of 1981 was however technically declared null and void by 
the Supreme Court of Nigeria. It was subsequently replaced with the Allocation of 
Revenue (Federation Account) Act Number 1 of 1982.  
Essentially, the Federation Act No.1 of 1982 increased the share of the states in 
the vertical revenue allocation from 31.5 to 35%. The FCT was, however, now 
classified as a state. Furthermore, the funding for the 1% ecological funds was also 
transferred from the federal government to the states. Finally, the fund for the 
development of mineral producing areas was reduced from 3% to 1.5%.
385
 The net 
effect of this was that the federal government’s share of the Federation Account 
remained unaltered. On the horizontal sharing of revenue amongst the states, the 
Financial Allocation Act adopted the following criteria: minimum responsibility of 
government, 40%; population, 40%; social development factor, 15%; and internal 
revenue effort, 5%.
386
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Shortly after the promulgation of the Federation Allocation Act, the military in 
December 1983, overthrew the government of Alhaji Aliyu Shehu Usman Shagari and 
Major General Muhammadu Buhari became the new Head of State.
387
 The military 
government of Major General Muhammadu Buhari subsequently promulgated the 
Allocation of Revenue (Federation Account) Amendment Decree No. 36 of 1984. The 
Federation Account Amendment Decree No. 36 of 1984 in the main only altered the 
existing formula for revenue allocation marginally. It reserved 55% of the Federation 
Account exclusively for the federal government and maintained the local governments’ 
share at 10%. The 1% and 1.5% for the development of mineral producing areas were 
also retained. The share of the state governments’ in the Federation Account was 32.5%. 
Out of this, 2% was to be paid directly to the mineral producing states in direct 
proportion to the value of minerals extracted from such states. Finally, the Federation 
Account Amendment Decree No. 36 of 1984 retained the Shagari regime (Federation 
Allocation Act) basis for the horizontal sharing of revenue amongst the states.
388
 
In 1989, the military government then headed by General Ibrahim Babangida, 
appointed a permanent revenue allocation committee which officially is known as the 
National Revenue Mobilisation and Fiscal Commission (NRMAFC). The Committee 
prescribed the following formula for the horizontal allocation of revenue amongst the 
states: equality of states, 40%; population, 30%; internal revenue effort, 20%; and, 
social development factor, 10%.
389
 The Committee (NRMAFC) had also the power to 
determine the vertical allocation formula on the National Assembly. The second part of 
the Committee’s recommendations was later adopted and inculcated in the 1989 
Constitution.
390
  
Although some partial democracy took place at the time, it did not last as full 
military government was restored in 1994 under the leadership of General Sani Abacha. 
The new government of General Sani Abacha immediately set up a National 
Constitutional Conference (NCC). As expected, the issue of revenue allocation was one 
of the contentious issues. It has for instance been asserted that: 
In 1994, the mineral producing states at the so called Constitutional Conference, convened 
by the federal military government requested that the allocation of revenues derived from 
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their areas be restored to what it was in 1957, namely, 65% thereof. Despite numerous 
discussions at several committee meetings and at plenary sessions, no agreement was 
reached. Eventually, it transpired that the powers that be had agreed to allocate 13% of the 
revenues derived from mineral producing areas to the affected state governments. But this 
was not to be until the proposed new constitution was promulgated in May 1999.
391 
 
At this point in time, the concern of the mineral producing states leading to tabling their 
grievances at the Constitutional Conference was predicated on the provision of the 1999 
Constitution which explicitly stated that:  
The President, upon the receipt of advice from the National Revenue Mobilisation 
Allocation and Fiscal Commission, shall table before the National Assembly proposals for 
Revenue Allocation from the Federation Account,  and in determining the formula, the 
National Assembly shall take into account, allocation principles especially those of 
Population, Equality of states, Internal Revenue Generation, Land Mass, Terrain as well as 
Population Density: provided that the principle of derivation shall be constantly reflected in 
any approved formula as being not less than 13% of the revenue accruing to the Federation 
Account directly from any natural resources, so however, that the figure of the allocation 
from derivation shall be deemed to include any amount that must be set aside for funding 
any special authority or agency for the development of the state or states of derivation.
392
   
 
Despite the above cited constitutional provision, the elected civilian government of 
Chief Olusegun Obasanjo refused to implement the provision. Instead, the federal 
government appointed a Committee to review the 1999 Constitution. On the issue of 
revenue allocation, the Review Committee recommended that the derivation formula be 
increased substantially beyond the 13% minimum recommended in the 1999 
Constitution.
393
 The federal government this time again refused to accept the 
recommendation. Rather, the federal government asked the Supreme Court to declare 
that the derivation principle does not apply to off-shore oil. The Supreme Court in a 
landmark judgement in April, 2002 agreed with the position of the federal 
government.
394
  
The uproar, especially from some of the affected oil producing states, and the 
imminence of the April, 2003 general elections, however, made the federal government 
to cede some grounds to the states on the issue. To this end, in an exclusive report, This 
Day News revealed the details of the new agreement between President Olusegun 
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Obasanjo and the Governors of the littoral states over the controversial on-shore/off-
shore dichotomy. The report indicates that the federal government may have agreed to 
grant the states a concession of 200 meter water depth Isobaths into the high sea. Also, 
part of the agreement reveals that the 200 meters will operate from coast to coast while 
the major oil companies like Shell, Elf, Mobil and Agip among others will be allowed to 
concentrate on what is termed Ultra Deep Exploration. A Presidency source has told 
Thisday News that the affected littoral states could only derive revenue from the ‘coast 
up to 200 meter depth Isobaths into the high sea, while the demarcation into ultra-deep 
exploration will be left for the federal government for the purposes of calculating the 
federal revenue’.395  
The legitimacy of the concessions granted through administrative fiat by the 
then President Olusegun Obasanjo, however, remains in doubt. This is especially so 
given the fact that the Supreme Court has already interpreted the constitutional 
provisions on the matter. It could therefore be argued that only a constitutional 
amendment can produce a change to the existing position. 
 What can be inferred from the above analysis is that, even though Nigeria is 
over 50 years in statehood, the country’s fiscal federalism has been far from 
satisfactory, and as such has generated large scale by ethno-political tensions. The 
revenue allocation debate and perhaps associated tensions would likely continue unless 
a consensus system is enthroned. 
Overall, what readily comes to mind based on the preceding discussions of the 
trends and development of revenue allocation system in the country is that there was 
lack of group based representatives meeting to negotiate and make mutual concessions 
in order to reach a common ground. Rather, the trend in both the pre and post-
independence era, for instance, was and has been the government in power that 
appointed commissions/committees to produce a system for revenue allocation. Recall 
that successive governments of the country have freed its burden by creating regions 
and states for a near liquidation of the centre and for grant of autonomy to the regions. 
The liquidation of the power of the centre did not happen in the case of generation and 
sharing of revenue. Given the above, the objective of what follows is first, a discussion 
of the relevant and potential issues around the revenue system in the generation and 
recurrence of ethno-political conflict and institutional instabilities in the country. 
                                                 
395
 See exclusive report by Kabiru Usman, ‘On-Shore/Off-Shore Oil War: Obasanjo Concede Rights at 
Last?’ Thisday News, 17 February, 2003.  
 180 
 
Secondly, to contextualise the Nigerian revenue allocation systems vis-à-vis the 
normative arguments and finally, to suggest frameworks that ought to guide revenue 
allocation given population, derivation and need based claims.  
 
7.4  Relevant and Potential Issues in the Revenue Allocation System 
As one can infer from the discussions in this chapter, the political leadership of Nigeria 
and thus its fiscal federalism was dominated by military dictatorship. For a period well 
over 35 years of nationhood, the leadership of the armed forces and consequently of the 
government of the country were firmly in the hands of the Northern officers. In this 
context, the control and allocation of resources as well as the employment and 
deployment of officials in top echelon of public offices were in the hands of the various 
regimes. To this end, many groups perceive that the sharing of the resources of the 
country has been heavily and unduly skewed in favour of the central authorities, and 
consequently of the close circles of the leaders. Akande observed: 
The military dictatorships effectively replaced the country’s federal system with highly 
centralised administrations that concentrated all powers in the hands of the north-
military.
396
 
 
The implication of the above observation is that the distortions and manoeuvres 
especially in the resource allocation between 1966 and 1999 are havocs perpetrated by 
the North against the South.
397
 Many years of these abuses are making the ethnic groups 
of the South to attribute the failures and misdeeds of the various regimes to Northerners 
in general. This perception has exacerbated sectional and ethnic distrust in the country.   
In assessing the tragedies of revenue allocation system and its concomitant yet 
to be resolved problems, it is important to acknowledge that crude oil production has 
been the most important economic activity in the Nigerian economy since the early 
1970s. Its impact is not limited to its contributing almost 90% of Nigeria’s total foreign 
exchange earnings, but also to the fact that the national budgets are predicated on the 
expected annual production and price of crude oil. Thus, crude oil is the primary engine 
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for national economic growth and development.
398
 It is therefore quite reasonable to 
expect that the areas producing the nation’s crude oil would be very highly developed as 
compensation for what is taken away as well as for the devastation on the land 
endangered by the exploration/exploitation processes. There should have been 
development of physical and social infrastructures, human capital creation, and 
economic empowerment of the general citizenry in those areas. 
 This means that the Niger Delta areas where a large percentage of Nigeria oil is 
derived suffer near total neglect by both the federal government that claims ownership 
of the oil (on-shore and off-shore), and the multinational companies that actually exploit 
the oil reserves. The Niger Delta areas of Nigeria is a picture of wanton environmental 
degradation of all types, land (despoliation of farmlands), water (destruction of fishing 
areas and sources of drinking water), and air (release of many pollutants causing 
diseases in humans, animals and plants). The people in the Niger Delta who once were 
able to cater for their needs are confronted with poverty as a result of loss of their means 
of livelihood. 
 The intervention of the federal government through the Niger Delta 
Development Commission (NDDC) seems to be a welcome development.
399
 However, 
the missing factor seems to be the proper treatment of the derivation principle in a way 
that would enable the state and local governments of the oil-producing areas to handle 
their developmental problems according to their own felt needs and priorities. The 
politically motivated and discriminatory use of the derivation principle over the years 
for instance, from the earlier 50% to 1% and now 13% might be considered a negation 
of freedom, equality and justice and worse still, national unity and stability. The 
rejection of the correct application of the derivative principle for the people of Niger 
Delta can also be considered unjust and unfair when one considers that Igbeti Marble 
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attract 55% derivation and the Value Added Tax (VAT) still attracts 20% derivation.
400
 
To make matters worse, the derivation principle was slashed from 3% to 1% by the 
Federation Act No.1 of 1982. The near abolition of the derivation principle acted to the 
detriment of the oil producing states because a higher share of the revenue generated in 
their local areas was allocated to states of non-oil producing.
401
 
The net effect of the above trend indicates that the revenue allocation system in 
Nigeria has increased the potential for ethno-political conflicts between the oil 
producing states and the central government. In this context, the rise of the Movement 
for the Survival of Ogoni People (MOSOP) and other civil society groups in the Niger 
Delta is not therefore coincidental.
402
 One of the reasons for the increase of ethnic 
militia activities and ethnic conflicts, especially among the minority ethnic groups in the 
South-South geo-political region of Nigeria is partly due to the dissatisfaction with the 
negative practice of fiscal federalism. The implications of all of the above mean that 
groups of insurgents constantly threaten oil company’s infrastructures and personnel 
and pose a serious risk to the country’s monolithic economy.403 
Closely related to the above is the emphasis on population as a principle of 
revenue allocation, the criticism which is also on the increase. There is a growing 
criticism of this principle because of the claims that population figures were 
manipulated in favour of some states.
404
 In addition, the progressive decline of weights 
on derivation principle for revenue sharing has also been criticised. The argument in 
support of the derivation principle is often made for retention of the tax revenue 
generated by the area of origin. Whereas, the derivation principle is being applied to 
personal income and Property taxes as the states and local governments from which 
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these taxes are collected are allowed under the law to retain them, the application of the 
derivation principle to the natural mineral deposits has been difficult to accept wholly 
with the claim that it would cause national development imbalance. The argument of the 
would-be favoured states has always been that, once the use of landmass is not causing 
development imbalance, the use of derivation should not be a concern. It is obvious that 
the use of landmass and terrain undermines the interest of the states with small 
landmass. But the concern of the non-oil producing states is that the derivation criteria 
makes no sense, and it is politically motivated and should be excluded from the revenue 
allocation system. According to them, this is more so that it is not normally considered 
in revenue allocation arrangements in other parts of the world. 
The main point is that, discriminatory use of the principles of derivation, 
population, and equality are considered by groups as serious issues as far as the revenue 
allocation in Nigeria is concerned. For instance, when national politics was dominated 
by the powerful three regional governments in the 1950s and early 1960s, each of the 
regions wanted to derive maximum benefits from the natural resources located in the 
geographic area it controlled, the regions pushed for a great emphasis on the derivation 
principle. However, from the 1970s onwards, the reality of the centralising military 
leadership that controlled the increasing oil revenues, plus the re-organisation of the 
federation into a thirty six-state structure made the principles of equality among states 
and population attractive. 
In addition, even the indirect assistance or support that the central government 
gives to the lower tiers, in the form of support for infrastructural development is often 
politicised. The operations of the disbanded Petroleum Trust Fund (PTF) can be cited 
here because it was allegedly established then to assist in developing a particular part of 
the country. For example, the analyses of the PTF project implementation during its 
existence in the six geo-political Zones are as follows: North-West 43.3%, North-
Central 17.4%, North-East 15.0%, South-West 10.6%, South-South 8.15%, and South-
East 5.6%.
405
 The argument of the critics of the PTF is that, the unequal allocation of 
the projects undertaken by PTF is due to the fact that the Chairman of the fund, General 
Muhamadu Buhari (Rtd) is from Daura in the North-West geo-political region. Despite 
his knowledge of the geo-political zones of the country as a former military head of 
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state, he has angered the Southerners because; he intentionally used his privileged 
position to distribute wealth obtained from the Niger Delta in the South-South geo-
political zone in favour of the North.  
Another major issue in the distribution of revenue in Nigeria since 1989 is what 
is classified as first charges.
406
 Examples of such first charges include Joint Venture 
Companies Cash calls, External debt, subsidy on domestic crude, transfer to Petroleum 
Trust and Development Fund (PTDF), 13% National Resources Derivation Fund, 
NNPC Priority Project Fund, and National Judicial Council. These first charges have 
been described from different sources as dictatorial practice illustrating clearly that the 
central government is not interested in Nigeria operating federalism and its corollary 
fiscal federalism. The belief in many quarters is that the country’s political, social and 
economic developments have been the worse for it since the central government 
abolished the fair shares principle.  
In conclusion, the centralised fiscal power also makes its mark in the political 
sphere. The stability of the political entity called Nigeria is being threatened because the 
centre is too powerful politically and economically. This can be seen in desperate bid of 
the major ethnic groups to ensure that their kinsmen are elected President, more so that, 
the direction of the flow of national wealth is often dictated by the sway of political 
power. In addition, due to constant security issues and pressures from different groups, 
the focus of the central government has also been diverted to quelling riots rather than 
addressing developmental issues. 
 
7.5 Evaluation and Framework for Revenue Allocation 
Which are the normative frameworks that ought to guide revenue sharing in Nigeria’s 
multi-ethnic society? The issue of revenue allocation first requires a determination of 
the body that has jurisdiction over the territorially based society from which revenue is 
generated. In the modern world, the state is generally assumed to be the body that has 
legitimate jurisdiction. By state here, it is referred to mean the commonwealth, the res 
publica. Kohn appropriately defines it as ‘the people legally united as an independent 
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entity’.407The union brings forth a national political community, having universal 
jurisdiction within its territorial boundaries, but creates an agent endowed with authority 
to exercise jurisdictional powers on its behalf. As an agent, government is accountable 
to the national community and the revenue it generates to carry out its business belongs 
to the people united. 
However, the essence of federalism is local sovereignty within a national 
community. Succinctly put, jurisdictional right is shared between the national and the 
other levels of government. Thus, the federal and regional levels of government have 
their respective jurisdictional spheres. Each generates revenue in its own sphere to carry 
its administrative responsibilities. However, very often revenues are centrally collected 
by the central government and shared among the regions. For this reason, the inability 
of some regions to generate revenue affects regional economy and equal tax rates for 
identical professions across regions.
408
 
In real economic terms, revenues would be shared on the basis of generation. If 
governance is reduced to pure business, then the generation and sharing of revenue 
would be considered in strict economic terms so that each unit of government will 
receive from the central fund a proportional equivalent of what it contributes. The 
allocation system will therefore, be based on the derivation principle. In this scenario, 
the centre will be playing the role of a contractor that collects and returns revenue, but 
keeping a part as payment for the services it has rendered. The various units will be 
acting like business outfits, and relations among them will be rooted in purely 
contractual terms. All this will presuppose the non-existence of a national community. 
It should be noted that in a political federation, the sharing of jurisdictional 
authority does not dissolve the national community. On the contrary, the sharing helps 
to give a sense of belonging to people who are associated in one entity. The entity 
defines people that are united, have mutual interest, common political bond, and 
common political fate. Although the constituent federal units have local autonomy, they 
collectively constitute a national community in which the good of all matters. The fact 
of the existence of a national community requires attending to the general good. This is 
assumed in the leading role the central government plays in revenue collection. For 
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example, the reasons given earlier on for central collection of revenue, implicitly 
present the national community as one in which there is concern for the general welfare. 
They show that the constituent units are not like sovereign states in the international 
system that acts on the basis of self-interest. Rather, they constitute a larger community 
in which there is an obligation to the common good. Perhaps, it is for this reason that 
states such as Canada have developed economic programmes for operating the country 
as a sharing community.  
What the preceding argument suggests is that national revenue ought not to be 
distributed strictly on the basis of what each region has contributed. This is for example 
because, the Igbos and the minorities in the East, now in the South-South geo-political 
zone were seriously constrained by the derivation system that was put in place because,  
agricultural exports were mostly from the North and West. At the time, this did not 
generate conflict because, the centre was practically liquidated, and there was no basis 
for complaining about neglect or uneven allocation of funds. It nevertheless showed 
indifference and lack of unity. This indifference to the well-being of other could trigger 
exit. For instance, it has been argued that it was the fortune in the East following the 
discovery and emergence of crude oil that prompted the Igbos to take the region out of 
the country.
409
 In other words, since the people in the region- East-Central and South-
South zones were left alone to take care of themselves during the period of economic 
adversity, they might as well exit now that their fortune has changed for good. The 
above discussions by implication means that, while it is fair to recognise those that 
contribute the most, the common good requires that market economics be transcended. 
A balanced and desirable formula will be one that combines several principles - 
derivation, need, population etc. In this respect, the allocation formula produced by the 
Hicks Commission of 1951 still appears to be the best for the country. 
 
7.6 Summary 
This chapter has discussed and evaluated the trend and development of Nigeria’s RAS. 
The analysis provided a background to the revenue allocation system in the country. It 
then examined the trends and developments, as well as the relevant and potential issues 
in the revenue allocation system and suggested normative frameworks for revenue 
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allocation in the country. The analysis pointed out that the major problem of revenue 
allocation system in Nigeria is how to evolve an acceptable formula, comprising the 
sharing rates and sharing principles that would achieve equity and fairness. To this end, 
revenue allocation system has generated controversies, dissatisfaction and suspicion 
against the North, especially among the Southern major ethnic groups and the minorities 
of the oil producing states. The Southern groups are alleging that revenue allocation has 
been driven largely by political considerations. The discontent with the revenue 
allocation system has become so intense that some of the Southern groups are asking for 
fundamental re-structuring of Nigeria because, the revenue allocation system is unfair 
and unjust as it favours one section of the country to the detriment of the other parts. By 
implication, revenue allocation system does not promote the achievement of Nigeria’s 
national goals. 
The chapter specifically examined the trends and development in the revenue 
allocation system in the country and discussed the mandates, recommendations and 
allegations of ethno-political issues contained in the reports of the various Committees 
and Commissions between 1946 and 2010.  In particular, it analysed the suggestions of 
some of the Committees and Commissions included Phillipson (1946), Hicks-Phillipson 
(1951), Chick (1953), Raisman (1958), Binns (1964), Dina (1968), Aboyade (1977), 
and Okigbo (1980). From the analysis can be deduced that the military did not abide 
strictly by the tradition of setting up Committees and/or Commissions to determine 
revenue allocation, and that this was an additional cause of division. For instance, 
between 1966 and 1979, the military changed or amended the revenue allocation system 
four times without a prior Commission on revenue allocation. In addition, having 
rejected the Dina report in 1968, the military did not set up another Commission 
(Aboyade’s) until 1977 when the Generals began preparations for handing over power 
to civilians in 1979. It was not until 1988 that the federal government established a 
permanent agency known as the National Revenue Mobilisation, Allocation, and Fiscal 
Commission (NRMAFC) to advise government continuously on matters of fiscal 
federalism. 
 This chapter also argued that the changes in the revenue allocation system have 
been in response to major constitutional and political changes, with development 
considerations being given scant attention.  Similarly, sixteen sharing principles have so 
far been recommended by the various Commissions to date. Of all the sixteen 
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principles, only three - derivation, population, and equality have featured prominently in 
the sharing schemes. In fact, the principles of population and equality - have dominated 
the revenue allocation system since 1970 and much more so since 1975. Thus, for over 
three decades, the revenue allocation system has relied principally on two rather 
simplistic sharing principles. 
The chapter critically analysed the relevant and potential issues in the RAS in 
Nigeria, and pointed out that ethno-politics has been the overriding determinant. Some 
major consequence of this heavy reliance on ethno-political criteria for revenue 
allocation is the continued ethnic militancy in the Niger Delta, agitation for 
constitutional re-structuring and power sharing, and demand for the creation of more 
states. Similarly, since 1981 when local governments were covered by RAS, there has 
also been a perceptible linkage of the demand for more local governments to the 
expected benefits from RAS. 
The analysis observed that, in spite of the basic changes in revenue allocation 
under various Nigeria governments, RAS remain politically skewed as it is alleged in 
favour of sections of the country. For instance, regarding the major sharing principles, it 
was skewed in favour of the derivation principle until 1970, and has remained skewed 
since the early 1970 in terms of population and oil-based revenues. Clearly, the 
fundamental flaw of RAS is that it is politically skewed against the oil producing states. 
And there is no prospect that the situation could change soon. This development has led 
to the anti-government campaigns in the oil producing Niger Delta. In this context, the 
chapter argued that, the inequality in the RAS in the Nigerian federation has precipitated 
a high level of distrust among the ethnic groups. This means that the RAS has further 
worsened the already fragile unity among Nigerian federation due to the associated 
ethno-political conflicts and controversies it is generating.  
             The chapter finally considered frameworks for revenue and suggests that, while 
it is fair to recognise those that contribute the most, the common good requires a 
revenue formula that combines several principles. In view of the above, it might be 
reasonable to argue that, while it is important not to down play the roles of the revenue 
allocation approach in the generation and recurrence of ethno-political conflicts and 
institutional stability in the country, it is equally important to mention two factors that 
have further aided the already precarious situation: the ascendancy of Military rule 
which created the ample opportunity for the Military to rule for about thirty five years,  
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and the period immediately after the civil war that coincided with the era of petroleum 
boom created a deepening crisis of corruption.
410
  
Given long military rule and the amount of petro-dollars in the national treasury, 
it is not surprising that the Military ruled until 1999, and that it is still present in 
Nigerian politics. Most of the changes in revenue allocation system that are still 
generating ethno-political tension and instabilities came into force during the Military 
era, between 1966 and 1999, and sadly, a combination of military power and abundance 
of petro-dollars is the source of the current escalation of corruption.
411
  
 In conclusion, even though the Military are currently not visibly in power and 
the country has been under civilian administration since 1999, it is the retired generals 
that are still ruling the country from behind the scene. Thus, in addition to putting in 
place a balanced and desirable framework for revenue formula that combines principles 
such as derivation, need and population, there is the need to also put in place 
Constitutional and institutional safeguards against military incursions in both 
government and politics. And this could be achieved through initiating and enforcing 
reforms in the politics and government of Nigeria. On the basis of the above 
submissions, the following chapter shall be examining the dynamics of group claims 
when oil became the mainstay of the Nigerian economy - claims and counter-claims 
regarding oil ownership and control, and the claims has intensified the ethno-political 
conflict and institutional instability in Nigeria’s multi-ethnic society. 
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 For more discussion of the Military and oil factor on the political development of Nigeria, see chapter 
eight of this thesis. See also Bill Freund, ‘Oil Boom and Crisis in Contemporary Nigeria’, Review of 
African Political Economy, 13 (1978), 91-100; William Ehwarieme, ‘The Military, Oil and Development: 
The Political Economy of Fiscal Federalism in Nigeria’, in Fiscal Federalism and Nigeria’s Economic 
Development, Proceedings of the Nigerian Economic Society, Ibadan, 1999. 
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 For more discussion of the incidence of corruption and unlawful enrichment in Nigeria, see Femi 
Adegbulu, ‘Nigeria’s (Unholy) Wedlock with Corruption: Can Death Put them Asunder?’, The Journal of 
Social Research, 3 (12) (2012), 9-26. Segun O. Osoba, ‘Corruption in Nigeria: Historical Perspectives’, 
Review of African Political Economy, 23 (69), (1996), 371-386. William N. Brownsberger, ‘Development 
and Governmental Corruption – Materialism and Political Fragmentation in Nigeria’, The Journal of 
Modern African Studies, 21 (2), (1983), 215-233. See also Robert L. Tignor, ‘Political Corruption in 
Nigeria Before Independence’, Journal of Modern African studies, 31 (2), (1993), 175-202. 
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   CHAPTER EIGHT 
STATE OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL (NATIONALISATION) OF  
   OIL APPROACH 
 
    An effective oil policy is one which … above all ensures political stability. 412 
 
In a country like Nigeria with its divers peoples and their corresponding diverse political, 
cultural and economic endowments, true federalism must reflect a genuine attempt to 
regulate relationship among the groups, as well as a reflection of these identifiable 
divergences within a framework of national unity … we in Nigeria must evolve our own … 
and take our own decisions and develop our own institutions anchored on our historical 
experiences.
413
  
 
8.1 Introduction 
This chapter examines how the presence of oil resources affected the process of state 
building, and how it has intensified the ethno-political conflict and institutional 
instability in the country.
414
 Whereas in the ethno-political datelines of Nigeria, 
especially up to the 1970s, conflicts have predominantly been between the major ethnic 
groups whose elites dominate national politics, starting from the 1970s when oil 
resource became the mainstay of the Nigerian economy, the dynamics of ethno-political 
competition in the country added up to include claims and counter-claims regarding oil 
ownership and control between the minority groups of the Niger Delta and other oil 
producing communities in Edo, Abia, and Ondo States and the Federal Government of 
Nigeria.
415
  
                                                 
412
 Comment by Abdul Atta in March 1971, on the 1969 Petroleum Act that vested ownership and control 
of petroleum resources to the federal government, and on the proposal by the regime of Yakubu Gowon 
to nationalise the oil industry via a Decree and, also establishing the Nigerian National Oil Company 
(NNOC). Citation adopted from Terisa Turner, ‘Commercial Capitalism and the 1975 Coup’, in Keith 
Panter-Brick, (ed.); Soldiers and Oil (The Political Transformation of Nigeria) (London: Frank Cass and 
Company Ltd, 1978), 168.   
413
 The position of the Constitutional Conference on the demands of the Niger Delta Group for the 
abolition of Federal Government sole oil ownership and control rights. See Federal Republic of Nigeria, 
Report of the Constitutional Conference Containing the Resolutions and Recommendations, Vol. II. 
(Abuja, National Assembly Press, 1995), 3. 
414
 The author owes the use of the phrase ownership and control to John Boye Ejobowah, ‘Who Owns the 
Oil? The Politics of Ethnicity in the Niger Delta of Nigeria’, Africa Today, 47 (1), (2000), 29-47.  
415
 The Niger Delta is defined geographically as ‘a triangle with its apex between Ndoni and Aboh, 
descending eastwards to the Qua Iboe River at Eket and westwards to the Benin River with its bases 
along the Atlantic coast between the Bights of Benin and Biafra’. See International IDEA, Democracy in 
Nigeria: Continuing Dialogue(s) for Nation-Building (Stockholm: International Institute for Democracy 
and Electoral Assistance, 2000), 239. See ‘Niger Delta’ at Wikipedia- 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Niger_Delta. In 2000, the Obasanjo administration expanded the definition of 
the Niger Delta to include all the nine oil producing states. This led to a distinction between core and 
peripheral Niger Delta. However, in geo-political terms, the Niger Delta is restricted to the six states of 
the South-South zone. This study adopts the political definition of the Niger Delta. See Appendices A and 
E for the map of the area referred to as Niger Delta states. For more discussions of Oil control rights, see 
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  In view of the oil resource dispute, the country witnessed a surge and escalation 
of violence in the ethnic minority Niger Delta region of Nigeria to the extent that, the 
claims and counter-claims over the ownership and control of oil assumed the dimension 
of an incipient insurgency. It is appropriate to note that, claims to natural resources 
ownership and control have been made by cultural groups, interest groups, and social 
activists all acting or claiming to act on behalf of ethnic communities, instead of their 
respective state governments to engage the federal government that is at the centre of 
the dispute. 
 The concern of many Nigerians especially since the second half of the 1990s is 
that the country has being witnessing renewed uprising by ethnic communities of the 
Niger Delta against the federal government and oil-producing companies.
416
 Unlike the 
Ken Saro Wiwa-led uprisings that were limited to the Ogoni who inhabit a small part of 
the region, the on-going crises involve several communities spread across the Niger 
Delta. As in the case of the Ogonis, the uprisings have been violent and deadly, and its 
geographic spread portends danger to the unity, stability and development of Nigeria. 
Indeed, some have observed that the Boko Haram attacks and the Niger Delta Question 
are the greatest challenges facing the country in the twenty-first century.
417
 The Niger 
Delta Question has to do with conflict arising from the federal government’s absolute 
ownership and control of oil on the one hand, and oil communities’ ownership claims to 
the resources on the other.
418
 As a result of the on-going conflict, the oil producing 
communities and the Niger Delta areas in particular has been transformed into one of 
the several hot spots of the world.  It is obvious that since oil represent the main income 
of Nigerian economy; its exploitation affects its unity, stability and development. This 
                                                                                                                                               
Ejobowah, ‘Who Owns the Oil? The Politics of Ethnicity in the Niger Delta of Nigeria’, Africa Today, 47 
(1), 29-47. See also Appendix E for the map of Nigeria numerically showing the Niger Delta region. 
416
 For a comprehensive review of the uprisings in the Niger Delta of Nigeria, see Cyril Obi, ‘Nigeria’s 
Niger Delta: Understanding the Complex Drivers of Violent Oil-Related Conflict’, African Development 
XXXIV (2), (2009), 103-128; see also, Eghosa E. Osaghae, ‘The Ogoni Uprising: Oil Politics, Minority 
Agitations and the Future of Nigerian State’, African Affairs, 94, (1995), 325-344. 
417
 The Ogonis are a small ethnic group in the Niger Delta. They have waged series of campaign for a fair 
share in oil revenues with the Federal Government of Nigeria. The leader of MOSOP, Ken Saro-Wiwa 
and eight others were hanged to death for activism by the Abacha military government. See Steven 
Cayford, ‘Ogoni Uprising: Oil, Human Rights, and a Democratic Alternative in Nigeria’, Africa Today, 
43 (2), (1996), 183-197. See also, Claude E. Welch, Jr. ‘The Ogoni and Self-Determination: Increasing 
Violence in Nigeria’, The Journal of Modern African Studies, 33 (4), (1995), 635-650. The Boko Haram 
is an Islamic revivalist movement whose philosophy and objective is to impose its religious beliefs on 
Nigeria’s secular society. See Ali S. Yusufu Bagaji; Moses Shaibu Etila; Elijah E. Ogbadu; and Jafa’aru 
Garba Sule, ‘Boko Haram and Recurring Bomb Attacks in Nigeria: Attempt to Impose Ideology Through 
Terrorism?’ Cross-Cultural Communication, 8 (1), (2012), 33-41.  
418
 For the Niger Delta Question and Oil control rights, see J.I. Dibua, ‘Citizenship and Resource Control 
in Nigeria: The Case of Minority Communities in the Niger Delta’, Africa Spectrum, 40 (1), (2005), 5-28. 
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chapter aims to advance the understanding of ethno-political conflicts and social, 
economic and political instability in the oil producing Niger Delta by analysing the 
country’s adopted state building approaches with respect to oil ownership and control. 
The chapter begins by providing a general background information about the emergence 
of the oil industry in the country and strong emphasis will be placed on the different 
forms state building approaches in the oil industry have taken over the years, and their 
implications to generate ethno-political conflict and government responses.  
This chapter will also discuss the tensions between the federal government and 
the cultural communities in the Niger Delta. Finally, in order to make a normative 
judgement on whether the state building arrangements of the federal government on the 
one side, and the claims of the minority communities of the Niger Delta on the other 
side is defensible and/or fair, the chapter will evaluate the claims made by both sides. 
 
8.2 The Oil Industry: From Foreign Concessions to State Ownership 
Since oil emerged as the mainstay of Nigeria’s economy, the oil industry has gone 
through three phases: the oil concession, state participation, and the deregulation 
phases. The earliest phase of the country’s oil industry had its roots in the first decade of 
the 20th century with pioneering oil exploration work by the German Bitumen 
Company. Oil exploration at this time was based on the Colonial Minerals Oil 
Ordinance No. 17 of 1914, which was amended in 1925, 1950 and 1958 to make 
provision for the participation of oil companies from other countries. The Mineral 
Ordinance was ostensibly passed to ‘regulate the right to search for, win and work 
mineral oils’.419 The Ordinance granted the monopoly of oil concessions in the country 
to British or British-Allied Capital; this meant that only British oil companies were 
allowed to obtain oil licences in Nigeria. Under this Ordinance, Shell D’Arcy- later 
Shell-BP was granted an oil concession covering the entire Nigeria’s mainland in 1938. 
Shell eventually discovered oil in 1956 at Oloibiri village in present-day Bayelsa State 
in the Niger Delta, formally marking the inception of the oil era in the country.  
                                                 
419
 See Nigeria Mineral Oil Ordinance (Colonial Mineral Ordinance No. 17) of 1914, Section 6 (1) (a). 
See also, Cyril Obi, Youth and the Generational Dimensions to the Struggles for Resource Control in the 
Niger Delta (Dakar: Council for the Development of Social Research in Africa (CODESRIA), 2006), 1-
48 and Cyril Obi, ‘Oil and Development in Africa: Some Lessons from the Oil Factor in Nigeria for the 
Sudan’, in Luke Patey, (ed.); Oil Development in Africa: Lessons for Sudan after Comprehensive Peace 
agreement, Report No. 8 (Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS), 2007), 9-34.  
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Encouraged by its success, Shell D’Arcy converted its Oil Prospecting Lease of 
the Delta into an Oil Mining Lease. In 1963, the company constructed a Trans-Niger 
Pipeline that zigzagged the Delta, connecting oilfields in Kokori, Ughelli, Olomoro, 
Uzere and other communities in the Midwest with those in Agbada, Umuechem, and the 
Port-Harcourt area and to the Bonny Terminal. The discovery of oil resources in the 
Niger Delta by Shell thus set the stage for the entry of other Multinational Oil 
Companies (MOCs) who took over the oil acreages that were given up by Shell in 1958. 
This early era of the oil industry in Nigeria was characterised by foreign control and 
non-participation of the federal government who simply collected rents and taxes from 
these oil companies. 
However, from 1958, due to amendment in the 1914 Ordinance, the colonial 
government extended concessionaire rights to a number of other companies that include 
Tenneco, Gulf, Agip, Sagfrap, and Phillip. At a later stage, the government of the 
country divided the off-shore continental shelf into twelve blocks, and granted leases to 
Mobil and Texas Overseas.
420
 In 1959, the government enacted the Petroleum Profit 
Tax Ordinance which required the MOCs to pay 50% of their oil profits to the federal 
government to off-set royalties, rents, and taxes. Similarly, in 1967, the Organisation of 
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) introduced terms that required the MOCs to 
treat royalties as expenses, so that in addition to the 50% profit tax, the Multinational 
Oil Companies were required to pay royalties to the host government of operation. The 
implication of the payment of rent and royalties to the host government by the MOCs 
presupposes federal government ownership of the oil in the Niger Delta. 
The second phase of state building in the Nigerian oil industry started during the 
Nigeria-Biafra civil war between 1967 and 1970.
421
 This period witnessed when oil 
ownership and control was disputed for the first time. This phase was also marked by a 
gradual, but increasing state participation in the oil industry and the country moved 
from the collection of oil rents to direct intervention in the running of the oil industry. 
Of the four political regions that existed in the mid-1960s, the Eastern and Midwest 
regions were the only oil producers. The leaders of the secessionist Eastern region, 
                                                 
420
 See Scot R. Pearson, Petroleum and the Nigerian Economy (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
1970), 15-18; See also, Ludwig H. Schatzl, Petroleum in Nigeria (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1969), 51-52. 
421
 In May, 1967, the Military Governor of the Eastern region Lt. Colonel Odumegwu Ojukwu declared 
the independence of Biafra. In July, 1967, a full-scale war was declared between Biafra’s side and 
Nigeria’s federal regime based in Lagos. Biafra surrendered in January, 1970. 
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whose attempts at this time was bolstered by the political support of France, ordered the 
Multinational Oil Companies within its territory to pay rents, royalties and taxes to the 
newly declared Government of the Republic of Biafra.
422
 But the Federal Government 
of Nigeria countered the move when it insisted that royalties be paid to it, and 
subsequently imposed a naval blockade on Bonny and Port Harcourt-the two main 
external outlets for oil. The fierce war that ensued ended with the liberation of the oil 
producing areas from the Biafran control.
423
 In November 1969, a month before the 
Biafran leaders formally signed terms of surrender in Lagos, the federal government of 
Nigeria promulgated the Petroleum Act of 1969. This Act nullified all concessions held 
by the MOCs and granted the Nigerian government the power to issue fresh oil 
exploration licenses and production leases. Specifically, the Petroleum Act of 1969 
vested in the Federal Government of Nigeria the ownership and control of:  
a) All petroleum in, under or upon any lands in the country.  
b) All petroleum under the territorial waters of Nigeria.  
c) All land forming part of the continental shelf of the country.
424
 
In an attempt to further consolidate its hold on the oil resource in the country, in 1971, 
the federal government set up the Nigerian National Oil Corporation (NNOC) to 
prospect, produce and market oil, and also began to acquire an equity stake in the oil 
companies.
425
 Until the 1970s, only foreign oil companies and their business partners 
carried out oil exploration. But after 1971, the Nigerian State Corporation-NNOC, its 
subsidiaries and sub-contractors also become involved in oil exploration on the ground 
in village communities. Thus from 33.33% in the 1970s, Nigeria’s equity stakes rose 
progressively in all the companies to 55-60% in the 2000s. Thus the federal government 
had become the owner, producer, and marketer of oil. The comprehensive list of the 
MOC operating in Nigeria detailing shareholders, operators and share of national 
production can be seen in table 1 below.  
                                                 
422
 See Sarah Ahmad Khan, Nigeria: The Political Economy of Oil (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1994), 10-11. 
423
 Some have argued that the secessionist Biafra war between 1967 and 1970 was strongly motivated by 
the fight over the distribution of oil rents, in addition to the struggle for political power and ethnic 
dominance. For more details of this argument, see Annegret Mahler, Nigeria: A Prime Example of the 
Resource Curse? Revisiting the Oil-Violence Link in the Niger Delta, Working Paper No. 120 (Hamburg 
(Germany): German Institute of Global and Area Studies (GIGA), 2010), 1-38, See also Ukoha Ukiwo, 
‘Violence, Identity Mobilisation and Re-imaging of Biafra’, Africa Development, XXXIV (1), (2009), 9-
30; Rotimi T. Suberu, ‘The Travails of Federalism in Nigeria’, Journal of Democracy, 4 (4), (1993), 39-
53, and Rotimi T. Suberu, ‘The Struggle for New States in Nigeria, 1976-1990’, African Affairs, 90 
(1991), 499-522.   
424
 See Kayode Somerekun, Perspectives on the Nigerian Oil Industry (Lagos: Amkra Books, 1995), 16. 
425
 The corporation was later to be known as the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC). 
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Table 1: The Major Multinational Oil Companies in the Niger Delta 
No Oil Company Shareholders Operators Share of National 
Production 
1 Shell Petroleum Development  
Company (SPDC) 
NNPC – 55% 
Shell – 30% 
Elf – 10% 
Agip – 5% 
Shell 42.2% 
2 Mobil Producing Nigeria NNPC – 50% 
Mobil – 42% 
Mobil 21.2% 
3 Chevron Nigeria NNPC – 60% 
Chevron – 
40% 
Chevron 20.4% 
4 Nigeria Agip Oil NNPC – 60% 
Agip – 40% 
Agip 7.5% 
5 Elf Petroleum Nigeria NNPC – 60% 
Elf – 40% 
Elf 6.1% 
6 Texaco Overseas (Nigeria) Petroleum NNPC – 60% 
Texaco – 20% 
Chevron – 
20% 
Texaco 2.6% 
Total    100% 
Sources: Festus Iyayi, ‘Niger Delta Crisis: Development and Socio-Cultural Implications’, Proceedings of 
the PENGASSAN Forum, Ijebu-Ode, 2008, 3; and Joseph Moerkamp, ‘Niger Delta: A Disrupted 
Ecology? The Role of Shell and other Oil Companies’, Proceedings of the Greenpeace Conference, 
London, 1996, 15. 
 
As can be seen in the above table, each of these Multinational Oil Companies is in joint 
partnership with the state-owned National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) that 
commands 55-60% of shareholding.  
At the end of the civil war in 1970, the revenue from oil became significant, by 
which time 12 states had emerged in place of the four regions.
426
 From a modest 5% of 
total national revenue in 1965, the share of oil revenue to the national economy 
astronomically rose to 26.6% in 1970, 43.6% in 1971, and 80% by 1990s.
427
 During this 
period, oil was derived principally from Rivers, Midwest, and Cross Rivers States. In 
order to further consolidate itself on ownership and control of oil, the federal 
government promulgated the Decree 9 of 1971. This decree extended federal 
government ownership and control to include off-shore rents. In 1975, the military 
government of the late Brigadier General Murtala Ramat Mohammed passed the 
Constitution Decree No. 6 thereby increasing to 80% the share of oil revenue going to 
the DPA and reducing to 20% the share that went to states of derivation.  
                                                 
426
 For detailed discussion and evaluation of the circumstances leading to the creation of 12 states in 1967, 
see chapter four of this thesis. 
427
 Augustine Ikein and Comfort Briggs-Anigboh, Oil and Fiscal Federalism in Nigeria (Aldershot: 
Ashgate Publishers, 1998), 140; see also, Scot R. Pearson, Petroleum and the Nigerian Economy, 112. 
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In addition to the above attempts, the military government of General Olusegun 
Obasanjo nationalised the British Petroleum (BP) in 1979. The nationalisation of BP 
was, however, conducted out of foreign policy consideration and not for economic 
reasons since the Nigerian government aimed at influencing British policies on 
Rhodesia, which later became Zimbabwe. Similarly, BP was supplying oil to South 
African apartheid government which the Obasanjo government strongly opposed. The 
1979 Constitution revised the Petroleum Act of 1969 by declaring federal government’s 
ownership of all mineral resources both on-shore and off-shore, and the derivation share 
of oil revenue slashed to 5% by the Second Republic government of Alhaji Shehu 
Usman Aliyu Shagari. By the end of the Ibrahim Babangida regime in 1993, the 
derivation principle had practically been eliminated as it fell to 3%.
428
 
The third phase of Nigeria’s oil industry started in the 1980s. This phase was 
marked by deregulation of state investments in the oil industry. Beginning from the 
early 1980s, Nigeria started to experience sudden downturn in the global oil prices 
which had disastrous consequences for the country. Faced with dwindling oil revenue, 
religious and political crises, the oil-dependent Nigerian economy went into a deep 
recession as oil revenues shrank and by 1982 the country had entered into discussions 
with the International Monetary Fund (IMF).
429
 Many organisations, without access to 
foreign exchange to import raw materials and other commercial and industrial inputs 
had to stop trading, and workers were retrenched as Nigeria’s oil dependent economy 
went into recession. In 1986, General Ibrahim Babangida, the then Military Head of 
State termed President announced the adoption of a Structural Adjustment Programme 
(SAP) approved by the IMF and the World Bank as well as the country’s creditors such 
as Paris Club.
430
 It was within the rubric of SAP that a deregulation programme aimed 
at rolling back state participation in the economy started from the critical oil sector in 
Nigeria.  
                                                 
428
 On the other hand, the number of states increased from 19 to 30 and to 36 in 1996, very much in 
validation of the 1957 Minority Commission Report that ethnic groups in Nigeria are many and their 
political recognition will be a bottomless process. Refer to Appendix B showing the administrative 
borders. 
429
 The NPN government of Alhaji Shehu Shagari formed a fragile coalition with the NPP as it was 
unable to win 2/3 majority in the National Assembly. It was at this time Nigeria witnessed the first 
Maitatsine attacks. See Figure 1, especially the ethno-political and religious events between 1980 and 
1983. 
430
 The Nigeria’s economic performance at this time was so bad that the real minimum wages fell by 90% 
between 1981 and 1990. See Deborah Potts, Whatever Happened to Africa’s Rapid Urbanisation? 
Counterpoint Paper Series (London: African Research Institute, February, 2012), 10-11. 
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Within this SAP framework, the government embarked on a systematic de-
investment in the oil industry, where the emphasis was on cutting of any state 
participation, and opening up the oil sector to foreign and local private investments. The 
government sold-off its equity participation in some of the downstream oil marketing 
companies and commercialised the NNPC. In terms of the critical upstream oil 
production sector, the government promoted more investments by the oil multinationals 
through a package of incentives and placing new oil wells in the deep off-shore and on-
shore on offer.
431
 These were directed at increasing oil production and exports, with a 
view to producing revenues for external debt management and economic recovery 
programmes.  
Some Nigerian companies also got licenses to explore for, and produce oil, but 
most of them, due to the huge costs or capital requirements involved, remained marginal 
players. For instance, of the 38 indigenous oil companies as at 1996, 20 were entirely 
inactive. Only 9 companies were active in the sense that they were engaged in sustained 
efforts at exploration and production.
432
 This means that the big-time oil multinationals 
were in no way threatened as they still consolidated their hold over the industry in this 
de-investment phase by concentrating on the upstream sector, but also dominating the 
downstream marketing sector-where some Nigerian independent marketers became 
increasingly visible and accounted for 30% of the domestic market.
433
 During this 
phase, the effort made to commercialise Nigeria’s four- State-Owned refineries could 
not succeed, partly for political reasons, and for the poor turn-around maintenance 
condition they were in. The conditions of the state-owned refineries worsened under the 
successive military regimes until the country was returned to democratic rule in 1999.  
The coming to power of the civilian government under retired General Olusegun 
Obasanjo - who had been Nigeria’s military Head of State from 1976-1979 - provided a 
boost for the partial privatisation of the country’s oil industry. From 1999, in what 
appeared to be a process of closing the gap between domestic and global prices of 
refined petroleum products, after about eight price increases, all existing price subsidies 
on the petroleum products were completely removed. The removal of the subsidy thus 
represented a form of sales tax on refined petroleum products leading to a substantial 
rise in domestic fuel prices with its attendant multiplier effects - a rise in the price of 
                                                 
431
 The upstream sector of the oil industry refers to the processes relating to the exploration and 
production of petroleum (oil) and natural gas  
432
 See Austin Avuru, Upstream Divestment: The Real Issues (Lagos: Malthouse Press, 1997), 93. 
433
 Independent marketers are indigenous and privately owned Nigerian oil marketing companies. 
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local goods and services. However, between 1999 and 2003, the federal government 
spent about US$250 million to repair and maintenance of oil depots, pipelines, and 
other oil infrastructures related to the oil industry. Thus, government’s fiscal incentives 
to oil companies and plans for partial privatisation of oil industry at the same time 
underline a continuing contradiction in Nigeria’s reforms in the oil industry.  
The federal government between 2000-2002 completely stopped to invest in the 
industry, and National Oil and Chemical Marketing Plc (NOACHEM, now CONOIL 
and African Petroleum Plc (AP) as well as Unipetrol Plc, now Oando, were 
privatised.
434
 The federal government also privatised the NNPC’s marketing arm, the 
Pipelines and Products Marketing Company (PPMC), while investors were invited to 
bid for the establishment of private refineries in the country. The expectation for all of 
these was based on the assumption that new investments would expand private domestic 
participation in the downstream sector, while making up for the shortfall in domestic 
products’ supplies as a result of the near-collapse of the country’s four refineries with a 
combined installed capacity of about 450,000 barrel per day (bpd). About eighteen 
companies were given approval in 2002 to build refineries in Nigeria.
435
  
In January 2006, the Chief Executive Officer of the NNPC, announced that 
government and five oil companies: Shell, Chevron Texaco, Exxon Mobil, Total and 
Agip (ENI), had concluded plans to build refineries with a combined installed capacity 
of 1 million bpd in the country. Another aspect of the deregulation policy was related to 
the consolidation of the Nigeria Liquefied National Gas (NLNG) Project (NNPC - 49%, 
Shell - 25.6%, Elf - 15%, and Agip (ENI) - 10.4%) and the West Africa Gas Pipeline 
Company (WAGPCO) (Chevron Texaco - 38%, NNPC - 25%, Shell - 17%, GNPC & 
VRA - 17%, SoBeGaz - 2%, SoToGaz - 2%) expected to provide immense profits to the 
NNPC and its partners.  
The government also provided incentives designed to attract more investments 
into the upstream sector of the oil industry with the aim of doubling daily oil production 
from the 2.5 million barrel per day to 5 million barrel per day by the end of the decade. 
In response, Shell, Chevron, Texaco and Exxon Mobil announced plans to increase their 
                                                 
434
 Meanwhile, the then Vice-President-elect, Abubakar Atiku said in May, 1999 that the privatisation of 
the NNPC assets in the oil company joint ventures was inevitable. See Dickson Osuji, ‘NNPC for Sale’, 
Guardian Newspaper, 10 May, 1999, 6. 
435
 The downstream sector of the oil industry refers to the processes related to the refining, storage, 
distribution and sale of refined products such as fuel, petrol chemicals and gas. See Alexander’s Gas and 
Oil Connections: Company News:Africa, 7 (12), 13 June, 2006,  at www.gasandoil.com  
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oil investments in Nigeria. Shell which accounted for half of the country’s oil 
production, had since the 1990s expanded the activities of its other wholly foreign 
owned subsidiaries in Nigeria that include, Shell Nigeria Exploration and Production 
Company (SNEPCO), Shell Nigeria Gas (SNG), and Shell Nigeria Oil Products (SNOP-
Marketing). All of the above subsidiaries of Shell took full advantage of the 
deregulation in the oil industry.
436
 
Apart from the existing Multinational Oil Companies, other oil investors from 
all parts of the world arrived on the Nigerian oil scene as the government sought to 
increase its oil reserves, earn more revenues, and diversify its dependence on Western 
oil companies. The new entrants into the upstream sector included China National Off-
shore Oil Company (CNOOC), China Oil and Petrochemical Corporation 
(CHINOPEC), China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), Korean National Oil 
Corporation (KNOC), Statoil of Norway, and Petrobras of Brazil.
437
  
The above deregulation/partial privatisation arrangements in the oil industry are 
indicative of two broad developments. First, the increased opening up of the upstream to 
national oil companies from Asia and South America and some foreign independent oil 
companies.
438
 Second, the state’s promotion of Nigerian participation in the oil industry 
by insisting that, there must be local content in all joint oil venture contracts. The policy 
also provided that 10% of each Oil Exploration License (OEL) granted to investors 
should go to Nigerian oil companies. With this strategy, rather than a complete 
surrender to foreign oil companies, the government sought to redistribute the benefits 
from oil investments by reserving a certain percentage of participation in oil 
investments and contracts for Nigerian oil companies. This is an indication that the 
country was seeking to ensure some meaningful participation of Nigerian citizens in the 
operations of the strategic oil sector.  
Overall, without downplaying the enormous revenues that flow to the coffers of 
the federal government as a result of its absolute ownership and control of oil, the three 
phases of state building arrangements in the oil industry: concessions, state ownership 
and deregulation was not as smooth as it appeared. Reforms in the oil industry discussed 
in the above phases have exposed the country to formidable challenges, including a 
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 See Andy Rowell, James Marriot and Lorne Stockman, The Next Gulf: London, Washington and Oil 
Conflict in Nigeria (London: Constable & Robinson, 2005), 102-103. 
437
 For the list of the major Multi National Oil Companies in Nigeria, see Table 1. 
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 Independent Oil Companies are privately owned with their operations restricted to oil exploration and 
production alone. 
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recurring ethno-political conflict and political instability. Because of the high interests 
at stake, the ethnic minorities of the Niger Delta have destabilised the oil industry and 
threatened the national economy.  
On the basis of the above discussions on the oil industry in the Nigeria’s 
political economy, it is clear; the different kinds of state building arrangements with 
regards to oil ownership and control generated different kind of effects, issues and 
problems. The first of such issues is the persisting dependence of the Nigerian state on 
oil, which appears to restrict the range of choices available to policy makers of the 
country. In the face of this constraint, the Nigerian state neglected the oil producing 
communities in the Niger Delta and caused the rise of even stronger claims over the 
control and ownership of oil. The following section of the chapter examines the essence 
of the oil resource dispute between the federal government and the communities in the 
Niger Delta. 
 
8.3 The Essence of the Oil Resource Conflict 
The struggle of the minority groups in the Niger Delta to claim ownership and control 
of the oil resource is rooted in the perceived inequities of the centralised distribution of 
oil revenues since the end of the Nigerian civil war. At the heart of the struggle of the 
minority groups was the abandonment of the derivation principle of revenue allocation 
which presupposed that revenues derived from natural resources should be allocated in 
proportion to what is contributed to the national account by the various political units of 
the federation.
439
 Implicit in their argument is that, throughout the 1950s and up to the 
late 1960s, the application of the derivation principle of revenue allocation ensured that 
the three regions- Northern, Western and Eastern regions whose revenue resources were 
largely based on cash crop economies be allocated 50% of their contributions to the 
Federation Account. This means that the derivation principle of revenue allocation 
placed the revenues derived from agricultural and mineral resources largely in the 
control of the regions. 
440
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 For more discussion of the principles and trends of revenue allocation in the federal republic of 
Nigeria, see chapter seven of this thesis. 
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 In spite of oil being the main source from which Nigeria’s mono economy had depended in the past 
four decades, there had been a decline in the derivation principle of revenue allocation and over 
centralisation of allocation process against the oil producing states. See Chibuike.U Uche and Ogbonnaya 
C. Uche, Oil and the Politics of Revenue allocation in Nigeria, Working Paper No. 54 (Leiden: African 
Studies Centre, The Netherlands, 2004), 1-42. 
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However, when it was the turn of the minority groups in the Niger Delta to 
benefit from the discovery of huge quantities of crude oil and gas, the revenue sharing 
formula established in the early sixties was arbitrarily changed by the dominant ethnic 
groups. The minority groups of the Niger Delta particularly used the revenue allocation 
formula in table 2 below to argue that it has been tilted against their region.  
 
Table 2: Federal – State Percentage Share in Petroleum Proceeds (1960- 2011) 
Year Share of Producing State (%) Share of Federal Government % Distribution Pool % 
1960-1967 50 20 30 
1967-1969 50 50 - 
1971 45 55 - 
1975 45% minus off-shore proceeds 55 plus off-shore proceeds - 
1979 20% minus off-shore proceeds 80 plus off-shore proceeds - 
1981 - 100 - 
1992 1.5% minus off-shore proceeds 98.5 plus off-shore proceeds - 
1999 3% minus off-shore proceeds 97 plus off-shore proceeds - 
1999-2011 13% minus off-shore proceeds 87 plus off-shore proceeds - 
Source: Adapted from United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Niger Delta Human 
Development Report (Abuja (Nigeria): United Nations Development Programme, 2006), 37. 
 
On the basis of the figures in the table above, the Niger Delta communities argue that, 
up to the 1960s, the oil producing states received 50% of the revenues derived from 
their local areas. However, they soon started to experience a downward trend in the 
revenue allocation from the early 1970s to the extent that, by 1981, the oil producing 
states received no share whatsoever.  
A critical analysis of the above table without any doubt shows that from the 
1970s, the federal control of oil led to the progressive reduction of derivation as a 
revenue allocation principle and its replacement by the Distributive Pool Account 
(DPA) or Federation Account that emphasised population size and equality of states as 
principles of revenue allocation. The introduction of DPA with emphasis on population 
and equality of states shifted the control of resources from the regions, now called states 
to the federal government. This by implication means that the federal government 
retains the control of most resources which was previously controlled by the three 
regions that were under the firm control of the majority group - Hausa/Fulani- North, 
Yoruba- West and the Igbo- East. As a result, the derivation principle was reduced from 
50% in 1970, to 5%, 1.5%, and then 3% by the mid-1980s.
441
 The minority groups of 
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 For further details of the decline of revenue allocation to the oil producing states leading to restiveness 
in the Niger Delta, see John Boye Ejobowah, ‘Who Owns the Oil? The Politics of Ethnicity in the Niger 
Delta of Nigeria’, 29-47. 
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the Niger Delta saw the abandonment of derivation principle of revenue allocation that 
favoured the majority ethnic groups and federal government as unfair and unjust, and a 
further evidence of their exploitation and marginalisation in a highly centralised 
Nigerian federation.  
From 1967, even though the minority groups of the oil producing Niger Delta 
gained some measure of local autonomy and self-determination as a result of the 
creation of Rivers state, and the national unity project that gave some Niger Delta elite 
access to lucrative state and federal appointment and patronages, they still felt 
marginalised. They also argue for instance that, inspite of their support for the Federal 
side during the war, the groups in the Niger Delta remained marginalised from the 
control of the oil produced in their region. The progressive abandonment of the 
derivation principle implied that their states could not claim or control the oil produced 
within their territories. Following their renewed protests, the derivation principle in 
federal allocations to states was arbitrarily increased to 13% during the 1994/5 
Constitutional Conference, but implementation commenced only after Nigeria’s return 
to democratic rule in 1999. However, since 1999, there have been increasing protests 
from the groups in the Niger Delta that the upward review has not gone far enough in 
compensating them for their rights and needs in the region.  
In addition to the withdrawal of the derivation principle of revenue allocation, 
the grievance of the Niger Delta groups is connected to the widespread impoverishment, 
militarisation and increased oil-related environmental degradation. The groups therefore 
believed that a distant federal government dominated by elite from the majority ethnic 
groups and foreign oil multinationals had no regard for their rights and welfare.
442
  
From the foregoing therefore, their claim and struggle for ownership and control 
of oil resources is directed at a return to the principles of true federalism which demands 
for a re-negotiation of the structure of the Nigerian federation in ways that transfers 
power over the oil to the oil-producing states of the Niger Delta. A derivation-based 
redress in Nigeria’s fiscal federalism is at stake, which also implies a fair distribution of 
the oil revenues between the various groups in the country. In the opinion of the Niger 
Delta groups therefore, the underlying dynamic to the changes in revenue allocation 
from the 1970s onwards and wide spread environmental degradation resides in the play 
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 See United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Niger Delta Human Development Reports 
(Abuja (Nigeria): United Nations Development Programme, 2006); Cyril Obi, Youth and the 
Generational Dimensions to the Struggles for Resource Control in the Niger Delta, 1-48. 
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of politics between the majority and the minority nationality groups in Nigeria. It is in 
accordance with the opinion of the Niger Delta groups, it was also observed: 
Even a superficial political analysis of the situation will reveal that the fate of the mineral 
resources of the Niger Delta minorities, particularly the trend from derivation to federal 
government absolutism, is itself a function of majority control of the federal government 
apparatus. In 1960, there were no petroleum resources of any significance. The main 
income earning exports were cocoa (Yoruba, West) groundnuts, cotton, and hides and skin 
(Hausa/Fulani, North) and palm oil (Igbo, East). Therefore, it was convenient for these 
majority groups usually in control of the federal government to emphasise derivation, hence 
its strong showing in the 1960/63Nigerian Constitutions.
443
 
 
The above citation provides the fundamentals of the oil conflict in the country’s Niger 
Delta region. As for the minority groups, the oil conflict in the Niger Delta arises from 
lack of fairness and justice in the appropriation of the huge oil revenues from the area. 
To them, therefore, activism is a struggle against underdevelopment.  
It is important to stress, in order to get fair hearing of their claims and 
arguments, the Niger Delta groups have taken a series of legal actions. For instance, the 
delegates from South-South geo-political zone the Niger Delta states, presented a joint 
petition for resource control demanding that the derivation principle of revenue 
allocation be raised from 13% to 25% and then 50% within five years at the 1994 
Constitutional Conference, and at the 2005 Nigerian Political Reform Conference 
(NPRC). On both occasions, their demands were rejected by the federal government. 
The outright rejection of their demands prompted most of them to boycott the closing 
sessions of both Conferences.  
The Niger Delta groups have also taken the struggle for oil resource control to 
the Supreme Court of Nigeria. But the groups were unsuccessful in their contest at the 
Supreme Court of Nigeria for access to oil revenues accruing from the off-shore oil 
fields based in the Atlantic Ocean.
444
 From this analysis it is evident that part of the 
failure of Nigeria’s project for national unity has been strongly compromised by the 
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 For the relevance of the derivation principle of revenue allocation to understanding the conflict in the 
Niger Delta, see Itsejuwa E. Sagay, The Extraction Industry in the Niger Delta and the Environment, An 
Annual Lecture of the ANPEZ (Port Harcourt: Centre for Environment and Development, University of 
Port Harcourt, 15 November, 2001). The emphases in italics are mine. 
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 See Figure 4 for the highlights of the Supreme Court ruling on the On-shore/Off-shore revenue 
distribution. In addition to the above measures, the Niger Delta communities have used other civic and 
constitutional steps. These measures include: petitions to political authorities, sponsoring of motions in 
both Houses of the National Assemblies, media publicity, co-optation of elites from the non-oil producing 
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Naanen, ‘The Niger Delta and the National Question’, in Eghosa E. Osaghae and Ebere Onwudiwe, 
(eds.); The Management of the National Question in Nigeria (Ibadan: PEFS, 2001), 221. See also, 
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refusal by the federal government to deal with the demands of Niger Delta groups 
asking for a revision of the allocation formula to 25% by the central government. This 
refusal caused the escalation of military activity in the region with serious consequences 
for the whole national economy. 
The older generation activists still think that the best approach to achieve a fair 
(re)distribution of oil revenues is through negotiation and dialogue. For the younger and 
more militant groups, though, the control of natural resources has become synonymous 
of ethno-national liberation from a new kind of colonisation imposed by multinational 
oil companies and supported by the federal government. For them the time for dialogue 
has exhausted and the best approach is through armed struggle.
445
 
Since January 2006, violence and insurgent activities of the militia groups’ 
whose utmost intention is resource control has escalated. In particular, the Movement 
for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) has attracted local and international 
condemnation because of kidnapping of expatriate oil workers, blowing up oil 
installations and attacking security personnel in the Niger Delta. The actions of the 
militia groups are partly the result of the government’s militarisation of the region and 
illegal oil bunkering. These violent activist organisations provided alienated, 
unemployed and marginalised youth, some of them University and high school 
graduates, with the opportunity to challenge the federal hegemony over oil resource. It 
also allowed the militia groups the opportunity to tap into a groundswell of anger 
against the state and the oil multinationals thereby drawing attention to their cause, and 
benefiting as individuals from their capacity to unleash violence capable of disrupting a 
critical transnational energy resource flow.  
In addition to the activities of MEND, and following the internationally well-
known Ogoni resistance campaign in the early 1990’s led by the Movement for the 
Survival of Ogoni People (MOSOP), the largest of the Niger Delta oil minority groups- 
the Ijaw mounted a fresh struggle for the ownership and control of oil resource.
446
 In 
December, 1998 Ijaw youths from six states of the Niger Delta that were organised by 
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 For more discussion of the escalation of violent attacks on oil installations and abduction of foreign oil 
worker in December, 2005 by a shadowy and largely unknown militant groups which include, among 
others, the Niger Delta People’s Volunteer Force (NDPVF), and the Movement for the Emancipation of 
the Niger Delta (MEND), see Michael Watts, ‘Petro-Insurgency or Criminal Syndicate: Conflict and 
Violence in the Niger Delta’, Review of African Political Economy, 114, (2007), 637-660. 
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 See Cyril Obi, Environmental Movements in Sub-Saharan Africa: A Political Ecology of Power and 
Conflict, Civil Society and Social Movements, Paper No. 15(Geneva (Switzerland): United Nations 
Research Institute for Social Development (UNRISD), 2005), 6-11. See also the full text of the Ogoni Bill 
of Rights at http://www.NigeriaScholars.AfricanQueen.com [accessed 13 March 2012].  
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the Ijaw Youth Council (IYC) met in Kaiama, the birthplace of Ijaw martyr Isaac Adaka 
Boro. At the meeting on 11 December 1998, the IYC announced the Kaiama 
Declaration which among others stated that  
all land and natural resources, including mineral resources within the Ijaw territory belong 
to the Ijaw communities and are the basis for our survival ... refuse to recognise all 
undemocratic decrees that robbed the Ijaw of the right of ownership and control of our lives 
and resources, which were enacted without our participation and consent ... we demand for 
self-government and resource control by the Ijaw people … all Multinational Oil 
Companies have to quit the Niger Delta by 30 December, 1998 … until issues related to the 
ownership and control of Ijawland and oil were resolved.
447 
 
In response to the Kaiama declaration, a state of emergency was declared by the federal 
government in the Niger Delta, and flooded the region with armed troops. Ijaw 
protesters were arrested, and shot at by anti-riot police during demonstrations in support 
of the Kaiama Declaration.
448
 The Ijaw local resistance was repressed but, as in the case 
of the Ogoni, it survived and regenerated itself particularly after the return to democratic 
rule in 1999. Similarly, across the Niger Delta, other passive radical groups organised 
around the demands for the control of local autonomy, and self-determination for the 
control of oil surfaced and became active. These included the Movement for the 
Payment of Reparations to Ogbia-Ogbia Charter of Demands, Egi people- Aklaka 
Declaration, Oron National Forum- Oron Bill of Rights, Ikwerre Charter of Demands, 
among others.
449
  
To address this situation the federal government, apart from the upward 
increment in the revenue allocation to 13%, has also responded to the developmental 
needs of the Niger Delta groups. For instance, in 2000, it established the Niger Delta 
Development Commission (NDDC) and the Council on the Socio-economic 
Development of the Coastal States of the Niger Delta (COSEDECS) in 2006. The 
government of the late President Umaru Musa Yar’Adua also established the Niger 
Delta Amnesty in April 2009. However, despite the establishment of all of the above 
mentioned agencies, the Niger Delta groups see the federal government responses as 
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 For more discussion of the federal government’s response to the Kaiama declaration and mass protest, 
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Niger Delta.  For gender segment of the mobilisation and agitations, see Niger Women for Justice at 
www.ndwj.kabissa.org/  [accessed 3 January 2011]. See also Augustine Ikelegbe, ‘Engendering Civil 
Society: Oil, Women Groups and Resource Conflicts in the Niger Delta Region of Nigeria’, Journal of 
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unsatisfactory. As the Militia groups renewed their vandalisation of oil infrastructures, 
the federal government responded by applying maximum force against 
communities/groups that are perceived as threats to the state-oil business alliance. For 
instance, in 1999, the Nigerian Army under Operation Hakuri II completely destroyed 
the Odi town in Bayelsa state in the Niger Delta in a military operation aimed at 
protecting oil installations.  
Five days after the invasion and destruction of Odi, the then Nigerian Defence 
Minister, General Theophanous Danjuma, who authorised the invasion of Odi 
Operation Hakuri II, justified the military intervention and the entire Niger Delta Hakuri 
campaign in a speech delivered at the Ministerial Conference of the Economic 
Community of West African States (ECOWAS) saying that the Operation Hakuri II was 
carried out with the purpose of protecting lives and property, in particular  oil platforms, 
flow-stations, operating rig terminals and pipelines, refineries and power installations in 
the Niger Delta.
450
 
Since the operation Hakuri II, other communities that have attempted to 
challenge federal authority have been similarly treated in the midst of the continued 
militarisation of the Niger Delta. For example, the military raid on Odioma in February 
2005 following a dispute with a neighbouring community Nembe-Bissambiri, over 
payments from Shell. The troops ransacked Odioma and seventeen people were 
reportedly killed. In a similar incident in 2006, troops went to Gbaramantu, another oil 
community, and about fifteen people reportedly lost their lives. Other communities have 
also come under fire as a result of the attempts of the military to flush out oil resource 
activists and militants. Unfortunately, the use of force to put down agitation in the 
troubled oil region and the use of armed groups by some local elite has contributed to 
the proliferation of youth militias, who are forcefully demanding resource control amid 
the escalating tensions and frustrations in the Niger Delta.
451
  
It is important to note at this point that, as a result of the limitations of the 
military approach, the government of the late President Umaru Musa Yar’Adua 
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introduced the Niger Delta Amnesty in 2009. With the shift of power from Chief 
Olusegun Obasanjo to Yar’Adua, the federal government realised that the use of 
military power to control the activities of the Niger Delta militants did not offer any 
solution and decided to offer them an amnesty as a first step towards a negotiated 
peace.
452
 Despite the Amnesty, the Niger Delta communities and Nigeria in general are 
yet to experience peace and security. For instance, apart from series of mass protests in 
Abuja- Nigeria’s capital, the Niger Delta activists claimed responsibility for the massive 
explosions on 1 October 2010 in Abuja that resulted in the loss of lives of innocent 
citizens. Similarly, in December 2011, the Niger Delta Youths for several hours 
occupied the Murtala Mohammed Bridge at Jamata, Kogi State. Although no life was 
lost on this occasion, this action affected the free flow of traffic at that critical time 
when many people were returning home for the Christmas and New Year holidays. 
Until now this chapter discussed the essence of the oil resource conflict. Based 
on the analysis, the claims of the Niger Delta groups for ownership and control of the 
oil resource in their domain as opposed to the Federal Government of Nigeria can be 
narrowed to two but related issues: the lack of compensation for sovereign take-over of 
the oil resource, and the lack of fairness and equity in the revenue allocation system. 
This part is important because it explains the claims of both the Niger Delta 
communities and the Nigerian government regarding who should own and control 
natural resources. The essence of the following evaluation is to make normative 
judgement of the claims and to assess whether even though the oil policies generates 
ethno-political conflicts and institutional instabilities, the state involvements in the oil 
industry were defensible and/or fair. 
 
8.4 Evaluation: Ownership and Control Oil Resources 
It is understandable why the minority activists and interest groups in the oil producing 
region of Nigeria take over the role of confronting the federal government. This is 
because, in a proper federal set up, the appropriation and centralisation of revenue by 
the federal government would not have gone unchallenged by the states from which the 
revenue are generated. But since about thirty five years of the country’s state building 
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and politics was mostly under military dictatorship, the country’s federal outlook has 
been transformed into a de facto unitary system. During Nigeria’s successive military 
rule, state building and political governance were synonymous with military 
operations.
453
 The characteristics of the army- hierarchical structure, one way flow of 
order, obedience and abhorrence to initiative and autonomy, all of which enabled it to 
function like a fighting machine pervaded state building processes and governance in 
Nigeria. Thus, the state governments lost all semblance of autonomy as their Military 
Governors were appointed by, and receive orders from, superior officers at the centre in 
Abuja.  
In those circumstances, the question of the state governments challenging the 
centre over rights to revenue generated in their domain generally, and ownership and 
control of oil could not be asked. The situation has not changed even in the fourth 
republic under the civilian administration, 1999-2012. This is because, due to the 
clientèle network and dominant influence of the ruling party, the Peoples’ Democratic 
Party (PDP), which not only impose gubernatorial candidates on the state, but has made 
all state governments accountable to the central government. The country therefore 
appears to be practising a one party state. More importantly, the state governments are 
weak, and therefore cannot challenge the centre since they depend on the centre for 
funds in order to survive.  
Given the gaps in the powers of the states, both under the military regimes and 
civilian administrations, cultural and interest groups have sought to fill the void by 
making claims and demands over oil ownership and control on behalf of their respective 
communities.
454
 Even though it might be argued that some of these groups are 
motivated by greed, some of them like the case of MOSOP in Ogoniland enjoy the 
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support of their communities and are, therefore, legitimate representatives of their 
people. 
 The question is, should the ethnic communities own and control the oil 
resources? As indicated above, cultural and interest groups have been at the forefront of 
the claims and demands. In their argument, they have invoked the derivation method of 
revenue sharing to support claims/demand of oil revenue generated from their land. 
They argue that in pre-civil war years when agricultural exports were the mainstay of 
the Nigerian economy, federal allocation to the then three and later four regions was on 
the basis of their relative contribution to the central account. The derivation 
arrangement, they argue, benefited the three majority ethnic groups who were the major 
producers of export crops at the time. The emergence of oil as the mainstay of the 
Nigerian economy from the early 1970s, therefore, requires an application of the same 
method, of revenue allocation on the basis of the derivation principle. Instead, the 
federal government decided to abandon the derivation principle of revenue sharing 
because oil is not produced from areas inhabited by majority groups.  
Simply put, the argument of the right of oil producing ethnic communities to 
revenue generated from their land is grounded on a tradition of federal revenue 
allocation principle. Before analysing whether the claims/demands of the groups about 
oil ownership and control on the one hand and that of the federal government on the 
other hand is defensible, desirable and/or fair, it is important to stress that 
claims/demands about oil ownership and control to date are fundamentally by, or made 
on behalf of ethnic communities, and not by their respective political units or state 
governments. 
 The argument of the minority groups in the oil producing states of the Niger 
Delta may not be as logical as it appears. It is logically coherent to say that the 
derivation principle of revenue allocation should be consistently adhered to, and should 
not be abandoned when it is the turn of the weak- minority to benefit from it. However, 
inconsistency emerges when oil producing ethnic communities/groups is substituted as 
political units or state government, and the derivation principle applied to them. In the 
1950s and 1960s when agricultural exports was the mainstay of the Nigerian economy, 
the derivation principle which the ethnic minorities of the oil producing region use as 
the basis of their argument was adopted to allocate revenues among the then three, and 
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later four political regions- Northern, Western, Eastern and Midwestern regions, but not 
to major ethnic groups in those regions.  
It is also important to add that, if in each of the four regions in the 1960s, the 
political leaders used the revenue they received on the basis of the derivation principle 
for the benefit of the majority group; this may not make the arguments of the Niger 
Delta groups any better. It is injustice, and not acceptable when leaders use regional 
revenues exclusively for the benefit of a sectional group of their region. Leaders ought 
to be fair and just. That the regional leaders were unjust should not be taken as a 
yardstick by the Niger Delta groups. To do so would amount to perpetuation of the 
same injustice that the ethnic minorities of the Niger Delta fight against. 
 The ethnic minorities in the oil producing areas have also used land ownership 
as a premise for their claims/demands. It is argued that the land from which oil is 
derived is the ancestral home of the oil producing ethnic communities; as such they 
have right to whatever comes from it. The basis for this claim bears semblance to 
Hume’s accession principle. The principle asserts that individuals have right to objects 
that are intimately connected to their property.
455
 For example, the mango tree on my 
land and the off-spring of my cattle are mine because they are derivatives of what I 
possess. Hume’s principle was with regard to individuals, but the ethnic 
minorities/groups in Nigeria’s Niger Delta uses it as the basis for group 
claims/demands. Probably, the shift from individuals to groups could be justified by the 
system of land ownership -family, village, clan - obtainable in the Niger Delta and in 
most parts of Sub-Saharan Africa. 
However, when critically analysed, ambiguities arises if rights to ownership and 
control of natural resources are assigned to ethnic groups usually composed of several 
communities each having its own territory. For example, an oil location might be in the 
territory of one and not in the territory of the other, yet both communities are of the 
same ethnic group and share common local boundaries. Thus, the problem of ownership 
rights rears its head at a lower level. For instance, a section of the Niger Delta 
community once challenged the source of authority of the late Ken Saro Wiwa (an 
Ogoni activist) to speak on behalf of the whole Ogoni people when his own village has 
no oilfield.   
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The absurdity is more palpable in the case of the lower Niger Delta where some 
ethnic communities live either by the coastline and on tiny pieces of land surrounded by 
sea, and  most oil fields in Nigeria are located not on land but on sea- off-shore and 
deep shore. It gets really absurd if coastal and island communities are assigned 
ownership of what is in the sea. And if it is assigned, this is just assuming the absurd, 
arguments would arise over territorial sea boundaries thus reproducing ownership 
problem anew. However, this is a problem of feasibility, and one still has to establish if 
it is desirable to invest ownership and control rights on groups, and this means making 
reference to the theoretical foundation of the thesis. 
 Liberal theorists such as Kymlicka and Taylor argue that minorities suffering 
injustice should be granted right to ‘internal self-government’ which does not exclude 
the right to determine the use of resources in their land.
456
 Theoretically, this would 
entail giving autonomy to every minority group, which is a practical impossibility in 
Nigeria’s highly heterogeneous society. There is no doubt, ethnic minorities of the 
Niger Delta may have suffered political neglect and injustice, but granting them the 
right to oil resources ownership and control would set a precedent for every other ethnic 
community in the country to exercise similar right with regard to what is in its land. In 
which case, states of the federation would cease to be relevant units of political 
authority and chaos would set in.  
On the basis of the above arguments, granting ownership and control of oil 
resources to the various ethnic groups in the country would not only generate, but 
promote chaos in inter/intra ethnic relations and institutional instability. Hence, it is just 
not desirable as it contradicts the country’s national goals, especially unity and stability. 
 What about the federal government, including the states? Do the above 
arguments make the federal government the rightful owner of natural resources? The 
position of the thesis is that oil resources are national wealth. Conventionally, it is the 
Constitution of a country that assigns right to natural resources, and this assignment has 
two presuppositions. First, the Constitution assumes that natural resources are not the 
product of any citizen’s labour, or have not been developed by anyone, or both. For 
example, when section 40 of the 1979 Constitution formally revised and replaced the 
Petroleum Act of 1969 and assigned complete ownership- nationalisation of mineral 
resources to the federal government, the presupposition may have been that they were 
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not the creation of any Nigerian citizen’s labour.457 A community assembling to decide 
who should control resources presupposes that it has ownership of what it is 
assigning.
458
 Thus, it is the Constitution that reflects the way the Nigerian society is 
structured and governed, therefore, the society should not be the basis for moral right. 
 The second assumption is that the Nigerian Constitution assumes federal 
government jurisdictional right of its national territory and its pre-eminence within. 
Indeed, international law recognises the jurisdictional right of states to their territory 
and to resources within. However, the basis for this right is contentious. In the social 
contract doctrines of Locke and Rousseau, the act by which individuals unite in a 
political society also submits their possessions to the community brought into being by 
the union. The submission is not alienation rather it is the basis for legitimate exercise 
of ownership right.
459
 As the guarantor of right, the Nigerian state regulates everyone 
and no one is exempt from its jurisdiction. It is in this sense that it has jurisdiction of the 
territory it presides over. Also, as a guarantor of right, the state ought not to invade what 
it guarantees. Doing so would amount to tyranny. As a body that has legitimate 
monopoly of force, it guarantees right not only by ensuring compliance to its laws but 
by warding-off external invasion. So, the state has jurisdiction of its territory relative to 
other states. 
However, the act of constituting a society gives birth to a territorial unit known 
as country, large enough for all its members to live in and enjoy in common. 
Jurisdictional right belongs to the sovereign who also establishes rules by which the 
territory can be enjoyed in common, or by which land acquisition can be made by 
members.
460
 The right of members to their acquisitions is subordinate to the right of the 
sovereign of the entire country.
461
 For this reason, property right of members could be 
subordinated when it is expedient to do so. For example, if some private buildings will 
stand in the middle of a proposed motorway, it may be expedient to subordinate private 
right to the interest of the community. In which case those who suffer loss of right 
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receives compensation to the value of what they lose. This is what is called the Right of 
Eminent Domain in countries like Canada and the United Kingdom.
462
 
 In fact, the right of the sovereign to its national territory partly explains why 
Multinational Companies carrying out economic transactions first seek its permission. 
Thus, a MOC coming to explore oil first negotiates with the agent of the people, the 
federal government, for permission and also pays taxes to it. However, communities 
immediately connected to resource endowed land should not be ignored. They suffer in 
a double sense, when their right is subordinated to that of the sovereign. Firstly, they 
forego the economic and cultural uses of their land. Secondly, they suffer effects of 
environmental degradation during the exploration, production and distribution of oil 
resources. The forego of the economic and cultural uses of their land entitles them to 
monetary compensation from the government, while the effects of environmental 
degradation during the exploration, production and distribution of oil resources requires 
the government to pay special attention with a view to restoring the environment and 
providing alternatives to what may have been destroyed. 
 For example, it is obligatory that communities sitting on oil be provided with 
alternative source of domestic water and protein if the rivers and lakes of their fragile 
ecosystem are destroyed. However, this obligation should not be expanded to include 
improvement projects that do not derive from the subordination of right or destruction 
of the environment. Provision of infrastructures like motorways, telephones or 
universities is a social responsibility of the state regardless of what is produced from a 
particular community. It is a duty the state owes its citizens, not one that springs from 
the fact of resource generation. It becomes an issue if the government fails both in its 
social responsibility and its particular obligation that arises from subordinating right and 
from environmental destruction. Most of the protests in the Niger Delta arise from the 
failure of the governments- state and federal- to provide the area with social 
infrastructures, which is not directly related to oil production. 
Is the ownership right that of the federal or state government? Conventionally, in 
a political federation, the sub-units have the same right to revenue generated from 
resources within their territories. A federal constitution often vests constituent states 
with powers to control natural resources within their units. This conventional 
understanding is sometimes not respected when such resources, usually located in a few 
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states, are of great significance to the national economy, as the Canadian experience 
regarding oil during the 1970s. By implication therefore, the question of who ought to 
control natural resources is not peculiar to Nigeria. For example, the Canadian 
Constitution assigned to the provinces the right to control the development and direct 
taxation of natural resources. When the price of oil quadrupled in 1973, and doubled in 
1979, the provinces raked in high incomes to the detriment of the industrial progress of 
the consuming provinces that had to pay for the high local price of gas. The Canadian 
federal government moved in to promote Canadian ownership of oil which resulted in a 
dispute not different from the Nigeria’s experience. The principal issue in the Canadian 
dispute was who owned the oil. While the oil producing provinces argued that they were 
entitled to the full benefits from their resources, the consuming provinces and the 
federal government on the other hand argued that the oil belonged to the Canadian 
people. Canadians had not been able to arrive at normative principles to regulate the 
competing claims when the price of oil crashed in 1983, and the conflict lost its 
relevance.
463
 
 The Canadian’s deviation from conventional understanding of economic 
entitlements, also evidenced by the Nigerian experience, are not simply matters of 
power flexing by the centre. As this chapter has argued, the sovereign body has 
normative right to resources within its territory. However, in a federal system, 
jurisdictional rights to the territory are shared between the central and state 
governments, for example, in the concurrent legislative list.
464
 The right to share power 
derives from one of the major conditions that give rise to federalism. In the case of 
Nigeria, as with other countries, ethnic diversity was the major condition that made for 
the adoption of federalism.
465
 This condition does not require monopoly control of 
natural resources by one level of government; instead, the sharing of jurisdictional 
rights also entails the sharing of rights to resources. Neither of the two levels ought to 
exercise absolute right that would eliminate that of the other. In fact, Nigeria is de facto 
unitary precisely because the federal government’s exercise of absolute powers has 
abolished the rights of the states.  
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In 1994, the military regime of the late General Sani Abacha constituted the 
Constitutional Conference. The sub-committee on Revenue Allocation received a joint 
petition from the Niger Delta groups. When considering the petition, the sub-committee 
acknowledged the concerns of the Niger Delta groups and recognised that, due to 
availability of natural resource in their domain, they have lost the economic and cultural 
uses of their land, as well as suffering from the effects of environmental degradation 
during the exploration, production and distribution of oil. In an attempt to provide 
monetary compensation and at the same time providing special attention to the oil 
producing Niger Delta, the Conference recommended 13% of revenue derived from 
natural resources. The question is, did the 1994/95 Constitutional Conference make a 
fair decision when it agreed on 13% as the minimum figure for derivation share of 
revenue accruing to the Federation Account from natural resources? In some respects, 
the agreement on broad revenue allocation framework that combined derivation 
principle with those of population, equality of states etc. was recognition that states 
have some right to economic resources. It was fair as the Conference recognised that the 
states have some right to revenues generated from natural resources in their domains, it 
is, however, not defensible how the Constitutional Conference arrived at 13% derivation 
base limit. 
 The sub-committee on Revenue Allocation that worked out the allocation 
criteria that was agreed upon by the Conference did not explain if the 13% figure was 
generated on the basis of some principles or if it was arbitrary. Critically analysed, the 
baseline of 13% is actually lower than it appears. For example, the 1999 Draft 
Constitution states that: 
The figure of the allocation for derivation shall be deemed to include any amount that may 
be set aside for funding any special authority or agency- Niger Delta Development 
Commission (NDDC) for the development of the state or states of derivation.
466
  
 
This provision as contained in the 1999 Draft Constitution which was amended in 2011 
draws a whole range of entitlements of the Niger Delta region into the 13% baseline 
figure. For example, monetary compensation to oil producing communities for 
subordinating their immediate right to that of the sovereign- Nigerian government is 
included. General social responsibilities to people of the Niger Delta are also built into 
it. This is further explained as follows. 
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 It may be recalled that, both the Minorities Commission of 1957/58 and the 
1975 government Panel on creation of states reported the Niger Delta as having suffered 
government neglect mainly because of the high cost of providing infrastructures in the 
swampy terrain. Both made far reaching recommendations for special development by 
the federal government in order to raise the area to the same level of infrastructural 
development as other parts of the country. The recommendations, and indeed 
government’s responsibility to pay special development attention to the Niger Delta was 
not derived from, and in fact does not in any way relate to oil production. It is a social 
responsibility owed to citizens of the Niger Delta. But the 1995 Conference factored its 
social responsibilities into the 13% baseline figure. 
A critical evaluation of the report of the 1995 Conference to compensate the 
Niger Delta reveals that all the range of entitlements that ought to go to the communities 
and the derivation share for the states falls drastically from the 13% baseline, while at 
the same time, there was an increase in the share for population and equality of states. 
By implication therefore, the Conference affirmed the right of the federal government to 
oil within the national territory and at the same time recommended a weak concession to 
the conventional practise of federalism by which constituent states share in wealth 
derived from their units. The 13% baseline recommended by the 1994/5 Conference, 
and which was eventually adopted by the federal government was not fair enough, 
although it marked an improvement on the previous state building arrangements- the 
1969 Petroleum Act, and the 1979 Constitution in which the federal government had 
absolute ownership and control of oil resources. Finally, given the unabated tension in 
the Niger Delta, despite revisions in the state building arrangements in the oil industry, 
it becomes easy to refer to state building and constitutional politics as important factor 
in the generation and recurrence of ethno-political conflicts and instability in the 
country. 
 
8.5 Summary 
This chapter examined Nigeria’s state building arrangements with regard to the oil 
industry. In particular the chapter examined the three, but interrelated aspects of the oil 
conflict dynamics. The first relates to and the discussion of the emergence of a series of 
state building arrangements leading to state ownership of oil resources.  The second 
aspect covered the essence of the oil resource conflict and attempts to bring into focus 
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the grievances and claims of the oil bearing communities. In conclusion, the chapter 
evaluated the claims and counter claims about oil resource ownership and control 
between the Federal Government of Nigeria on the one hand, and the ethnic groups in 
the Niger Delta on the other hand. The aim was to provide a normative judgement on 
whether the oil bearing communities have ownership and control right, and whether the 
state building arrangements with regards to oil ownership and control by the federal 
government was fair. 
The analysis shows that the stakes in ownership and control of the oil is high on 
both parties to the conflict. The chapter particularly dwells on how the legitimacy of the 
Nigerian government was bitterly contested by the Niger Delta communities, who feel 
that they have been side-lined or cheated as a result of politics of state building in the oil 
sector of the Nigerian economy. The Niger Delta communities used abandonment of the 
derivation principle of revenue allocation and lack of physical infrastructure as the basis 
of their claims/demands for local autonomy and self-determination.  
From this evaluation, this study can infer that first; the government did not act 
according to justice by abandoning the derivation principle of revenue allocation. 
Second, the government also made a mistake by factoring arbitrarily at 13% the baseline 
figure for compensation to the oil producing states. Third, the politics around oil and the 
lack of basic infrastructures in the oil producing states are indication of government 
failure in discharging its developmental responsibilities, and this has thus generated 
intense ethno-political conflict and instability that is threatening the legitimacy of the 
government of the country. Finally, in an ideal federal political system, agitation for 
who is to own and control resources is not ideally the essence of ethnic groups, but that 
of the federal and state governments. Thus, allowing the ethnic groups in the Niger 
Delta to partake in the ownership and control of the oil resources instead of the political 
units- states would set precedents for others to follow, and this in so many ways would 
amount to chaos and institutional instability in Nigeria’s multi-ethnic society. 
When the above lessons are contextualised within the political environment in 
which they occurred, for instance, under successive corrupt Military regimes, it 
becomes reasonable to observe that, as at 1966 when the Military ascended to power, 
many observers saw the Nigerian armed forces primarily as a fighting force, largely 
uninterested in the paraphernalia of political office and accoutrements of power. 
However, this changed with the arrival of oil wealth. This thus means that the origins of 
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Nigeria’s post-independence ethno-political tensions can be traced back to the central 
role played by the military in the control and management of this new found wealth, and 
the tendency toward personal accumulation of oil wealth to the extent that all 
subsequent Military regimes and civilian administration have been pervaded by 
corruption. For instance, many of the Military officers who ruled the country are highly 
linked to leading businesses, especially through its implementation of the Nigerian 
Enterprises Decrees of 1972 and 1977. This means that the personal accumulation of oil 
wealth the retired Army officers corruptly acquired has given them some financial 
leverage, and hence the leading politicians, because they are able to easily fund political 
parties. 
As discussed in the body of this chapter, the state ownership and control of oil 
approach play roles in the ethno-political and stability problems in the country. 
However, given the environment and circumstances in which the resources of the 
country were managed by the Military, it becomes necessary to mention the relevance 
of the paramount roles of the political Military and corruption in the generation and 
recurrence of ethno-political tensions and instability. In order to mitigate this trend, it 
becomes necessary to think of the way forward. And what readily comes handy is a 
suggestion that, political incursion of the Military and combating corruption could be 
achieved through Constitutional and institutional safeguards able to monitor and hold to 
account those in charge of the state and the treasury.
467
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 219 
 
       CHAPTER NINE 
        CONCLUSION 
 
9.1 Summary 
The discussions of state building and constitutional politics in Nigeria’s multi-ethnic 
society reveal that successive governments, in different historical moments, initiated 
and established several state building institutions with the aim to assist in the realisation 
of the country’s triple national goals: recognise and accommodate diversity, achieve 
national unity and political stability. The key state building strategies discussed in this 
thesis were:  
(1) The political system and recognition of minorities approaches in the pre- 
independence era - wherein the differences among the three major groups were 
given political expression; while those between the majority and minority 
groups were suppressed. 
(2) The Quota System and separation of minorities approaches- a federal system in 
which the sub-units were restructured and an affirmative action programme was 
instituted to favour wider political expression of differences among both the 
majority and minority groups.  
(3) The federal character (principle) approach - more state status for groups within a 
federal system, wherein central government institutions and material resources 
were distributed evenly across the states, and while the state governments in turn 
also distributed their offices and resources across the local governments.  
(4) The revised federal character principle approach- more state status for more 
groups in a federal system in which the executive cabinet was rotated from 
ethnic region to another.  
(5) Revenue Allocation (System) approach - wherein, the central government 
affirmed right to distribute resources evenly among states, but with some 
attention to source of derivation.  
(6) State ownership and control of oil approach – with the aim to achieve national 
unity and even development in the country.   
Some of these state building strategies were morally defensible in the very 
circumstances in which they were negotiated, but were either not deep enough to make 
for adequate political inclusion or were not combined with different counter strategies to 
minimise problems of group proliferation and institutional instability. This is true of 
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virtually all the state building strategies discussed in this thesis. There were some that 
were morally defensible even though they generated tension among groups or were 
driven by strategic considerations for power. This was the case with virtually all the 
state building strategies that involved the affirmative action programme - Quota System 
and the political separation of minorities in the 1960s. Others were pragmatic at the very 
time they were negotiated and in the circumstances of the period, but not morally 
defensible. This is true of the state building strategy, for instance, the type of political 
system negotiated in the 1950s. 
 The concrete case by case analysis of these state building strategies showed that 
recognition and accommodation of diversity in Nigeria have offered greater promise for 
stability than  their suppression in favour of the three major ethnic groups- 
Hausa/Fulani, Yoruba and Igbo. Indeed, it would not be an over-statement to say that 
the little unity that exists in the country today is the result of the affirmation of identity 
strategies that have been adopted in its history. However, the case by case analysis also 
showed that Nigeria’s state building strategies that recognise expression of difference 
has generated some recurrence of ethno-political and institutional problems that were 
anticipated at the outset of their being initiated and that no concrete counter measures 
have been taken in order to guarantee the political stability of the country. The 
difficulties include, among others, institutional instability arising from endless demand 
for state creation by groups, leading to endless proliferation of Nigeria into states, local 
governments and geo-political zones. Ethnicity became the basis for citizenship rights, 
and the ethno-political conflict arising from the ownership and control of natural 
resources. In the proceeding paragraphs, the thesis explores the difficulties and tensions 
that have arisen in the process of state building in the country to evaluate the 
prescriptions proposed by the normative theorists. 
 The main theme in the three normative philosophy theories adopted for this 
thesis is that, in a multicultural society, equality and justice, unity and stability prevail if 
government institutions reflect diverse cultures. This main theme was argued in a 
variety of ways. For example, Walzer locates equality and justice for groups in the 
distributional meaning of social goods and argues that, in a democratic order, difference 
should be tolerated.
468
 Charles Taylor argues that our identity is shaped by the 
recognition we receive from others, and that the demand for equal recognition requires a 
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model of liberal society in which culturally diverse groups are treated as equal 
partners.
469
 On his part, Kymlicka argues that in liberal democracies minority groups 
require special rights to enable their members exercise autonomy and freedom taken for 
granted by majority group members of the country.
470
 In all of the above mentioned 
arguments, at the heart of the analysis is the group. That is to say, all the theorists 
recognised and presented the relevance of the interest of diverse groups in state building 
and constitutional processes of the country. 
 However, the Nigerian experience shows that the design of state building around 
ethnic groups triggers proliferation of groups and political apparatuses that renders the 
Nigerian state unstable. The problems arising from proliferation of groups and state 
apparatuses was recognised way back in 1958 when the Minorities Commission used it 
to justify its refusal to meet demands by some minority groups for recognition in 
separate political units. But subsequently, recognition had to be granted by the 
successive military governments by creating states and local governments to avert 
imminent disintegration of the country. Between the 1960s and 2012, redrawing of 
internal political boundaries around groups has activated the emergence of new groups 
with new political demands. For instance, the number of states increased from 12 in 
1967 to 36 in 2012. The introduction of the federal character strategies further 
stimulated the proliferation of groups with new demands etc.  
On the basis of the above, a slippery slope was inevitable because the use of the 
ethnic principle led to the duplication of state institutions, created access to power and 
wealth for few privileged elites, and gave symbolic value to ethnic groups in need of 
esteem and honour. These have fuelled endless demands for recognition, stimulated 
countless multiplication of local governments from 301 in 1984 to 774 in 2012, and 
rendered national institutions unstable and costly as they are duplicated all over the 
country. 
 Theorists like Kymlicka and Taylor anticipated this sort of ethno-political and 
institutional problems in their arguments and did provide ways of dealing with them by 
placing a limit on the groups that would qualify for recognition. Both Kymlicka and 
Taylor proposed a requirement that state building strategies and constitutional designs 
should give recognition to groups who are tied to a homeland and can support a culture. 
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In the North America and many other western countries, this requirement limits 
recognition to a small number of non-immigrant groups. But when this requirement is 
applied to Nigeria, there is bound to be a problem. This is because both the three 
majority and numerous minority ethnic groups are all non-immigrants. The minority 
ethnic groups are countless in number, while the majority ethnic groups are made up of 
subgroups.  
The above analogy and others that would follow are not suggestion that the 
theoretical arguments of Kymlicka and others have no theoretical relevance to Nigeria. 
The country’s responses through series of state building strategies and constitutional 
designs are indications that arrangements in which recognition and accommodation are 
not given to ethnic groups are not a better alternative. The country has on many 
occasions publicly debated and revised its state building strategies for recognising and 
accommodating pluralism, national unity and political stability over and over again. For 
instance, the series of reviews in the revenue allocation systems, review of the federal 
character principle to include rotation in Presidency and Gubernatorial positions, 
creations of states and oil ownership and control policies to include or exclude on-shore 
or off-shore, etc. But on each occasion the key elements of federal character survived 
because they were found to be the best way for ensuring equity and justice. The only 
unanswered lingering problem is when and how proliferation of sub-units would end 
since it is a criterion for political representation and revenue allocation.
471
 
 A second important issue the application of the normative prescription to the 
Nigerian experience raises is the question of citizenship rights. One common thread that 
runs through the arguments of the theorists is that a liberal commitment to equality and 
justice requires constitutional order in which citizenship is differentiated. For example, 
the democratic equality theorists such as Iris Marion Young argues that the common 
standard which pervades the original position from which the Rawlsian model of justice 
is derived is actually the standard of the strong who share a common way of life. In the 
original position, Young argues, the weak minority groups share different ways of life 
and cannot make their voices heard. As a remedy, she proposed a democratic public that 
provides mechanisms for the effective representation and recognition of distinct 
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voices.
472
 Joseph H. Carens takes similar position when he argues for a genuinely 
shared citizenship in Canada. According to him, the best way of doing justice to 
Aboriginals of Canada who do not have a sense of common political bond with non-
Aboriginal Canadians is to ‘recognise the inevitable injustice of a deliberative process 
that effectively excludes or overrides Aboriginal cultural perspectives on what justice 
requires’.473 Carens therefore proposes dialogue as a means of arriving at arrangements 
that combine mutual compromises and mutual understanding about justice. Also, Taylor 
argues for a model of liberal society in which the collective rights and goals of 
disadvantaged and threatened cultural communities are recognised.
474
 
 In line with the above arguments, recognising the interest of the weak (diverse 
minority groups) in state building process and constitutional instruments has been a 
major issue that defined Nigerian politics since the 1950s. For example, the bitter 
Nigeria-Biafra civil war that was fought over between 1967 and 1970 finally led to the 
statutory adoption of ethnicity as a principle for ensuring equitable access to power and 
resources. Since the 1970s, ethnicity has been used as a state building principle to create 
states, make cabinet appointments, constitute political parties and make selections into 
the Army, the Universities, the civil service and government parastatals. It has also been 
used as the basis for political representation to ensure that the positions are rotated 
among groups at the three tiers of government. 
The boomerang effects of citizenship rights have over the years clearly emerged. 
For instance, although the constitution of Nigeria defined citizenship in legal terms, 
family descent has become the primary basis for the determinant of membership of the 
states and of the local government units.
475
 This has led to sensitivity in the ethnic/state 
origin of people contesting for political positions and of those appointed or selected into 
national institutions. In fact, although the country had started implementing federal 
character principles since the late 1970s, Federal Character Commission (FCC) was 
specifically established in 1996 to monitor geo-ethnic origin of public employees.
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Thus, apart from the other key state building strategies discussed within chapters’ three 
to eight of this thesis, the formal establishment of the FCC has further made ethnicity to 
become the basis for citizenship identification. For example, individuals relating with 
national institutions have to first submit letters of identification from the chairperson of 
their local government areas attesting to their ethnic origin. Indeed, the Political Bureau 
of 1986 observed that the constitutional definition of membership of the sub-units of the 
federation in terms of indigeneity was an impediment to the development of Nigerian 
citizenship and encouraging attachments to home communities.
477
 
The multiple roles of Nigeria’s state building strategies in recognising ethnicity 
as indicated above notwithstanding,  the country’s  experience shows enormous costs 
and contradictions in terms of elevating ascriptive criterion such as ethnicity as the 
major determinant of citizenship. For instance, the perpetration by states and local 
governments of discriminatory practices that exclude so-called non-indigenes-Nigerians 
resident in a constituent state that does not incorporate their presumed historic ancestral 
or indigenous communities from opportunities (educational admissions, bureaucratic 
placement, political offices, land and other economic resources, federal projects) 
available in such states has engendered a monumental crisis of internal citizenship in 
Nigeria, including convulsive violence between indigenes and long-settled non-
indigenes in states such as Plateau, Taraba and Benue.
478
  
Similarly, the above problem shows that normative arguments for the 
recognition and accommodation of ethnic difference in state building and constitutional 
processes run the danger of elevating ascriptive group membership as the major 
determinant of citizenship. Critics of multiculturalism such as Nathan Glazer, Alvin 
Schmidt, and Arthur Schlesinger Jr. etc., have made similar criticism. For example, 
Alvin Schmidt equates multi-culturalists to soldiers seeking to conquer and destroy 
America. He regards bilingual education and a curriculum that reflects multiculturalism 
as evils that bring ethnic separateness, disunity and conflict.
479
 Schmidt and his fellow 
critics emphasise what Steven Rockefeller has referred to as the danger of elevating 
ethnic identity over universal human potential.
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In fairness, theorists such as Kymlicka and Taylor are particularly interested in 
opening up a space in liberalism for the rights of minority groups. They separately argue 
that departure from liberal individualist rights is justified only to the extent that is 
needed to rectify inequality. In a chapter on apartheid, Kymlicka shows that ‘the notion 
of cultural membership and the principle of equalising cultural circumstances would not 
justify petty apartheid.
481
 But as the Nigerian experience shows, and as the country’s 
Political Bureau of 1986 reported, a deep sense of ascriptive inclusion and exclusion are 
inevitable outcomes of the principle of equalising cultures. These are the very fears that 
the critics of multiculturalism in North America harbour. But the Nigerian experience 
especially; the fears and reluctance of the country’s successive governments to abandon 
the use of indigeneity in the definition of membership of political sub-units, would 
suggest that there is no better alternative to the ethnic principle. What all this means is 
that it is to criticise the prescription of theorists that they elevate group rights over 
individual rights. 
A third issue in the Nigerian experience is the tension and confusion associated 
with the right of ownership and control of resources on groups. Scholars such as 
Kymlicka and Taylor for instance are more or less arguing that cultural minorities such 
as the Niger Delta communities suffering injustice should be granted right to internal 
self-government which will include the right to determine the use of resources in their 
land.
482
 In this case the unit of government is expected to be co-extensive with the 
cultural group, so resources are to belong to the unit. In the Nigerian case where internal 
boundaries have been drawn over and over to take account of ethnic cleavages, rights to 
natural resources have been vested under the sovereign body with the central 
government acting as its agents. This has to do with the disaster that resulted from 
winner-takes-all system of politics that is being practised in the country. The system 
made for political determination by elites from a few ethnic regions of the country and 
also made for unequal distribution of public goods. 
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The determination to do away with unequal allocation of goods after the civil 
war made the federal government to declare state’s ownership of natural resources with 
the aim of sharing their monetary benefits proportionally among various ethnic sections 
of the country. Proportional distribution of wealth derived from natural resources was 
held as the key to public perception of state objectivity and neutrality and to long term 
political stability. The federal character strategies designed in the 1970s/80s were all 
about proportional distribution of public positions and national wealth. Theoretical 
arguments for rights of groups to use resources in their land may sound reasonable, but 
the Nigerian case shows that such rights work against equity and generate grievances 
among ethno-regional groups that are not so endowed in natural resources. In addition, 
recent claims to oil wealth by groups such as the Ogoni, the Ijaw and others in the oil 
producing Niger Delta do show that investing ethno-cultural groups with right to 
resources would set a precedent for every other ethnic community in any part of the 
country to exercise similar rights with regard to what is in its land.  
 The fourth issue is the social and economic base of the Nigerian elite. Members 
of the dominant social class in Nigeria, as in most parts of Africa, are not rooted in 
industry. They are not capitalist in the technical sense of the word. Instead, they have 
their roots in politics. If elsewhere in the western world, economic productive activity is 
the principal means of accumulating wealth, in the case of Nigeria, it is the state. 
Politics is a career, a full time economic activity, and the chief medium for material 
self-improvement, and rather like the absolutist state which was the principal means of 
surplus extraction, and war a full time occupation of the nobility.
483
 Thus, those who 
control power have no intention of losing it, while those out of power are obliged to 
seek alternative centres of power. For instance, the combination of federal revenue 
allocation system from the 1970s which disconnected allocation formula from revenue 
generation to such criterion as population, equality of states, and establishment of 
Distributable Pool Account etc. gave impetus to the demands for alternative centres of 
power.
484
 
 On the contrary, the social and economic base of elites in Western societies is 
that in which the social base of the dominant class is rooted in economic productive 
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activity, and the custodians of power are constrained from using power for private 
purposes. In liberal democratic societies of the West, officials of the state use power to 
secure freedom, equality and autonomy of individuals, values necessary for capital 
accumulation etc. These liberal democratic values are desirable, and apparently they are 
either weak or non-existent in the developing world. In fact, it is precisely because of 
the weakness of these values in the Nigerian society that the state is used as a private 
power by its custodians.
485
 To be more specific, the lack or weak mechanisms for 
preventing the custodians of power from using it for private purposes and more or less 
politically automatic access of governments to centrally collected and redistributed oil 
revenues has promoted grand corruption and patronage politics, including the theft of 
‘more than $380 billion in public funds … by those in government between 1960 and 
1999’.486  
In addition, the oil-based funding of constituent states and local governments 
has been a particularly powerful inducement to corruption at the sub-national level. This 
is because these governments are neither responsible to the centre nor accountable to 
their constituents for the use of the funds. Instead, despite their overwhelming 
dependence on central government- oil-based financial transfers, the state governments 
regard them as an unconditional, constitutional entitlement that is not subject to central 
government discretion or oversight under Nigeria’s federal practice.  
Between 1999 and 2007, 31 State Governors were indicted or brought under 
investigation by Nigeria’s anti-corruption agencies for various breaches of the public 
trust, including embezzlement, money laundering, false declaration of assets, 
maintaining foreign bank accounts in contravention of the statutory code of conduct for 
Nigerian public officers, and the fraudulent acquisition of properties abroad. Corruption 
has been equally rampant at the local government level.
487
 Thus, a 2007 report on local 
government corruption in oil-rich Rivers State highlights several cases of embezzlement 
that included, for instance, the illegal allocation to the chairman of Khana local 
government in 2005 of salary and allowances worth $376,000, which were ‘nearly half 
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the total amount allocated for the wages and allowances of Khana’s 325 health-sector 
workers’; the allocation in 2006 to the chairman of Tai local government of a security 
vote of $300,000, which exceeded the council’s total capital budgets for either health or 
education; and the illegal awarding during 2005-2006 by the chairman of Opobo Nkoro 
local government of $91,000 worth of construction contracts to himself.
488
 
The large-scale economic corruption in the Nigeria is also closely intertwined 
with massive electoral corruption, which has been the most basic source of political 
democratic instability in the country. Monumental electoral frauds were the primary 
element in the collapse of the First and Second Nigerian Republics, and the proximate 
factor in the abortion of the Third Republic. Although the Fourth Republic has endured 
longer than any of its predecessors, Presidential elections held under the Republic in 
1999, 2003, 2009 and 2011 have been ‘successively less fair, less efficient, and less 
credible’.489 Electoral corruption, which is enormously facilitated by the overwhelming 
Presidential and Gubernatorial control over the appointments and funding of the 
Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) and the 36 state Independent 
Electoral Commissions (SIEC), has distorted and degraded Nigeria’s political system in 
the different interrelated ways. 
Electoral corruption has undermined the incentives for inter-ethnic coalition and 
accommodation embedded in the ‘federal character’ electoral rules that require 
Presidential and Gubernatorial candidates to obtain broad geographical support. Instead 
of generating and mobilising genuine support across the nation’s ethnic, regional and 
religious fault-lines, candidates have been able to use force and fraud to manufacture 
seemingly broad-based, but actually farcical, electoral mandates. For instance, although 
his policies on the Niger Delta during the 1999-2003 periods were extremely unpopular 
in the region, President Obasanjo was still able to win with landslide victories in the 
Niger Delta States in the 2003 elections. In essence, as long as parties and candidates 
can simply concoct election results, they will have very little incentive to cultivate or 
exhibit the ethnically conciliatory or moderate behaviour necessary to achieve the broad 
geographical support mandated by formal electoral rules.
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 Furthermore, electoral corruption in Nigeria has impeded the development of the 
robust, nationally integrated party systems considered to be crucial for the stability and 
development of federations in general, and multi-ethnic federal systems, in particular. 
Without the competitive discipline of a credible electoral system that rewards partisan 
coalitions with power on the basis of the voters’ verdict, Nigeria’s parties will continue 
to be weak, faction-ridden, personality-driven institutions lacking internal democracy, 
viable organisations, coherent policy platforms, vibrant social bases, effective 
representation for women and other marginalised social groups, and genuine cross-
regional, inter-religious, and/or trans-ethnic appeals. Even the PDP, which proclaims 
itself to be Africa’s largest party, and is in fact impressively multi-regional, remains a 
fractious and ideologically in-articulate conglomerate of politicians, whose great 
common enterprise is the doling out of patronage along ethno-geographical lines. 
 In addition, electoral corruption has promoted political over-centralisation, and 
retarded decentralisation in Nigeria. A promise of Nigeria’s three-tier system of 
government is that the existence of multiple state and local governments, with 
significant policy autonomy and access to resources, can disperse the stakes of political 
competition, making struggles for control over the centre less intense and helping 
political pluralism and policy innovations to gain footholds in different states and 
localities governed by various parties. But the malign hand of electoral manipulation 
has suppressed this federalist genius, producing an artificial condition of single-party 
domination of central, state and local governments.
491
 Thus, in the First, Second and 
current Fourth Republics, the ruling parties at the national level used their control of key 
electoral and security institutions to dislodge opposition parties at the regional or state 
level, thereby imposing an oppressive, ethnically provocative, single-party hegemony 
on the entire country. Regional and state governments have similarly used their control 
of the institutions for local electoral administration to undermine opposition control, and 
thus political devolution and diversity, at the local level. 
 At the same time, as it has fostered an artificial near-monolithic party system in 
the country, electoral manipulation has obstructed the development of the robust 
intergovernmental co-partisanship associated with genuinely integrated party systems. 
Such co-partisanship promotes the sustainability of federal programmes and policies 
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through the support of those agendas by state governments that share the same party 
label and electoral interests with the federal government. However, because it is largely 
the by-product of electoral manipulation and corruption, inter-governmental co-
partisanship in Nigeria often fails to yield genuine political or policy consensus between 
levels of government. During Obasanjo’s civilian Presidency, for instance, the PDP 
federal government orchestrated the impeachment or political subversion of several 
PDP state governments in Anambra, Bayelsa, Oyo, and Plateau states, while many PDP 
state governments similarly challenged the federal government’s positions on major 
policy issues like Sharia implementation, anti-corruption reform, and the savings of 
windfall oil revenues.
492
 
Electoral manipulation has directly contributed to ethno-regional conflict and 
communal violence in Nigeria’s multi-ethnic society. The control of federal, state, and 
local governments by corruptly imposed and politically unaccountable governments has 
obstructed the alleviation of the inter-regional inequalities and mass poverty that fuel 
violent ethno-regional militancy and religious extremism. In the Niger Delta, for 
instance, the mismanagement of derivation revenues by fraudulently elected, and thus 
politically unaccountable, state and local governments has fuelled militant uprisings 
against the region’s ecological neglect, economic underdevelopment, social inequalities, 
and abysmal governance. Similarly, in Jos the rigging of local government elections by 
the state government in 2008 directly provoked convulsive ethno-religious violence. 
Finally, the prevalence and perpetuation of the above mentioned corrupt 
practices were carried out before the watchful eyes of the Economic and Financial 
Crime Commission (EFCC). The EFCC is Nigeria’s crimes watch agency was 
established in 2002, and inaugurated on the 11
th
 April, 2003. Since its establishment, 
despite the publicity about arrests of highly placed Nigerians allegedly involved in 
money laundering and other financial crimes such as the ones mentioned above, the 
EFCC, like a toothless bull dog barks, but does not bite.
493
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Overall, it is important to mention at this point that, highlight of the above 
fundamental and underlying issues inherent in the Nigerian body politics are not to 
suggest that the theoretical and empirical arguments have no relevance to Nigeria. 
Rather, when the issues are critically appraised against the backdrop of the roles of the 
political military and the attendant corruption following the discovery of oil resources, 
the issues would serve to further reveal that it is the inherent internal contradictions in 
the Nigerian society complicated by Military incursion in politics that prevents full 
realisation of the main theme of the group recognition theories. For instance, of the 
sixty two years since the country attained political independence from Britain, about 
thirty five years was under the Military hegemony.
494
 This thus means that a 
fundamental and underlying issue in state building and constitutional politics in Nigeria 
is the ascendancy of the Military to power following the Northern sponsored coup d’état 
of 1966 and corrupt practices that has posed serious challenges to the peace and stability 
of the country. For instance, the Military incursion in politics brought out the worst in 
Nigerian politics: repression, intimidation, violence, corruption, betrayals, and the 
manipulation of primordial loyalties. It is this kind of socio-political and economic 
environment perpetuated by the Nigerian Armed forces that inhibits the practice of 
democratic values advanced in the prescriptions of the normative and empirical 
scholars.    
In conclusion, the commitment of successive Nigerian governments to design 
series of state building strategies that accommodate ethnicity and the determination to 
revisit the arrangements to redress the existing inequalities, validate the main theme of 
theories of group recognition. The theme being that, in a multicultural society such as 
Nigeria, equality and justice are likely to prevail if state building mechanisms recognise 
and accommodate ethnic diversity. Despite the tensions, Nigerian case has demonstrated 
that the central government should not abandon the state building strategies that 
accommodate ethnic pluralism in politics. Nigeria stands to benefit from revising 
periodically the impacts of such strategies until the side effects are minimised or 
completely eliminated from the body politics of the country.  
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9.2 Findings 
The following are the findings of the thesis based on the discussions and analysis on: 
what governmental strategies have been attempted to establish state building institutions 
that accommodate ethnic diversity? And what roles do the state building strategies play 
in the generation and recurrence of ethno-political conflicts in the country?  
1. Nigeria’s attempts at coping with ethnic diversity validate the normative 
philosophy prescriptions proposed by Michael Walzer, Charles Taylor and Will 
Kymlicka on the one hand, and the empirical prescriptions proposed by 
Crawford Young, Eric Nordlinger, Donald Horowitz, and Donald Rothchild on 
the other. In fairness to these scholars, the generation and recurrence of ethno-
political conflicts and institutional instabilities in the country are rather due to 
fundamental and underlying tensions in Nigeria’s body politics such as military 
dominance of the political scene, perpetuation of large scale electoral and 
financial corruption, and manipulation of ethnic loyalties among others.  
2. Of all the opposing proposals/positions by the elites of the three majority groups 
on how best to accommodate multiple groups in the country, federalism 
triumphed over all the other types of political systems, and indeed validates the 
normative and empirical prescriptions that are the frameworks for discussing 
Nigeria’s attempts at coping with ethnic diversity. However, the federal 
arrangement that was negotiated in the pre-independence was imperfect because 
it rested on the mutual advantages of the regional leaders and the majority ethnic 
groups. Hence, it generated large scale ethno-political conflict between the 
majority and minority groups in the country. 
3. The Quota System greatly disadvantaged people in the Western and Eastern 
regions, more especially the latter, as it reduced the positions they would have 
filled under the merit system. A critical evaluation of the quota policy showed 
that the historically rooted educational backwardness of the Muslim North 
required the use of a distributive principle other than merit for a just allocation 
of positions. To insist on merit is to insist on punishing people in the 
predominantly Muslim North. 
The justification for the Quota System is even further strengthened by 
the Constitutional subscription of the Nigerian-state to justice and equality. The 
adoption of justice and equality as the fundamental objectives of state 
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presupposed a desire to promote the common good. It presupposed a desire for 
the general well-being, not the well-being of some. Actualising the general well-
being required a set of distributive principles that take account of the 
circumstances and interest of each section of the country. Merit principle 
reflected the circumstances and interest of the Southern regions, while 
reservation of spots through quota addressed the circumstances and interest of 
the North. Combinations of both principles were reasonably fair. 
4. The creation of the Midwest region was the result of power struggle between the 
NPC and its NCNC. The means, the carving of the Midwest region out of the 
Western region was essentially to fragment the West, and thus increase the 
bargaining power of the coalition. In just the same manner, strategic 
consideration for power also prompted the creation of the twelve states that 
separated ethnic minority groups from the three major groups in 1967. The 
implication of both the 1963 and 1967 boundary adjustment exercises is that 
they were driven strictly by strategic consideration for power and military 
success, not by considerations for local self-determination and equal recognition 
on which the minorities’ right from the pre-independence era based their claims.  
Thus, despite the claim that the 1963 and 1967 exercises were to 
preserve the unity of Nigeria, the exercise could be inferred to have been used as 
pretence to meet normative claims. In the above context, therefore, the 
separation of the minorities’ strategies has not only failed to meet normative 
claims, but the exercises triggered an inevitable slippery slope and the 
unforeseen consequential problems. For instance, since recognition of groups in 
separate states during the 1963 and 1967 exercises, Nigeria’s internal boundaries 
has been adjusted and re-adjusted over and over again, and many more demands 
are being made. Even worse, the circumstances and speed with which states are 
being created are generating recurrence of ethno-political conflicts and 
institutional instabilities in the Nigerian federation. 
5. Demands for creation of more states were driven by elite and group competition 
for public wealth, and by the need for equal political accommodation of groups. 
Wealth was found to be a weak basis for political claims and that internal self-
determination granted on account of it would be endless demand for creation of 
new units. On the other hand, demands for equal accommodation were found to 
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have emanated from unequal distribution of states during the 1967 states 
creation exercise, and could be properly regarded as claims to redress injustice. 
Denying the claims on account of their economic viability had the advantage of 
avoiding the emergence of new and endless claims. But groups that felt cheated 
during the 1967 exercise would have been treated unfairly. 
6. Federal character policy was a reflection of the multi-ethnic make-up of the 
country and was informed by real historical experiences regarding the monopoly 
of power by elites of a few ethnic regions. It was aimed at ensuring balanced 
representation in public institutions through the combination of free competition 
and geo-ethnic appointments. One of the key assumptions behind the policy was 
that its electoral requirements would induce ethno-regional elites to reach across 
ethnic lines and build inclusive political parties which would in turn be induced 
by the same electoral requirements to reach across groups in order to win their 
support. The expectation was that the government that would finally emerge will 
be highly inclusive. This turned out not be very correct. The electoral 
requirements of the federal character succeeded in inducing the most efficient 
means of acquiring power.  
In addition to the above problem, political parties remained under the 
firm control of a few ethnic elites who recruited clients from other geo-ethnic 
areas in order to give their parties some legitimacy. Governments that emerged 
equally remained under their firm control and were less inclusive. 
7. One aspect of the revised federal character policy was the successive creation of 
more states and local government units to further accommodate groups. This 
was necessary for group equity but the problem was that the multiplication of 
units turned into an endless exercise that risked trivialising what it was meant to 
accomplish.  
8. The revised federal character policy failed attempt to do away with the 
indigeneity requirement for political appointment and recruitment. The 
requirement amounted to discriminating against citizens resident in states not of 
their biological descent and, in this respect, violated their right to equal 
treatment as citizens. But there were no better alternatives to the requirement. 
Reverting to unrestrained universal criteria for appointment and recruitment 
 235 
 
would have meant going back to the winner-takes-all system of political 
competition that resulted in civil war. Substituting residency for indigeneity 
requirement was not a better alternative either, for it would have made room for 
some groups to be dominated in their own states. But perhaps, the indigeneity 
clause in the federal character principle could be allowed to stay with 
amendment to include percentage on residency right.  
9. The revised Federal character also involved Constitutional agreements on 
competing claims to alternative political structure, power sharing arrangements, 
and revenue generating natural resource ownership. Claims to confederation and 
political break-up as alternative forms of structural arrangement were defensible 
on ground of denial of right to exercise political leadership to members of some 
geo-ethnic sections of the country, and example was when Moshood Abiola 
legitimately won in a free and fair election, but the election was annulled by the 
military junta from another section of the country. They were also defensible on 
ground of military campaigns against some ethnic minorities of the South-South 
demanding equitable share of wealth derived from their land. However, 
confederation or political break up posed frightful political and social costs. 
They were not alternatives that offered hope for peace and stability. Even though 
rotational Presidency has the danger of limiting the freedom of citizens to 
compete for the office in question, it nevertheless was found to make for groups 
equity in recruitment into the highest office in the land. 
10. Despite the basic changes in revenue allocation under various Nigeria 
governments, RAS remain politically skewed as it is alleged in favour of 
sections of the country. Clearly, the fundamental flaw of RAS is that, it is 
politically skewed against the oil producing states. This development has created 
anti-government campaigns in the oil producing Niger Delta. Thus, further 
worsening the already fragile unity among Nigerian federation. 
11. Oil being the mainstay of the Nigerian economy, the stakes and volatility in its 
ownership and control is high on all parties. Thus, the lessons to be learned in 
the manner in which politics is being played around it are: first, it was not fair 
for the federal government to abandon the derivation principle of revenue 
allocation. Second, the arbitrary factoring of 13% as baseline figure for 
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compensation to the oil producing states was not fair. Third, the lack of basic 
infrastructures in the oil producing states is indication of failure and 
developmental irresponsibility. It is therefore not surprising that the legitimacy 
of the government of the country. Finally, in an ideal federal set up, agitation for 
who is to own and control resources is not ideally the essence of ethnic groups, 
but that of the federal and state governments. Thus, allowing the ethnic groups 
in the Niger Delta to partake in the ownership and control of the oil resources 
instead of the political units or states would set precedents for others to follow, 
and this in so many ways would amount to chaos and institutional instability in 
Nigeria’s multi-ethnic society. 
12. Finally, while it is important not to down play the roles of the various state 
building strategies in the generation and recurrence of ethno-political conflicts 
and institutional stability in the country, two factors has further aided the already 
bad situation: the ascendancy of Military rule following the successful Northern-
sponsored counter-coup of 29 July 1966 which created the ample opportunity for 
the Military to rule for about thirty five years, i.e. to fashion the Nigerian state in 
their image. And the immediate post-civil war period which coincided with the 
era of petroleum boom that created a deepening crisis of corruption.  
The conclusion one can make out of the above findings is that, given the military 
command structure in place, and the early taste of the apparent over-abundance of petro-
dollars in the national treasury, it is not surprising that the Military visibly hung unto 
power until 1999, and have been operating from behind the scenes up till now. Most if 
not all of the state building strategies that are generating ethno-political tension and 
instabilities were executed during the Military era between 1966 and 1999. The 
consequence is that a combination of military power and abundance of petro-dollars has 
exposed the nature and extent of Nigerian political corruption.  
The above observation implies that the origins of Nigeria’s post-independence 
ethno-political conflict and institutional instabilities can be tracked to the central role 
played by the military in the control and management of the country’s oil wealth, and 
the tendency toward personal accumulation of oil wealth. The situation is so serious that 
all successive Military regimes and civilian administration have been pervaded by 
corruption. For instance, many of the Military officers who ruled the country are linked 
to leading businesses in the country, especially through its implementation of the 
 237 
 
Nigerian Enterprises Decrees of 1972 and 1977. It is for the above reason that only the 
retired Army officers and their civilian collaborators that corruptly enriched themselves 
are still the prominent politicians in the country. 
 
9.3 Recommendations and Conclusion 
State building and Constitutional politics in Nigeria’s multi-ethnic society is a difficult 
task. Overcoming ethno-political conflict and institutional instabilities perpetuated by 
the Nigerian Armed Forces that has built up over the years requires commitment and 
patriotism on the part of all the citizens. On the basis of the discussions and findings in 
this thesis, it is clear Nigeria has the potential to be a great country, but sadly, it has 
been engulfed in ethno-political and institutional chaos. The ethno-political 
conflict/tensions and institutional instabilities that were discussed in this thesis could be 
minimised and or eliminated by pursuing the following minimum political agenda:  
  
1. The post-independence group based claims and government responses to the 
claims, for instance, strategies such as state creation, Quota System etc. that are 
generating recurrence of ethno-political conflicts and institutional instabilities in 
the country today could have been resolved right from the pre-independence era 
through rounds of Constitutional Conferences on power sharing and institutional 
checks to domination that involved the representatives of both the majority and 
minority groups in the country. 
2. The ethno-political conflict/tensions being generated by the implementation of 
the quota approach to state building can be gradually mitigated if the Muslim 
North begins to take concrete measures that include among others, embarking on 
Nomadic education, and socio-cultural orientation. The socio-cultural 
orientation should be particularly targeted at demystifying the negative impact 
of Western education on Islamic beliefs among the Muslim youths. 
3. Even though separation of minorities and the continuing multiplication of the 
internal political units into states and local government areas in order to 
recognise smaller groups to some large extent meet normative claims, there is 
the need to stop this tendency to fragmentation. Therefore, the Nigerian 
government should respond to the problem of slippery slope by making a 
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Constitutional provision that place moratorium for the creation of states and 
local government units to at least twenty five years. 
4. The present arrangement that allows political power to be confined to and or 
dominated by a section of the country could be remedied by embracing the 
proportional representation inclusive of all relevant competing parties in the 
executive cabinet and or full implementation of power shift, for instance, 
rotation of the office of the President among six geo-political zones every five 
years. This would allow equal opportunity to all the geo-political zones in the 
country to exercise the right to rule. 
5. The indigeneity clause no doubt violates equal citizenship rights. However, in 
order to douse the ethno-political conflict/tensions in the country, the indigeneity 
clause could be amended to incorporate some elements of percentage on 
residency rights. This in essence entails making Constitutional provision for 
certain percentage right that allows non-indigenes to take appointment in states 
not of their biological descent.  
6. Of all the political structures advance by the various groups in the pre and post-
independence that were discussed in this thesis, the present federal arrangement 
is the best of the other alternatives. The federal structure of the country itself is 
not the problem, but underlying tensions in the Nigerian body politics such as 
electoral corruption and the continuing domination of the political scene. These 
fundamental and underlying issues can be mitigated by Constitutional reform of 
the Military and institutional reform of the relevant agencies. 
A balanced and desirable framework for revenue formula that combines principles such 
as derivation, need and population that would reduce ethno-political tensions should be 
incorporated into the Constitution. The current National Revenue Mobilisation and 
Fiscal Commission (NRMAFC) should be disbanded and replaced by a permanent and 
independent Commission.  
All the state building strategies play roles in the generation and recurrence of 
ethno-political and institutional instabilities in the country. However, given the 
environment and circumstances the country has been corruptly managed by the Military 
and their civilian collaborators, it becomes necessary to enforce Constitutional and 
institutional safeguards against military incursions in both government and politics. In 
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this respect, safeguards against military incursion in politics and corruption can be 
facilitated by pursing the following democratic measures:   
a) The institutionalisation of a multi-party political system in which parties must be 
genuinely mass-based, national in outlook and exclusively funded by its members’ 
financial contributions, which must be limited to what an ordinary working person can 
afford. This will safeguard the parties from being highjacked and turned into the 
political instruments of money bags against the people. 
b) The Constitutional entrenchment of the principle that the Nigerian people in their 
respective constituencies have the power to recall at any point in time any elected 
official who has been found by due process to abuse or betray the people’s mandate. 
c) The Constitutional requirement that only men and women with proven ability and 
integrity should be appointed to the governing boards of public institutions, 
corporations and businesses to ensure that the public resources and assets therein will be 
safeguarded and enhanced rather than looted and squandered by their official custodians 
as has hitherto been the case. 
d) Freedom of information as an entrenched legal norm to include (a) the requirement of 
open declaration of assets by all public officers, on entering and leaving office and 
irrespective of rank or status. Such asset declaration should be available for verification 
and monitoring by any interested citizen; (b) open and uninhibited access by interested 
citizens to all documents relating to, or dealing with any aspect of public policy. (This 
will mean, effectively, the death of all secrecy laws, behind which past and present 
governments have covered up all manner of crimes against the people). 
e) The Constitutional entrenchment of freedom of the press as the watchdog of the 
people’s interest, subject only to the limitations imposed by the laws of libel and 
defamation. 
f) The Constitutional entrenchment of the principle of independence of the judiciary and 
the independence of the appointment and tenure of judges from interference by political 
decision makers whose conducts might be subjects of adjudication by the courts.  
In conclusion, whilst the thesis acknowledges that earlier researches on 
Nigeria’s state building strategies, diversity and ethnicity were conducted strictly from 
empirical viewpoint, explicit attempts that generates awareness about the applicability 
of theory were underrated. This thesis is a response to this gap, and the above 
mentioned core findings are a reflection of the importance of recognising dynamics in 
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group claims and government responses to them through state building institutions and 
constitutions and/or decrees. The employment of theoretical alternative to discussing 
and understanding the research problems of this thesis is not a rejection of earlier 
empirical contributions, but differentiates it from the approach of earlier studies as it 
provides an alternative approach through which group claims and responses to them are 
discussed and analysed.
495
 Similarly, the use of content/textual analysis has in a useful 
way been able to provide understanding and discussion of the formulated research 
questions the thesis addressed. It is the hope of this author that the findings and 
recommendations contained herein will assist policy makers in their attempts aimed at 
resolving ethno-political crisis and institutional instabilities prevailing in the country, 
and also be a source of inspiration and reference for future research on related subject 
matter.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
495
 The significance of this research is discussed in chapter one, section 1.3 of this thesis. 
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                                                        APPENDICES 
 
Figure 1: Chronology of Major State Building/Constitutional Events, and Ethno-  
Political/Religious Violence 
 
Year                                               Events 
1950/1953 
 
 
 
 
1956 
1957 
 
1959 
1960 
- Political elites that represented Northern, Western and Eastern regions in 
series of London and Lagos Conferences negotiated a federal system of 
government for the country 
- Minority groups felt marginalised and agitated for representation and 
separation 
- Northern regions opposed motion for independence for fear of domination 
- Western and Eastern regions attained internal self-government amid 
clashes among regional leaders 
- Northern region reluctantly attained self-rule 
- October – Political independence from the United Kingdom amid 
pronounced cultural and political differences among its dominant groups 
(Hausa, Igbo and Yoruba).  
- Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa became head of a fragile NPC/NCNC 
coalition government. 
1962 
 
1962/1963 
- The NPC Federal controlled government introduced Quota System in the 
Nigerian Army 
- Controversial census fuels regional and ethnic tensions. 
1963 
 
 
 
 
1964 
 
1964/1965 
-Nigeria became a Federal Republic with Nnamdi Azikiwe as its first 
President. 
- Fear of Western regional domination, but under the guise of minorities 
agitation for separation, NPC/NCNC coalition government created 
Midwestern region in addition to Northern, Western and Eastern regions 
- Political tension between Obafemi Awolowo and Samuel Akintola 
sparked Western Nigeria regional violence code named operation wet ye 
- Regional fears of outwitting the other triggered Federal Election violence 
1966 - January - Fear of Northern hegemony contributed to first military coup 
headed by Major General Johnson T.U Aguiyi-Ironsi against the Northern-
dominated Federal Government.  
- Northern resentment led to second coup headed by Major General Yakubu 
Gowon heightening ethnic tensions. 
- July/October - Northern mobs kill thousands of Southerners, mostly Igbos 
in Kano, forcing hundreds of thousands to flee back to safety in the South. 
1967 
 
 
 
 
1969 
- Fears of emerging regional Armies made the Federal Government to 
abandon the Quota System of recruitment 
- May- Lieutenant Colonel Odumegwu Ojukwu declared the Eastern region 
as Republic of Biafra, sparking a brutal three-year civil war. 
- Yakubu Gowon reorganised Nigeria’s four regions into twelve states. 
- The 1969 Petroleum Acts vested ownership and control of petroleum 
resources to the Federal Government 
1970 
 
 
- After 30 months of civil war, Biafra surrendered and was re-integrated. 
- Yakubu Gowon introduced 3Rs- Reconciliation, Rehabilitation and 
reconstruction programme 
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1971 
 
1974 
1975 
 
1976 
- May - Yakubu Gowon nationalised the oil industry and established the 
Nigerian National Oil Company (NNOC) via a Decree 
- Federal Government participation in oil industry increased by 55% 
- Federal Government increased its stake in oil industry to 80% leaving 20% 
to states via Decree 6 
- Yakubu Gowon was overthrown. Brigadier Murtala Ramat Mohammed 
became Head of State.  
- Constitution Drafting Committee was set up to develop Executive 
Presidential Constitution with instruction to introduce Federal Character 
- Murtala Ramat Mohammed reorganised twelve  states into nineteen 
- Murtala Ramat Mohammed was assassinated in a bloody military coup.  
- Lieutenant General Olusegun Obasanjo became Head of State 
1978 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1979 
 
- Constituent Assembly endorsed the 1979 Draft Constitution. 
-  Olusegun Obasanjo lifted twelve year state of emergency opening the way 
for registration of political parties, preparatory for democratic elections 
- Federal Government enacted Land Use Act which declared all minerals, 
oil, natural gas, and natural resources within Nigeria boundary as property 
of the Federal Government  
- Government endorsed Executive Presidential System of Government, and 
enshrined the Federal Character into the 1979 Constitution.  
- October- After a keenly contested election, Lt. Gen. Obasanjo transferred 
power to the National Party of Nigeria (NPN) candidate Alhaji Aliyu 
Usman Shehu Shagari. 
1980 
 
 
 
 
1981 
- 18 December - Confrontation between Maitatsine (a fundamentalist 
Muslim group) and police at a rally in Dan Awaki Ward, Kano sparked 
massive, week-long rioting, left many hundreds dead and spread to other 
states. Despite leader’s death- Muhammadu Marwa in the initial riots, 
sporadic violence continued for several years in neighbouring states. 
- Alhaji Aliyu Usman Shehu Shagari announced austerity measures due to 
fall in petroleum prices in the world market 
1982 - 30 October - The Archbishop of Canterbury laid the foundation stone of 
Anglican church in Fegge, Kano, in Kano state triggered violent Kano 
Metropolitan riot. 
- Maitatsine uprising witnessed in Rigasa, Kaduna, Kaduna state, and 
Bulumkutu, Maiduguri Borno state 
1983  
 
1984 
 
 
 
1985 
- December - Shagari government (viewed as corrupt and incompetent) was 
overthrown in military coup by Muhammadu Buhari. 
- Major General Muhammadu Buhari launched the War Against 
Indiscipline (WAI)  
- Maitatsine uprising witnessed in Jimeta, Yola, Adamawa state, Bauchi and 
Gombe, Bauchi and Gombe state respectively. 
- January - Decree no. 36 fixed Revenue Allocation at 55% for the Federal 
Government, 32.5% for the states, and 10% for the Local Governments 
- 27 August - Buhari government was overthrown in military coup by Major 
General Ibrahim Badamosi Babangida. 
1986 - 27 June - Ibrahim Badamosi Babangida announced the Structural 
Adjustment Programme (SAP). 
- As palliatives to SAP, Ibrahim Badamosi Babangida announced 
MAMSER and NDE 
- Nationwide riots against SAP forced the Federal Government to enact 
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Decree 17, and eventually  proscribed NANS, ASUU and NLC 
- Ibrahim Badamosi Babangida announced 1990 as the official deadline for 
a return to democratic governance, a date he later changed to 1992 after 
surviving a bloody military coup. 
- Maitatsine  uprisings witnessed in Bauchi, Bauchi state 
- January/February - Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC) crisis 
- March – Christian procession march at Easter sparked Muslim/Christian  
riots in Ilorin, Kwara state 
- Babangida inaugurated the Political Bureau to recommend constitutional 
design and political reforms such as power shifts and political 
representation 
1987 - 4 March- Dispute between Muslim and Christian students of the College 
of Education in Kafanchan over a Christian sermon triggered religious 
violence at Kafanchan, Kaduna, Zaria and Funtua in Kaduna state 
- September - Ibrahim Badamosi Babangida reorganised nineteen states into 
twenty one (Akwa- Ibom and Katsina states) 
 1988  
 
 
 
 
1989 
-29 February - Federal Government banned the Nigerian Labour Congress 
(NLC) 
- March/April – Increase in fuel price demanded by the IMF inspired SAP 
sparked violent riot throughout University campuses 
- 14 June – Constituent Assembly convened in Abuja 
- 3 May - Ibrahim Badamosi Babangida created additional 149 Local 
Governments Areas 
- October/November – Nigeria was engulfed in Sharia (Islamic law) Debate 
- Ibrahim Badamosi Babangida lifted ban on partisan politics and 
announced new Constitution recommended by the Constituent Assembly 
- 7 October- Ibrahim Badamosi Babangida announced two state sponsored 
political parties- Social Democratic Party (SDP) and National Republican 
Convention (NRC). 
- Ibrahim Badamosi Babangida promulgated the Nigeria’s Third Republic 
Constitution. 
- Intra-religious fundamentalism triggered the Bayero University riot in 
Kano, Kano state between the Muslim Students Society (MSS) and 
Fellowship of Christian Students (FCS). 
1991 - October - Visit of German revivalist Reinhard Bonnke at the request of the 
Christian Association of Nigeria triggered rioting in Kano. 
- Ibrahim Badamosi Babangida increased the number of states to thirty 
- March – December - Religious fundamentalism and ethno-political rivalry 
between minority and majority groups ignited riots in Bauchi and Tafawa 
Balewa, Bauchi state; Katsina, Katsina state; Zangon-Kataf, Kaduna state; 
Kano, Kano state, and Jos, Plateau state. 
1993 - June- Ibrahim Badamosi Babangida annulled the Presidential election 
result that presumed a victory for SDP candidate Moshood Kashimawo 
Olawale Abiola, leading to 12 June, 1993 violence.  
- August – Ibrahim Badamosi Babangida handed over power to a civilian-
led Interim National Government (ING) under Ernest Shonekan 
- November – Three months later, General Sani Abacha seized power after 
Federal High Court declared the ING unconstitutional. 
1994 
 
- Sani Abacha convened the National Constitutional Conference (NCC), 
which gave preliminary endorsement to draft Constitution. 
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1995 
 
1996 
 
 
 
 
1998 
- A riotous situation  broke out in Kano following the killing of an Igbo man 
allegedly by Shiites Muslims 
- The final NCC report to Sani Abacha contained new Constitution and 
fixed the Revenue Allocation to oil producing states at 13%. 
- Sani Abacha increased the number of states in Nigeria by six. One each in 
the geo-political zones. This brought to a total of thirty six states in the 
federation. 
- Shiites attacks on orthodox Muslims, with some political undertone 
sparked intra-religious blood bath in Kano, Kano state. 
- The Military Government of Sani Abacha killed Ken Saro-Wiwa and nine 
other Ogoni/Niger Delta activists by hanging 
- June – Sani Abacha died in a mysterious and unexpected circumstance.  
- General Abdulsalam Abubakar took over as President, and announced 
transition to civilian administration to terminate by 29 May, 1999. 
- Government published the draft Constitution by NCC 
- July – Moshood Kashimawo Olawale Abiola, the man thought to be the 
winner of the 12 June, 1993 election died in government custody. 
- December- Arising from the Ijaw Youth Council (IYC) Kaiama 
Declaration, the Niger Delta areas witnessed violent protests and occupation 
of oil production facilities. 
1999 - Abdulsalam Abubakar declared the Fourth republic 
- February – In a controversial election, INEC declared the former military 
leader Olusegun Obasanjo as President, and this marked return to 
democracy on 29 May. 
- Mass protests erupted as twelve of the Northern states adopted Sharia 
(Islamic legal codes) 
- July – Southern states expressed anti- Sharia legal codes resulting in 
Shagamu, Ogun state ethnic tension 
- Federal Government launched the Operation Hakuri to counter Niger 
Delta violence and insurgencies 
- An anti-establishment and rejectionist group known as Boko Haram 
surfaced in Borno and Yobe states. Police silenced it. 
2000 - Opposition to Sharia legal codes triggered violent Christian-Muslim 
clashes, mainly in Kaduna and Kano states. 
2001 - April – Jos North Local government election results triggered violent 
clashes between the Native Biroms; Anaguta; Jarawa; Buji; Miango, and 
Rukuba and Hausa/Fulani settlers in Jos, Plateau state.  
- 7-11 September – The Al Qaeda attacks in the USA, and the erroneous 
spirit of identifying with Osama Bin Laden sparked violent clashes between 
Muslims and Christians in Jos, Plateau state after Friday Juma’at prayers. 
2002 - February – Sporadic clashes in Lagos between Hausas from mainly 
Islamic North and ethnic Yorubas from predominantly Christian South-
West. 
- November - Rioting, mainly in Kaduna, Kaduna state stoked by Muslim 
fury over the Miss World beauty pageant planned for December. The 
organisers relocated the event to the United Kingdom. 
- Ethno-Political rivalries between the natives and the Hausa/Fulani settlers 
in Jos sparked violent ethno/religious clashes 
2004 - May - Government declared state of emergency in the central Plateau state 
after Muslims were killed in Yelwa area of Jos in presumed attacks by 
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Christian militia. 
- Muslim youths in Kano, Kano state launched series of revenge attacks. 
- Clashes between a sect known as Nigerian Taliban presumably replacing 
the silences of Boko Haram and Police in Borno and Yobe states 
2006 - February - Muslim protest against Danish cartoons of the Prophet 
Mohammed ran out of control. Violence began in Maiduguri and  
retaliatory attacks in the Southern city of Onitsha, Anambra state. 
- MEND detonated bomb near Chinese Oil Refinery in the Niger Delta 
2007 - Tensions over Obasanjo’s attempts at manipulating the Constitution to 
allow him a third term 
- Umaru Musa Yar’Adua became President in an election condemned by the 
international community as massively flawed. 
2008 - MEND declared oil war in the Niger Delta  
- November- Massive clashes between Christians and Muslims in the town 
of Jos, Plateau state over disputed local government election. 
2009 - January - Violence between Christian and Muslim gangs in Jos, Plateau 
state. 
- March – Suspicion, fear and distrust triggered clashes between Muslims 
and Christians in Jos, Plateau state. 
- July- Maiduguri, Borno state, Boko Haram Islamist Movement re- 
launches anti-establishment campaign replacing Nigerian Taliban. Security 
forces stormed its stronghold and killed the movement’s leader- 
Mohammed Yusuf on 30 July. 
- August - Umaru Musa Yar’Adua announced the Niger Delta Amnesty. 
-  December- clashes between security forces and members of Boko Haram 
Islamic sect witnessed in the Northern city of Bauchi, Bauchi state. 
2010 - January - Recurring religious and ethno-political rivalry triggered violent 
clashes between Muslims and Christians in Jos. 
- March – Clashes between Muslims and Christians resurfaced in Jos. 
- 5 May - Yar’Adua died after prolonged illness and five-month absence 
that created Constitutional crisis.  
6 May - Vice President Goodluck Ebele Jonathan was sworn in as President 
to serve until the election scheduled in April 2011. 
- September - Boko Haram freed over 700 prisoners, including 150 of its 
members in dramatic prison break in Bauchi, Bauchi state. 
- October - Series of Boko Haram assassinations witnessed in Maiduguri, 
Borno state 
2011 - Boko Haram assassination and bombing of government establishments 
spread from North-East to North-Central/North-West zones, Kano, Kaduna 
and Niger states 
- Ethnic hatred and religious arrogance deepened the recurring Jos 
ethnic/religious crisis. 
- April- In a keenly contested election with Muhammadu Buhari of 
Congress for Progressive Change (CPC), INEC announced Goodluck Ebele 
Jonathan, a Southerner and the PDP candidate as the elected President.  
- Northern Nigeria witnessed violent post-Presidential election crisis  
13 December – President Goodluck Ebele Jonathan presented the proposed 
2012 budget of N4.74 Trillion to the joint session of the National Assembly 
with security taking lion share- N921.91 billion.  
- 25 December - Boko Haram detonated massive bomb at Roman Catholic 
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Church Madalla near Abuja 
2012 - January - Massive Boko Haram bombings targeted government 
establishments in Niger, Kano, Bauchi and Kaduna states. 
- January - Boko Haram attacks spreads to lower North-Central zone when 
it freed prisoners in a dramatic prison break in Kotonkarfe, and attacked 
Police Headquarters in Lokoja Kogi state. 
- Removal of Oil subsidy by the PDP government of Goodluck Ebele 
Jonathan triggered Nationwide strike organised by labour and civil society 
organisations.  
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April - Parliamentary probe into fuel subsidy headed by Lawan Farouk 
submitted its report.  Subsidy graft cost the country $6.8 billion. Prosecution 
of individuals and organisations indicted urged. 
- 29
 
April, 2 University Professors and 18 students were killed in a Boko 
Haram suspected bomb attacks at the St. Stephen Catholic Church, Bayero 
University, Kano, Kano state. 
Source: Adapted from International Crisis Group, Northern Nigeria: Background to Conflict, Africa 
Report No. 168 (Brussels: International Crisis Group, 20 December 2010), 31, and Rotimi T. Suberu, 
Federalism and Ethnic Conflict in Nigeria (Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 
2001), xxiv-xxvi. 
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Figure 2: The Structure of Nigerian Federation Before 1963. 
 
Regions Territory 
(Sq. Km) 
Percentage of 
Nigeria 
Territory 
(%) 
Population 
(No.) 
Percentage of 
Nigeria 
Population 
% 
Northern 
Region 
79, 815 75.49 16,845, 376 54.02 
 
Eastern Region 119, 308 12.34 7, 974, 399 25.58 
Western 
Region 
117, 524 12.16 6, 087, 414 19.52 
Lagos Colony 70 0.01 272, 304 0.87 
Total 966, 717 100.00 31, 179, 492 100.00 
Source: Adapted from Omolade Adejuyigbe, ‘Creation of States in 1967 and 1976’, in Peter P. Ekeh; 
Patrick Cole and Gabriel Olusanya, (eds.); Nigeria Since independence: The First Twenty Five Years, 
(Vol. V: Politics and Constitution) (Ibadan: Heinemann Books, 1986), 207. 
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Figure 3: Highlights of Legislative Jurisdictional Powers in the 1999 Constitution 
as Amended in 2011  
 
Type of Power                             Legislative Jurisdictional Power 
Exclusive List Defense (Army, navy and Air force) an any other branch of the 
armed forces 
Foreign Affairs, diplomatic, consular and trade representation 
Creation of states and boundary adjustment 
International trade, customs and excise duties  
Currency and coinage, banking, borrowing, exchange control 
Use of water resources, fishing and fisheries 
Maritime shipping, navigation  and federal trunk roads 
Formation and regulation of political parties, including elections 
Aviation, Railways, postal service (post, telegraph and telephones ) 
Police, prisons and other security services 
Regulation of labour, interstate commerce, telecommunications 
Immigration, emigration, citizenship, naturalisation and alien, 
passports and visas 
Mines and minerals, including oil fields, nuclear energy, meteorology 
Social security, insurance, national statistical system (Census births, 
deaths, etc. 
Guidelines and basis for minimum education) 
Registration of business names, price control, standards and 
inspections 
Any matter with respect to which the national Assembly has power to 
make laws 
Any matter incidental or supplementary to any matter mentioned 
elsewhere in the list 
Concurrent List Culture, health, safety and social welfare 
Education (post primary/technology/professional ) 
Antiquities, monuments, and archives 
Statistics, stamps duties, collection of taxes 
Regulation of commerce and industry 
Electricity (generation, transmission, distribution) 
Regulate, coordinate scientific and technological research 
Cinematography, Trigonometrical, cadastral and topographical 
surveys 
Residual List Any subject neither assigned to federal, state and local government 
Local 
Government 
Economic planning and development 
Health, Social welfare, and Marriages 
Land use, development of agriculture and natural resources 
Control and regulation of advertisements, pets, small businesses 
Markets, public conveniences, sewage and refuse disposal, 
Registration of births and deaths 
Primary, adult and vocational education 
Local government and chieftaincy affairs 
Source: Federal Republic of Nigeria, Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (Amended) (Abuja: 
National Assembly Press, 2011), Second Schedule (Legislative), Part I and II. 
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Figure 4: Highlights of the Supreme Court Ruling on the On-shore/Off-shore Oil  
   Revenue Distribution (Suit No. SC 28/2001) 
  
This suit arose out of the Federal Government’s dichotomisation of oil revenue 
between on-shore and off-shore sources. Its position was that, the principle of 
derivation was applicable only to oil extracted from on-shore deposits; off-shore oil 
extracted from the deep sea in the country is commonwealth, accruing jointly to the 
federation. Some oil producing states countered by challenging certain practices of the 
Federal Government relating to federation revenues. The major substance of the 
Supreme Court ruling are as follows: 
 That oil mined in the deep sea belongs to the federation as a whole, and not to 
the nearest state, and as such, is not subject to 13% derivation 
 That only on-shore mineral resources was subject to the 13% derivation 
payment to states 
 That natural gas is a mineral resource and, where produced on-shore , is subject 
to 13% derivation (the practice of the federation had been to exclude the natural 
gas from its definition of mineral resources) 
 That all revenues accruing jointly to the federation, including unexpected extra 
earnings from oil, are subject to distribution in the usual manner, the federal 
government having no power to “save” any part of it without the consent of the 
constituent governments. 
 That payment of the 13% derivation should be with effect from 29 May, 1999 
when the Constitution came into effect and not from January, 2000 as effected 
by the federal government. 
 That the practice of making first line charges on the Federation Account for 
priority projects and debt service is unconstitutional and should be ended 
 That the Federal Capital Territory (FCT) is not a state, and its area councils are 
not properly local governments, and so cannot benefit from direct allocation of 
resources from the Federation Account as had been the case before the ruling. 
Source: Adapted from The World Bank, Nigeria: State Finances Study, Report No. 25710-UNI 
(Washington DC: The World Bank, 2003), 42. 
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                Appendix A: Map of Nigeria Showing Major Cities and Towns 
 
 
 
Source: Adopted from International Crisis Group, Northern Nigeria: Background to Conflict, Africa 
Report No. 168 (Brussels: International Crisis Group, 20 December, 2010), 28.  
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            Appendix B: Map of Nigeria Showing the Administrative Borders 
 
 
 
Source: Adopted from International Crisis Group, Northern Nigeria: Background to Conflict, Africa 
Report No. 168 (Brussels: International Crisis Group, 20 December, 2010), 29. 
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Appendix C: Map of Nigeria Showing the Six Geo-Political Zones  
 
 
 
Source: Adopted from www.biomed.com [accessed 23 February 2012]. 
 
1. North-West Zone: Sokoto, Katsina, Jigawa, Kano, Kaduna, Kebbi, Zamfara. 
2. North-East Zone: Borno, Yobe, Bauchi, Gombe, Adamawa. 
3. North-Central Zone: Niger, FCT, Kwara, Kogi, Benue, Plateau, Taraba. 
4. South-West Zone: Oyo, Ogun, Ondo, Lagos, Osun, Ekiti. 
5. South-East Zone: Enugu, Anambra, Ebonyi, Imo, Abia. 
6. South-South Zone: Edo, Delta, Bayelsa, Rivers, Cross Rivers, Akwa Ibom. 
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              Appendix D: Map of Nigeria Showing Ethno-Linguistic Group 
 
 
 
Source: Adopted from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/file:Nigeria_linguistic_1979.jpg 
[accessed 23 February 2012]. 
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Appendix E: Map of Nigeria Numerically Showing Niger Delta Region 
 
 
 
Source: Adopted from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Niger_Delta [accessed 23 February 2012]. 
 
1. Abia State 
2. Akwa Ibom State 
3. Bayelsa State 
4. Cross River State  
5. Delta State 
6. Edo State 
7. Imo State 
8. Ondo State 
9. Rivers State 
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